Tomorrow Is Yesterday

1. The Peace Process: An Illusion Built on Suppressed History

Peacemakers focused on repressing history by arbitrarily choosing a starting point and defining the conflict as a territorial spat, the challenge as one of drawing lines on a map.

Ignoring roots. The Oslo Accords and subsequent peace efforts fundamentally misdiagnosed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reducing it to a mere territorial dispute over the West Bank and Gaza (post-1967). This approach deliberately overlooked the deeper historical grievances, emotional wounds, and existential claims rooted in the 1948 Nakba (Palestinian catastrophe) and the very founding of Israel. By attempting to "repress history," peacemakers imposed an artificial framework that failed to resonate with the profound realities and yearnings of both peoples.

Surface-level solutions. The process prioritized "sanitized negotiations" and "textual understandings" over genuine reconciliation of competing narratives. Diplomats focused on getting leaders to utter "talismanic words" and sign documents, believing that ambiguity about the ultimate destination would make agreements possible, even if it made their undoing "inexorable." This created a facade of progress, where appearances mattered more than underlying truths, leading to a cycle of unfulfilled promises and renewed despair.

Consequences of denial. This deliberate suppression of history ensured its eventual, violent return. The conflict was never just about drawing lines on a map; it was about justice, redemption, dignity, self-determination for Palestinians, and genuine acceptance and eternal security for Israelis. Ignoring these core issues meant that any "peace" achieved would be fragile, temporary, and ultimately unable to withstand the formidable revenge of a past that stubbornly refused to be forgotten.

2. The Two-State Solution: A Foreign Concept, Not a Shared Aspiration

What it has not been, save for a relatively short period, is an indigenous Palestinian or Jewish demand.

External origins. The idea of partitioning historic Palestine into two states was primarily a foreign imposition, first proposed by the British Peel Commission in 1937 and later by the 1947 UN partition plan. For much of their history, neither Israelis nor Palestinians genuinely embraced it as their primary objective. Zionists often viewed it as a stepping stone to control all of Palestine, while Palestinians vehemently rejected it as a step away from ruling the whole of Palestine.

Misaligned motivations. When Palestinians eventually warmed to the idea in the late 1980s (after decades of advocating for a democratic, binational state), Israelis had largely turned their backs on it. Israel's later, cautious reconsideration was driven by demographic concerns—to maintain a Jewish majority—rather than a desire to grant Palestinians their due. This meant that even when both sides nominally supported a two-state outcome, their underlying motivations were tactical, not strategic, and often contradictory.

Loss of luster. For Palestinians, statehood was a proxy for liberation and dignity, not an end in itself. When the two-state solution became a "technocratic project" overtly aimed at protecting Israeli interests and defeating Hamas, it lost its "sheen" and "luster." Its "suffocating embrace" by the West, particularly America, transformed it from a national idea into a predominantly foreign one, diminishing its value in Palestinian eyes and breeding contempt for what felt like a "consolation prize to the vanquished."

3. Camp David 2000: A Tragedy of Misjudgment and Misaligned Intentions

Had Arafat consented to the Israeli/American proposal in 2000, we might have had a Palestinian state two decades ago. But had Barak accepted the Palestinian ideas of that same year, we might now be marking two decades of Israeli–Palestinian peace.

Blame game. The failure of Camp David 2000 is often singularly attributed to Yasser Arafat's inflexibility, a narrative perpetuated by American and Israeli officials. However, the summit was a "tragedy of errors" with shared responsibility. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's approach was characterized by:

• Disregarding prior agreements
• Intensifying settlement construction
• Insisting on a high-stakes, binary-outcome summit
• Refusing to engage Arafat directly

Palestinian passivity. Arafat, convinced it was a "US-Israeli conspiracy" and a "trap," attended in "survival mode," aiming to cut losses rather than maximize gains. His team remained largely passive, viewing Israeli proposals as ephemeral and unserious due to their constant modification. They saw Israel's "offers" not as generosity, but as haggling over land that was rightfully theirs, rooted in a history of dispossession.

Ephemeral red lines. Israel's positions on territory and Jerusalem evolved dramatically during the summit, with each "red line" proving to be a "false bottom." This constant shifting, while presented as magnanimity, reinforced Palestinian suspicion that Israel and the US were "toying with Palestinian rights." The lack of a clear, consistent American position, coupled with its subservience to Israeli demands, further undermined any chance of a genuine, mutually acceptable agreement.

4. The American Role: A Cycle of Ineffective Mediation and Strategic Deceit

The United States was not merely unable to achieve what it set out to do; far from improving the situation, its involvement in Israeli–Palestinian affairs and stranglehold on the peace process often made them worse.

Distorted dynamics. America's self-proclaimed role as chief mediator often distorted the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic. It shielded Israel from pressure, propped up a "feckless Palestinian Authority," and invoked "imaginary, imminent progress" to dismiss alternative conflict resolution methods. This created a situation where Israelis enjoyed the "luxury of being spared the price of their actions," while Palestinians were given the "illusion that the glaring power imbalance might be evened out."

"Lies, damned lies." US diplomacy became characterized by "persistent fabrications" that fooled nobody, including those who uttered them. These included:

• Repeated assertions of an imminent two-state solution.
• Claims of caring equally for Israelis and Palestinians.
• Warnings that the status quo was "unsustainable" (despite its decades-long persistence).
• Groundless optimism about ceasefire deals.

Power without purpose. Despite immense financial, military, and diplomatic leverage, the US consistently failed to persuade either side to act according to its wishes, even on "marginal significance." This "chasm between capability and accomplishment" stemmed from wanting peace "too little and too much." Progress was never a singular strategic objective, but rather served ancillary purposes like regional stability or managing relations with Arab allies, making the pursuit of peace more about appearance than genuine achievement.

5. Palestinian Leadership's Decline: From Liberation to Governance, Losing Legitimacy

The Palestinian Authority, the instrument born of the 1993 Oslo Accords and designed to protect them, had failed; diplomacy, the path that was supposed to liberate them, was a dead end.

Identity crisis. Oslo introduced a fundamental contradiction for the Palestinian movement: was it a liberation struggle or a political party focused on governance? Fatah, once the heart of the armed struggle, found itself caught between these roles, leading to:

• Leaders trading militant roles for ministerial posts.
• Activists becoming middlemen and entrepreneurs.
• Militants feeling cheated and disillusioned.
• Refugees feeling ignored.

Erosion of authority. Yasser Arafat, with his "gun in one hand and olive branch in the other," managed to straddle this divide, but his successors, particularly Mahmoud Abbas, lacked his charisma and symbolic clout. Abbas's commitment to non-violence and diplomacy, while appealing to the West, alienated many Palestinians who saw it as "unilateral Palestinian disarmament" without tangible returns. His reliance on foreign benefactors and security cooperation with Israel further eroded his legitimacy, making him appear more concerned with survival than national interest.

"Nothingness." The "Fayyadism" era, championed by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, focused on building state institutions and good governance under occupation. While achieving some economic and security stability, it failed politically. Palestinians felt their destiny was being written by others, and the "prize of statehood lost its luster" when it became a "technocratic project" aimed at protecting Israeli interests. Fayyad himself concluded, "I represent the address for failure.… This is the result of nothingness."

6. Hamas's Duality: Pragmatism and Militancy in a Cycle of Defiance

Hamas is two movements rolled into one. It is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose primary goal is the steady, persistent building of a self-sufficient, Islamic society, that sees Israel’s removal as a necessary but longer-term objective, and for whom violence is not the tool of first resort. It is also a nationalist group, for whom a priority is to terminate Israel’s occupation and armed struggle is the means to that end.

Dual identity. Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood, initially prioritizing social and religious transformation over immediate armed confrontation. However, the First Intifada (1987) forced its hand, leading to the adoption of armed struggle alongside its social agenda. This duality allowed Hamas to:

• Engage in both governance and resistance.
• Be open to long-term truces (hudna) while maintaining its ultimate goal of Israel's elimination.
• Adapt its tactics based on circumstances, from building institutions to launching attacks.

Gaining legitimacy. As the Oslo peace process crumbled and Fatah's diplomatic strategy failed, Hamas's more defiant, transactional approach to Israel gained traction. Its electoral victory in 2006, despite Western and Israeli opposition, was a "protest vote" against Fatah's corruption and the perceived futility of diplomacy. This cemented Hamas's position as a significant, if controversial, leader within the Palestinian national movement.

The Gaza cycle. Hamas's rule in Gaza, following the 2007 split with Fatah, established a "deadly script" with Israel:

• Hamas launched rockets; Israel responded with disproportionate force.
• Indirect talks led to ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, and promises of easing the siege.
• Israel claimed military dominance; Hamas claimed victory for still standing.
  This cycle, while seemingly senseless, offered benefits to both: Israel contained Hamas without losing control, and Hamas gained recognition as a consequential interlocutor, proving resistance yielded results.

7. October 7: History's Revenge, Not an Aberration

October 7 was not a calculated attempt to attain specific objectives, however ambitious or even unrealistic. It was an irrational undertaking to bring about Israel’s end.

Predictable shock. The October 7, 2023, attacks, while "utterly shocking," were "wholly predictable" given the historical context and Hamas's dual nature. Israel's "complacency born of hubris" and its long-standing policy of containing Hamas through economic pressure and physical isolation created the conditions for an "explosion." Hamas leaders, particularly Yahya Sinwar, had publicly warned that the "unsustainable" situation in Gaza would lead to an "unavoidable" confrontation.

Reclaiming the past. The attack was not novel in its nature but unprecedented in its scale, echoing earlier Palestinian militant operations aimed at inflicting maximum damage, seizing hostages, and reminding the world of the Palestinian cause. It was "Palestinian to the core," speaking to deep-seated feelings of dispossession and a yearning for vengeance. Many Palestinians reacted with "pride and elation," seeing it as an act of self-determination and a "reclamation of a Palestinian past."

Historical reenactment. Israel's response, a "war of destruction," also drew on a long Zionist tradition of "destruction, displacement, and dispossession." Both sides viewed the other's actions as fulfilling their "national nightmares"—ethnic cleansing for Palestinians, extermination for Israelis. October 7 and its aftermath were "historical reenactments," stripping away the "pretense of a hollow peace process" and reverting the conflict to its "original, primitive form."

8. The Resilience of the Status Quo: A Comfortable Hell for Some

In the here and now, it is a posture that it is difficult to fault. For the most part, Israelis have not had to pay a price, and when they have—a Palestinian uprising or acts of violence—it has sharpened their reluctance to reward or empower those who presented them with the bill and strengthened their hesitance to take what would inevitably be an uncertain gamble on their future.

Enduring viability. Despite constant declarations of its "unsustainability," the status quo has proven remarkably resilient, lasting over half a century. For Israelis, it offers:

• Control over Palestinian land, resources, and lives.
• Economic prosperity.
• The ability to manage and quell violence with superior military force.
• Subsidies for occupation from Western powers.
• A divided Palestinian leadership, undermining calls for a unified state.

Palestinian dependency. For the Palestinian Authority, the status quo, though oppressive, provides a degree of stability, financial security (from foreign donors), and power for its elite. The "Oslo process gave the Palestinians in legitimacy it took away in freedom of action," creating a "culture of dependency." Threats to dissolve the PA or resort to civil disobedience often prove "empty," as the leadership fears losing its acquired power and economic benefits.

No incentive for change. Neither side has a compelling incentive to fundamentally alter the status quo. Israelis see no urgency to take "security risks" or provoke "deep internal political rifts" for a "two-state solution" when their current situation is manageable. Palestinians, while suffering, often find their leadership unable or unwilling to pursue effective alternatives, leading to a cycle where "exhaustion is least felt by those most eager to fight."

9. Unfulfilled Yearnings: Beyond Borders and Technical Fixes

Political objectives, however weighty, are not the same as deep-rooted aspirations. Those reach further. They give life to historical experience.

Beyond the map. The failure of the peace process stems from its inability to address the "deep-rooted aspirations" of both peoples, which extend far beyond "territorial percentages" or "security arrangements." For Israelis, this includes:

• A craving for unquestioned acceptance and "ordinary security."
• Freedom from the specter of Palestinian refugee return.
• An "abiding attachment to the land, all of it."

Justice and dignity. For Palestinians, the core demands relate to:

• Addressing the historical experience of "dispossession, expulsion, dispersal, massacres, occupation, discrimination."
• Acknowledging and redressing the Nakba.
• Preserving the "right of return" for refugees.
• Achieving genuine self-determination and dignity.

The "Godel's theorem" of conflict. The conflict inhabits "two worlds at once: worlds of the rational and irrational, of reason and emotion." A purely "rational resolution" focused on technical fixes cannot be "complete" because it ignores emotive impulses. Conversely, a "complete resolution" incorporating these impulses may not be "internally consistent." This inherent tension means that any "artful compromise over the realities of the present" will inevitably confront the "ghosts of the past."

10. The Illusion of American Omnipotence: A Chasm Between Capability and Accomplishment

The tragedy of the peace process is not America’s fault alone. But it is difficult to imagine a greater chasm between capability and accomplishment. In this the United States stands apart. The bully was bullied and did nothing about it.

Powerless giant. Despite being the sole superpower with immense leverage, America's record in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been "abysmal." Its involvement often "made them worse," failing to achieve its stated goals or persuade either side to act according to its wishes. This "chasm between capability and accomplishment" is unique, as the US was "regularly rebuffed" by both Israelis and Palestinians, yet did little more than "witness its own embarrassment."

Strategic miscalculations. America's failures stemmed from:

• Prioritizing ancillary interests over a genuine resolution.
• Believing that "reassurance, not pressure" would move Israel.
• Misconstruing Palestinian politics, constantly seeking "moderate" partners who lacked popular legitimacy.
• Ignoring the lessons of its own history in the Middle East, repeating failed strategies.

The "lie" of optimism. US officials routinely spoke "empty words" and made "claims readily disproved by events," creating an "alternate universe" of "happy talk." This "stubborn pursuit and public defense of policies that knowledge, experience, and common sense should condemn to the dustbin" bred cynicism and eroded credibility. The "earnestness with which they are spoken is not redemptive. It is confounding, which makes them the more destructive."

11. The Enduring Power of the Past: Tomorrow is Yesterday

Tomorrow is yesterday because yesterday—before the pretense that history matters little and before sanitized negotiations between two unequal parties mediated by a powerful third that sides with the stronger of them—is where Israelis and Palestinians seek refuge.

Reversion to origins. The collapse of the peace process and the events of October 7 represent a "return to the past," where the conflict reverts to its "original form" of "naked and unbridled violence." Both Israelis and Palestinians seek refuge in a past where their narratives are uncompromised, and the other side is wished to "vanish." This means:

• Israelis return to "triumphalism," conquering but unable to prevail.
• Palestinians return to "survival," enduring but facing loss and chaos.

Historical echoes. The current landscape is rife with historical reenactments:

• Rising communal strife and settler violence in the West Bank, echoing "age-old ambition to drive Palestinians off the land."
• Palestinian armed groups resorting to "unconventional forms of warfare," reminiscent of early fedayeen attacks.
• Global hostility toward Israel and rising antisemitism, mirroring early 20th-century diaspora divisions.
• Israel's internal polarization coexisting with a blurring of lines on the Palestinian question, as the mainstream embraces its fringe.

Unsettling future. The future will be "disorienting," lacking the "clarity and simplicity of a familiar moment." The "peace process theology" has been capsized, and the "grief that attends the destruction" gives license to "renounce rigid notions and revisit past taboos." However, this does not promise an easy path, but rather a return to the "instinctive and raw" dynamics of a conflict deeply rooted in history, where "old wrongs are still unattended, new ones await the hour of revenge."

12. The Path Forward: Acknowledging Complexity and Embracing the Unsettling

A breakdown of this magnitude, so epic, a physical, human, and political wreckage this complete, can be redeeming. It purges falsehoods and unveils uncomfortable truths.

Beyond narrow confines. The current desolation offers a chance for "radical reassessment." Future efforts must move beyond the "sliver of communities" and "alien lexicon" that defined past diplomacy. This means:

• Rethinking participants to include the diverse "Israels" and "Palestines"—secular, religious, diaspora, citizens, settlers, refugees.
• Acknowledging their "views and concerns," even if "messy and acrimonious."
• Considering "unconventional" solutions untethered to rigid notions of territorial sovereignty.

Confronting history. The inclination to "concentrate on the here and now" and dismiss "narrative issues" as "formulations" has proven futile. A genuine resolution requires a "painful historical reckoning," grappling with:

• Justice, responsibility, accountability, and rights for all affected groups.
• The "most visceral and deep-seated emotions" of both peoples.
• The origins of the conflict in 1948, not just 1967.
  This means moving beyond "peace as a laboratory experiment" or "algebraic formula" to embrace the "rational and irrational, of reason and emotion."

New approaches. Direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, often a "charade" that reproduces power imbalances, are not the "only conceivable tool." Alternatives include:

• Unilateral steps by either side.
• Third-party initiatives (UN resolutions, international courts).
• Actions by external powers addressing only one belligerent.
• A larger, more central role for Arab governments, reflecting their historical interdependence with the Palestinian cause.

The future will be "confusing," with "time horizons" stretching out, impervious to foreign calendars. The goal is not to find a "ready-made grand solution" but to navigate a complex reality where "the future is the worst thing about the present," yet also holds the potential for a more honest, if unsettling, path.

Last updated: March 11, 2026