Modi, Muslims and Media

Borrowed from filmmaker Mahesh Bhatt, the term "conflict entrepreneurs" describes activists and NGOs who financially sustain themselves by perpetuating communal hostility. Key anti-Modi campaigners — Teesta Setalvad from Mumbai, Shabnam Hashmi from Delhi — had no roots in Gujarat's Muslim community. Their former ground operative, Rais Khan, testified that Teesta fabricated affidavits, suppressed photographs implicating Congress workers in riots, and distributed funds to maintain tutored witnesses.

Those who tried engagement were punished. Maulana Vastanvi was forced to resign as Deoband's vice chancellor for merely acknowledging Muslim prosperity under Modi. Journalist Shahid Siddiqui was expelled from his party for interviewing Modi. The message was clear: breaking the demonization consensus carried severe consequences.

Nineteen weeks of inclusive governance. Between October 2001 and February 2002, Modi launched earthquake rehabilitation on a war footing, Samras Panchayats for consensus-based village governance, Lok Kalyan Melas delivering welfare at people's doorsteps, Kanya Kelavani for girls' education, and recruited 120,000 teachers after a decade-long freeze. His first budget was scheduled for February 27 — the very day of Godhra.

Congress panic began before any riot. Kishwar documents that the smear campaign started immediately upon Modi's appointment because his inclusive agenda threatened the Congress vote bank. His first election from Rajkot saw brazen slander and police complicity with Congress — all before Godhra. The riots destroyed his development momentum; they didn't serve it.

A world record in reconstruction. The 2001 earthquake killed 13,805 people and destroyed 1.2 million houses. Under the previous government, politicians openly looted donated supplies. Modi made reconstruction his top priority within days, sending senior officers to spend every weekend in devastated villages. Instead of government contractors, village committees built schools with free materials from government depots — producing better quality at lower cost, with many returning surplus funds.

The World Bank's standard seven-year timeline was beaten in three to four years. Modi simultaneously attracted industrial investment, wind and solar energy, and revived agriculture through water harvesting. Land bought for Rs. 500 thirty years ago commanded Rs. 30 lakhs per acre. Kutch became Modi's laboratory for citizen-centric governance.

Systems over spectacles. Rather than suspensions or sting operations, Modi redesigned governance to eliminate corruption structurally. School permissions went online — officers saw applications only on meeting day and couldn't deny without published reasons. Policy drafts were posted publicly for feedback, killing backroom deals. Tenders moved online. The SWAGAT grievance redressal portal let citizens escalate complaints to the CM via video conference.

Lok Kalyan Melas delivered welfare benefits publicly to named individuals at mass gatherings, making phantom beneficiaries nearly impossible. This approach won UN Public Service Awards in 2009 and 2010. But it made bitter enemies of every politician and bureaucrat whose corruption pipeline it disrupted — which, Kishwar argues, explains the ferocity of anti-Modi politics.

The anatomy of a distortion. Zee TV broadcast Modi saying, "A chain of action-reaction is going on" — but cut the second sentence: "We want that there should be neither action nor reaction." The Times of India published fabricated interview statements on its front page; Modi's correction appeared twenty days later in an inside corner. The SIT found Modi was "quoted out of context."

False atrocity stories went viral unchecked. The pregnant-woman-disemboweled narrative was repeated by BBC and Arundhati Roy but never verified. Roy's claimed source was a fact-finding team organized by Teesta Setalvad. When challenged, Roy dismissed "genuine errors" as irrelevant. Despite corrections, these distortions became unchallengeable orthodoxy — because repetition, not evidence, drove the narrative.

Centuries of communal violence stopped. Gujarat had experienced hundreds of riots — 1969, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1992, 2002. Curfews once lasted 200 consecutive days. Yet after mid-2002, not a single communal riot occurred. Even the Akshardham terrorist attack killing 33 and the 2008 serial bomb blasts killing 56 provoked zero retaliatory violence.

Modi defanged extremists on both sides. The VHP's Praveen Togadia could spew hate speeches freely in Congress-ruled states but dared not in Gujarat, where enforcement was swift. When infrastructure projects required demolishing 280 illegally-built temples on public land, VHP leaders called Modi "the new Mehmood Gaznavi" — but he proceeded. Muslim dons were similarly marginalized, reducing both communal triggers and the cycle of retaliation.

Data from the government's own Sachar Committee showed Gujarat Muslims far ahead of most states. Muslim literacy stood at 73.5% versus India's 59.1% average. The Tendulkar Committee ranked Gujarat's Muslim poverty rate lowest nationally at 7.7% — compared to 34% in Bihar and UP, 28.6% in Maharashtra, and 40.2% in Assam. Universities grew from 11 to 44 in a decade; engineering seats expanded from 3,000 to 55,000.

No scheme was labeled "for Muslims." Everything targeted "all Gujaratis." When 24x7 power reached every village, Muslim homes weren't excluded. When Kanya Kelavani enrolled every girl child, Muslim daughters participated equally. Modi's argument: creating abundance eliminates scarcity-driven competition between communities, making quota politics redundant.

The voting shift was bottom-up. In Bharuch district, with 38% Muslim voters, every seat went to BJP — even against Congress Muslim candidates. In Salaya municipality (95% Muslim), all 27 seats were won by BJP. Hundreds of Muslims won panchayat, municipal, and district elections on BJP tickets. When political scientists dismissed this as fear-based voting, Kishwar counters: in 2002, when Muslims were genuinely terrorized, they voted against Modi because elections are by secret ballot.

Former Congress spokesperson Asifa Khan switched to BJP after four years of internal frustration, citing Congress dysfunction versus Modi's accessible, responsive governance. A Muslim taxi owner explained the shift simply: "Modi brought such peace that we are actually breathing freely. Our daughters go out freely at night. This was unthinkable fifteen years ago."