Wittgenstein

1. Wittgenstein's Core Quest: Solving Philosophy by Understanding Language

The main point [of the Tractatus] is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions – i.e. by language – (and, which comes to the same thing, what can be thought), and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.

Philosophical aim. Ludwig Wittgenstein believed that the fundamental problems of philosophy—concerning existence, knowledge, truth, and value—arise from a misunderstanding of how language works. His lifelong project was to clarify "the logic of our language" to resolve these deep-seated conceptual puzzles. He argued that once we properly grasp language's true nature, traditional philosophical dilemmas would be revealed as spurious and simply vanish.

Language as lens. For Wittgenstein, language is not merely a tool for communication but the very lens through which we perceive and structure reality. Therefore, an investigation into language is simultaneously an investigation into the limits of thought itself. He posited that what can be clearly said is synonymous with what can be clearly thought, and anything beyond these linguistic boundaries risks becoming nonsensical.

Unveiling structure. Both his early and later philosophies, despite their stark differences, shared this foundational conviction. The shift in his thought lay not in the goal, but in his evolving understanding of what "the logic of language" truly entailed. Initially, he sought a singular, underlying logical structure; later, he embraced a multiplicity of linguistic practices.

2. The Early Vision: Language as a Logical Picture of the World

A proposition is a picture of reality.

Parallel structures. In his first major work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein proposed that language and the world possess parallel, hierarchical structures. The world is a totality of facts, composed of states of affairs, which are combinations of simple, unanalysable objects. Correspondingly, language is a totality of propositions, built from elementary propositions, which are combinations of simple names.

The picture theory. The crucial link between language and the world is the "picture theory of meaning." Propositions, as expressions of thoughts, are logical pictures of facts. They depict reality by sharing a common logical form with the states of affairs they represent. Just as a model of a car accident uses toy cars to mirror the real-world arrangement, a proposition's names are arranged to logically mirror the objects in a state of affairs.

Truth-functionality. The truth or falsity of complex propositions depends entirely on the truth-values of their constituent elementary propositions, a concept known as truth-functionality. This means that propositions are either true or false, with no ambiguity, based on whether they accurately picture existing or non-existing states of affairs. This rigorous, formal system aimed to lay bare the precise connection between language and reality.

3. The Unsayable: Ethics, Aesthetics, and the Limits of Factual Discourse

There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.

Factual discourse only. A profound consequence of the Tractatus's picture theory is that only propositions that can picture facts about the world are meaningful. This restricts significant discourse to the realm of natural science. Anything that falls outside the domain of facts—such as ethics, aesthetics, religion, or the "problems of life"—cannot be meaningfully said.

Showing, not saying. Wittgenstein argued that these deeply important matters are not nonsensical in themselves, but attempts to articulate them in language inevitably lead to nonsense because there is nothing for such propositions to picture. Instead, these transcendent aspects of human experience "show themselves" or "make themselves manifest." He referred to this as "what is mystical."

Protecting value. This stance was not a dismissal of value but an attempt to protect it from scientific reductionism. Ethical and religious truths, he believed, are not contingent facts about the world but concern the world as a whole, affecting how it appears to the moral agent. They are delimited "from within" by his book, by its very silence on them, highlighting their profound, ineffable significance.

4. A Philosophical Reckoning: Rejecting the Tractatus's Oversimplification

[Recently] I had occasion to re-read my first book … It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish these old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again … I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book.

Self-critique. Wittgenstein himself became the Tractatus's most incisive critic, recognizing "grave mistakes" that prompted a radical shift in his philosophical approach. He found his early work to be a vast oversimplification, imposing a rigid, unitary model on the rich and diverse landscape of human language. The elegant symmetry of the Tractatus came at the cost of distorting reality.

Beyond statements. The Tractatus assumed language was primarily used for making factual statements, neglecting a multitude of other linguistic activities. It failed to account for:

• Questioning
• Commanding
• Exhorting
• Promising
• Joking
  This narrow focus rendered large areas of language "senseless" by its own criteria, a conclusion Wittgenstein later found unacceptable.

Flawed foundations. Furthermore, the Tractatus's denotative theory of meaning—that a word's meaning is the object it denotes—was fundamentally flawed. Wittgenstein later argued that ostensive definition (pointing to an object to name it) cannot be the basis of language learning, as it presupposes a prior understanding of the "language-game" of naming itself. This realization dismantled the very foundation of his early picture theory.

5. The Later Turn: Meaning as "Use" in Diverse Language-Games

The meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Multiplicity of language. In his later philosophy, particularly the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein abandoned the search for a single, underlying essence of language. Instead, he argued that language is a "multiplicity of language-games"—a vast collection of different activities, each with its own "logic" or "grammar." These activities are connected not by a common essence, but by "family resemblances," like the overlapping similarities among family members.

Meaning as function. The central tenet of his later theory is that the meaning of an expression is its use in these various language-games. This moves away from the idea of words standing for objects and towards understanding how words function within specific contexts and practices. He used terms like "functions," "aims," "purposes," "offices," and "roles" interchangeably with "use" to capture this broad, practical sense.

Language-games as activities. The term "language-game" emphasizes that speaking a language is an integral part of an activity, or a "form of life." It highlights that language is not an abstract system but is interwoven with human actions, behaviors, and social interactions. To understand a word is to know how to employ it correctly within these diverse linguistic practices.

6. Understanding as Practice: Rule-Following and Community Agreement

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.

Understanding as ability. Wittgenstein redefined understanding not as a hidden mental process or an inner experience, but as a practical ability—a "mastery of a technique." This technique involves knowing how to use expressions correctly, which in turn means knowing how to follow the rules governing their use within various language-games.

Public rules. Rule-following, for Wittgenstein, is not a private, internal act but an essentially public and social practice. Rules are constituted by the customs, agreements, and training within a linguistic community. The "guiding" function of a rule, like a signpost, derives from an established custom of how such signs are interpreted and acted upon by the community.

No private rules. This communal basis implies that there can be no "private" observance of a rule. An individual cannot know if they are truly following a rule without public criteria for correctness, which are provided by the shared practices of a community. Therefore, "thinking one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule" if there's no external check.

7. Language's Bedrock: Our Shared "Forms of Life"

"So are you saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not an agreement in opinions but in form of life.

Foundational consensus. The concept of "forms of life" is central to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, serving as the ultimate bedrock for meaning, understanding, and justification. A form of life represents the shared, underlying consensus of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviors, assumptions, and natural propensities that humans, as social beings, collectively share.

Language embedded. Language is deeply woven into this pattern of human activity and character, deriving its content and significance from the shared outlook and nature of its users. When philosophical inquiry seeks ultimate explanations or justifications for our concepts, it eventually reaches this "bedrock" of a form of life, beyond which no further explanation is needed or possible.

Agreement in action. This "agreement in form of life" is not an agreement in opinions, but a fundamental concordance of natural and linguistic responses that underpins our definitions, judgments, and behaviors. It is the framework we learn to operate within when acquiring our language, and it is "what has to be accepted, the given."

8. The Public Nature of Mind: No Logically Private Language

In what sense are my sensations private? – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is false, and in another way nonsense. If we are using the word ‘to know’ as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.

Challenging privacy. Wittgenstein directly challenged the Cartesian tradition that posits private, inner mental states as the foundation of knowledge and self-awareness. He argued against the possibility of a "logically private language"—one intelligible only to a single individual—because language is inherently public and rule-governed.

Expression, not report. For Wittgenstein, first-person psychological statements like "I am in pain" are not reports or descriptions of private inner occurrences. Instead, they are expressions of pain, learned substitutes for more primitive, natural behaviors like groaning or wincing. A child learns "pain-behaviour" that includes verbal expressions, linking the word to public manifestations.

Public criteria. This view implies that there are public criteria for the application of psychological terms, whether referring to oneself or others. Our understanding of pain-talk, for instance, encompasses both the natural behavioral signs and the possibility of pretense. This eliminates the traditional "problem of other minds," as our grounds for ascribing pain to others are rooted in publicly observable behavior and shared linguistic practices.

9. Re-evaluating Knowledge: Doubt Requires a Framework of Certainty

Can one say: "Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either?"

Doubt's context. Wittgenstein argued that the concept of "knowledge" is often misused in philosophy, particularly when applied to fundamental beliefs. He contended that one can only genuinely know what it makes sense to doubt. Since, in ordinary circumstances, it is senseless to doubt basic facts—like having hands or the world's long existence—claiming to "know" them is a misuse of the word.

Framework of certainty. Legitimate doubt, he explained, can only operate within a framework of propositions that are themselves exempt from doubt. These "grammatical" propositions, such as "physical objects exist," form the "scaffolding" or "hinges" of our language-games and practices. They are not empirical claims to be tested, but rather the unquestioned background against which all testing and inquiry take place.

Action as bedrock. Our commitment to these foundational beliefs is not a matter of intellectual assent but of practical action and our shared human nature. "My life consists in my being content to accept many things," he stated. This means that the ultimate justification for our practices and beliefs ends in our actions, which lie at the bottom of the language-game, forming a relatively stable, though not immutable, "bed and banks" for our thought.

10. Philosophy as Therapy: Dissolving Problems, Not Building Theories

The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.

Beyond theory. Wittgenstein's later philosophy explicitly rejected the systematic theory-building approach of his Tractatus. He viewed philosophy not as a discipline that constructs doctrines or offers explanations, but as a therapeutic activity aimed at dissolving philosophical problems. These problems, he believed, arise from linguistic confusions—when "language goes on holiday" or is "like an engine idling."

Clarification, not discovery. The task of philosophy is to "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" by clarifying the actual workings of our language. This involves looking at "depth grammar" rather than being misled by "surface grammar." The goal is not to discover new information, but to rearrange and properly understand what we already know about our language and thought, making everything "lie open to view."

No hidden essence. He insisted that there is no hidden "essence" of language or thought to be unearthed through deep analysis. Instead, philosophy "simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything." By making the diverse uses of language transparent, philosophical perplexities are meant to vanish, much like symptoms disappearing after successful therapy.

11. Wittgenstein's Complex Legacy: Profound Thinker, Limited Mainstream Influence

What is most important, for present purposes, is the continuing response given to Wittgenstein’s thought by the philosophical community at large. Here matters are straightforward. There is, as noted above, no question of there being general or even widespread agreement with Wittgenstein’s fundamental claims.

High praise, mixed impact. Despite being hailed by many as the twentieth century's greatest philosopher, Wittgenstein's actual influence on mainstream philosophy has been more limited and diffuse than his reputation suggests. Most contemporary analytic philosophers do not accept his core diagnosis that all philosophical problems stem from linguistic misunderstanding, and they continue to engage in systematic investigations that his work largely proscribes.

A distinct school. While a dedicated "Wittgensteinian school" emerged from his disciples, his impact on broader philosophical trends, such as "Ordinary Language Philosophy," was indirect. His ideas on "meaning as use" and the public nature of psychological concepts have entered general philosophical currency, but often with caution due to the inherent vagueness and interpretative difficulties of his later concepts like "criteria" and "forms of life."

Enduring questions. The enduring challenge for Wittgenstein's legacy lies in the fact that his therapeutic method, which aims to dissolve problems by reminding us of ordinary language use, often fails to satisfy deep philosophical perplexities about concepts like truth, goodness, or reality. His apparent commitment to relativism, stemming from the "forms of life" concept, also raises significant questions that many philosophers find unacceptable.

Last updated: February 10, 2026