Treacherous Alliance

1. Geopolitics, Not Ideology, Drove Israel-Iran Relations

I argue that the major transformations of Israeli-Iranian relations are results of geopolitical—rather than ideological—shifts and that a negotiated resolution of their strategic rivalry will significantly facilitate the resolution of other regional problems rather than the other way around.

Core argument. The book posits that the complex and often contradictory relationship between Israel and Iran has been primarily shaped by shifting geopolitical forces, not by deep-seated ideological antagonism. While ideology and rhetoric play a role, they often serve as justifications or tools for underlying strategic interests. This perspective challenges conventional analyses that attribute the current enmity solely to ideological clashes.

Strategic calculus. Both nations, despite their cultural differences and religious identities, have consistently prioritized their national security and regional influence. Their alliances and enmities have historically adapted to the prevailing balance of power in the Middle East, rather than being dictated by immutable ideological principles. This pragmatic approach allowed for periods of close cooperation, even between a secular monarchy and the Jewish state, and later, between the revolutionary Islamic Republic and Israel.

Impact on U.S. The failure to recognize this geopolitical dynamic has led U.S. policymakers to misunderstand the true nature of the rivalry, often ignoring its profound impact on American national interests. The book argues that resolving this strategic competition is crucial for broader regional stability, suggesting that focusing solely on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the "key to peace" overlooks a more fundamental regional power struggle.

2. The Periphery Doctrine: Israel's Alliance of Necessity with the Shah

The doctrine held that the improbability of achieving peace with the surrounding Arab states forced Israel to build alliances with the non-Arab states of the periphery—primarily Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia—as well as with non-Arab minorities such as the Kurds and the Lebanese Christians.

Strategic isolation. At its inception, Israel was surrounded by hostile Arab states, making direct peace seem impossible. To counter this isolation, David Ben-Gurion formulated the "Periphery Doctrine," seeking alliances with non-Arab nations on the fringes of the Arab world. This strategy aimed to weaken the Arab bloc and prevent the spread of pan-Arabism.

Iran's role. Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah became a cornerstone of this doctrine. Sharing fears of Soviet expansionism and radical Arab nationalism (especially Nasser's Egypt), Iran and Israel developed extensive, albeit secret, cooperation. This included:

• Financing and construction of the Eilat-Ashkelon oil pipeline, bypassing the Suez Canal.
• Intelligence sharing and military training.
• Iranian oil supplies to Israel.
• Israeli technological expertise for Iran's economic development.

Mutual benefit. This alliance was one of necessity, driven by shared threats and complementary needs. Iran benefited from Israel's influence in Washington and its technology, while Israel gained a crucial non-Arab ally, oil supplies, and a counterweight to its Arab adversaries. The Shah, however, always maintained a public distance to avoid Arab wrath.

3. The Shah's Strategic Balancing Act and "Betrayal" of Israel

In its balancing game, Iran did not want Israel to be weak, but neither did it want Israel to be too strong.

Shifting dynamics. The 1967 Six-Day War significantly altered the regional balance, transforming Israel from an embattled state into a dominant military power. This shift prompted the Shah to re-evaluate Iran's relationship with Israel, as an overly strong Israel could complicate Iran's own aspirations for regional preeminence and alienate its Arab neighbors.

Arab rapprochement. As Egypt under Anwar Sadat began to pivot away from the Soviet Union and moderate its foreign policy, an opportunity arose for Iran to mend fences with the Arab world. The Shah, seeking Arab acceptance for Iran's growing power, started taking more visible steps towards Arab nations, including:

• Freezing joint Iranian-Israeli projects.
• Adopting a tougher public stance against Israel's occupation of Arab territories.
• Providing financial aid to Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

Algiers Accord. The ultimate "betrayal" from Israel's perspective came with the 1975 Algiers Accord between Iran and Iraq. Without consulting Israel, the Shah ended support for the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion, a key lever against Baghdad, in exchange for a favorable border agreement. This move, while a diplomatic triumph for Iran, severely damaged Israel's trust and left the Kurds vulnerable, ultimately strengthening Saddam Hussein.

4. Revolutionary Iran's Geopolitical Continuity Amidst Ideological Shifts

Though the methods and justifications of the Pahlavi and Khomeini regimes differed considerably, their strategic goals were remarkably similar—regional leadership and primacy.

Revolutionary ambition. The 1979 Islamic Revolution replaced the Shah's pro-Western monarchy with a theocratic regime, ushering in a new era of anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric. Despite this profound ideological shift, the core strategic goal of Iranian foreign policy remained remarkably consistent: achieving regional leadership and primacy, albeit through different means.

Political Islam as tool. While the Shah sought legitimacy through alliances with the West and moderate Arab states, Khomeini's government aimed to lead the entire Islamic world by exporting its brand of political Islam. Anti-Israel rhetoric became a powerful tool to:

• Challenge the existing regional order.
• Bridge the Arab-Persian divide by appealing to the "Arab street."
• Undermine pro-Western Arab governments.

Pragmatism prevailed. Despite the revolutionary zeal, geopolitical realities often forced Tehran to prioritize national interest over ideology. During the devastating Iran-Iraq War, Iran secretly purchased arms from Israel, demonstrating a pragmatic willingness to set aside ideological differences for survival. This duality of harsh rhetoric and pragmatic action became a hallmark of Iran's foreign policy.

5. Iran-Contra: Israel's Desperate Bid to Preserve the Periphery Doctrine

From the Israeli perspective, this was a long-term and strategic plan; it was the peripheral policy.

Strategic imperative. Despite the Islamic Revolution and Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric, Israel continued to view Iran as a crucial strategic partner, especially during the Iran-Iraq War. The periphery doctrine remained deeply ingrained in Israeli thinking, seeing Iran as a necessary counterweight to the growing threat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. An Iraqi victory was considered a far greater danger to Israel than a revolutionary Iran.

Arms for influence. Israel initiated the Iran-Contra affair, secretly selling arms to Iran in exchange for Iranian influence in securing the release of American hostages in Lebanon. This complex scheme aimed to:

• Prevent an Iraqi victory and maintain a "strategic breather" for Israel.
• Strengthen "moderate" elements within the Iranian regime, hoping for a post-Khomeini rapprochement.
• Reinvigorate the U.S.-Israel alliance by demonstrating Israel's unique ability to engage with Iran.

Misguided optimism. Israeli leaders like Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin believed that Iran's anti-Israel stance was temporary and that geopolitical interests would eventually lead to a renewed alliance. They underestimated Iran's long-term commitment to its revolutionary ideology and its strategic use of anti-Israel rhetoric to gain legitimacy in the Arab world, while only seeking to use Israel as a conduit to Washington.

6. Post-Cold War: Iran Emerges as Israel's Primary Strategic Rival

The sudden shift in Labor's view of Iran “stemmed from the fact that [Tehran] could aspire to [the] regional hegemony to which Israel aspires.”

New world order. The end of the Cold War and Iraq's decisive defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War fundamentally reshaped the Middle East. With the Soviet threat gone and Iraq neutralized, Israel's traditional security assumptions were upended. Iran, no longer checked by Iraq, began to be perceived as a rising power capable of challenging Israel's regional preeminence.

"New Middle East" vision. Israel's Labor government, led by Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, sought to capitalize on this new environment by pursuing peace with Arab neighbors and redefining Israel's strategic role. Peres envisioned a "New Middle East" where Israel would be the economic engine, marginalizing the Persian Gulf and Iran. This vision inherently put Israel and Iran on a collision course for regional influence.

Campaign against Iran. To justify this strategic pivot and secure continued U.S. support, Israel launched an aggressive campaign to portray Iran as the new existential threat. Rabin and Peres accused Iran of:

• Seeking nuclear weapons by 1999 (a claim later proven premature).
• Harboring "megalomaniac tendencies" and aiming for regional dominance.
• Exporting "Khomeinism without Khomeini" as a new ideological threat to the West.
  This campaign aimed to shift international focus from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the perceived Iranian menace.

7. Oslo Accords and Dual Containment: Fueling the Israel-Iran Cold War

If Oslo was successful, and the Arabs rushed to make peace with Israel, Iran would be left in a state of prolonged isolation, Rafsanjani feared.

Peace as threat. The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, represented a historic breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations. For Iran, however, this peace initiative, coupled with Israel's campaign to isolate Tehran, was perceived as a direct threat to its regional standing. Iran feared that a successful peace process would lead to its prolonged isolation and the establishment of an Israel-centric regional order.

Dual Containment. The Clinton administration, influenced by Israeli lobbying, adopted the "Dual Containment" policy in 1993, aiming to simultaneously contain both Iraq and Iran. This policy, while intended to reassure Israel during the peace process, inadvertently gave Iran a strong incentive to sabotage the fragile Israeli-Palestinian talks. Iran's exclusion from the new regional architecture pushed it towards a more confrontational stance.

Iran's response. In response to Oslo and Dual Containment, Iran intensified its anti-Israel rhetoric and, for the first time, translated this rhetoric into operational policy. Tehran began actively supporting Palestinian rejectionist groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas, and Lebanese Hezbollah, to undermine the peace process. This marked a shift from a "cold peace" to a "cold war" between Israel and Iran, with terror attacks against Israeli interests becoming a new dimension of the rivalry.

8. Khatami's Détente: Iran's Outreach and Missed U.S. Opportunities

The American civilization is worthy of respect. When we appreciate the roots of this civilization, its significance becomes even more apparent.

Reformist surge. The election of Mohammad Khatami as Iranian president in 1997 signaled a new era of reform and détente in Iran's foreign policy. Khatami sought to improve relations with the Arab world, Europe, and even the United States, aiming to break Iran's international isolation and rebuild its economy. His outreach included:

• Reassuring Arab neighbors of Iran's peaceful intentions.
• Resolving the Salman Rushdie fatwa with Britain.
• Expressing regret for the 1979 embassy takeover and calling for dialogue with the American people.

U.S. infatuation. The Clinton administration, particularly Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, responded positively to Khatami's overtures, issuing an indirect apology for past U.S. actions and proposing a roadmap for rapprochement. However, the existing economic sanctions (ILSA), largely driven by Israeli lobbying, remained a significant barrier.

Israeli skepticism. Israel, despite Netanyahu's brief attempt at rapprochement, remained deeply skeptical of Khatami's intentions. Fearing that a U.S.-Iran dialogue would come at Israel's expense, Tel Aviv and its allies in Washington actively worked to prevent a breakthrough. This persistent opposition, coupled with Iran's own internal divisions and overconfidence, ultimately led to missed opportunities for a U.S.-Iran rapprochement.

9. 9/11 and the "Axis of Evil": Undermining U.S.-Iran Cooperation

States like these [Iran, Iraq, and North Korea], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil.

Unlikely allies. The 9/11 terrorist attacks dramatically shifted U.S. foreign policy, leading to the war in Afghanistan. Iran, a bitter enemy of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, became an indispensable, albeit unofficial, ally to the U.S. in Afghanistan. Tehran provided crucial intelligence, offered airbases, and played a pivotal role in establishing the post-Taliban Afghan government at the Bonn Conference.

Israeli alarm. This U.S.-Iran cooperation deeply alarmed Israel, which feared that Washington would prioritize its strategic interests with Iran over its commitments to Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon publicly criticized Bush, comparing him to Neville Chamberlain, for potentially "selling out" Israel. This pressure, combined with neoconservative influence in the Bush administration, aimed to halt any U.S.-Iran rapprochement.

"Axis of Evil." The interception of the Karine A ship in January 2002, allegedly carrying Iranian arms to the Palestinian Authority, provided the pretext needed by hardliners in Washington and Tel Aviv. Despite Iranian denials and requests for evidence, the incident directly contributed to President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech, lumping Iran with Iraq and North Korea. This speech, delivered just weeks after Iran's crucial assistance in Afghanistan, effectively closed the promising Geneva Channel and solidified Iran's isolation.

10. The Iraq War: An Unintended Boost to Iran's Regional Power

Iraq couldn't have turned out better for us.

Strategic dilemma. As the Bush administration prepared to invade Iraq, Iran faced a complex strategic dilemma. While Saddam Hussein remained a hostile neighbor, his weakened state was preferable to a potentially pro-Western, U.S.-backed government in Iraq that would complete Iran's encirclement. Despite opposing the war, Iran ultimately offered moderate support to the U.S. effort, fearing the chaos of a disintegrating Iraq.

Missed grand bargain. In May 2003, just weeks after the fall of Baghdad, Iran, feeling vulnerable, offered a comprehensive "grand bargain" to the U.S. This unprecedented proposal included concessions on its nuclear program, support for Hamas and Hezbollah disarmament, and even indirect recognition of Israel. However, the Bush administration, confident in its post-Iraq power and influenced by neoconservative hardliners, dismissed the offer, believing Iran's weakness meant America could dictate terms.

Unintended consequences. The U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, far from weakening Iran, inadvertently removed its primary regional rival and boosted Tehran's influence. Iran's ties to Iraqi Shia militias and Kurdish factions gave it significant leverage in post-Saddam Iraq. This outcome, coupled with Washington's refusal to engage, strengthened Iranian hardliners who argued that America would only negotiate from a position of weakness, not strength.

11. The Futility of Containment and Military Solutions

The one policy that hasn't been seriously pursued is regional integration through dialogue and engagement.

Containment's failure. The policy of containing and weakening Iran, pursued by the U.S. and Israel since the early 1990s, has largely failed and often backfired. The 2006 Lebanon War, intended to weaken Iran's proxy Hezbollah, instead enhanced Hezbollah's political standing and demonstrated its formidable capabilities, further complicating Israel's security. This showed that containment, even when backed by military force, can inadvertently strengthen adversaries.

Military risks. A military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, whether by the U.S. or Israel, carries immense risks and potentially catastrophic costs. U.S. military leaders warn of severe repercussions in Iraq and the broader region due to Iran's asymmetric counterstrike capabilities. Israel, lacking the full military capacity for a comprehensive strike, would likely draw the U.S. into a wider conflict, further destabilizing the Middle East.

Irrationality vs. rationality. While some Israeli hardliners portray Iran as irrational and suicidal, most strategic thinkers recognize the Iranian government as pragmatic and rational. Iran's "simulated irrationality" is a calculated strategy to confuse adversaries and enhance its deterrence. This suggests that a stable deterrent is possible, and that preemptive strikes based on assumptions of irrationality are highly dangerous.

12. Regional Integration: The Path to Stability and Taming Rivalry

The clash between Iran's regional ambitions and Israel's insistence on strategic dominance will continue to fuel instability and undermine Washington's interests in the region unless America recognizes that neither stability nor democracy can be achieved without ending the balancing game and genuinely seeking a Middle East that integrates the legitimate aspirations of all states, including Iran.

Beyond the status quo. The current geopolitical order in the Middle East, characterized by the Israel-Iran rivalry and U.S. attempts to contain Iran, is inherently unstable and costly. The book argues that true stability and democracy cannot be achieved without a fundamental shift towards regional integration and collective security that accommodates the legitimate aspirations of all states, including Iran.

Iran's aspirations. Revolutionary Iran, like its imperial predecessor, seeks a prominent leadership role in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions, commensurate with its size and resources. While it has shown a willingness to sacrifice ideological objectives for strategic survival, its foreign policy has radicalized when faced with exclusion and containment. A more powerful and integrated Iran has historically been a more moderate Iran.

A new approach. This requires a U.S. policy of dialogue and engagement, offering Iran recognition and security in exchange for concessions on its nuclear program, support for terror groups, and acceptance of Israel's existence. Israel, in turn, must re-evaluate its doctrine of military domination, which constantly puts it on a collision course with regional powers. Taming the Israel-Iran rivalry is essential for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and fostering a genuinely stable Middle East.

Last updated: March 11, 2026