Why David Sometimes Wins

1. The Power of Strategic Capacity: Why David Sometimes Wins

The greater an organization’s strategic capacity, the more informed, creative, and responsive its strategic choices can be and the better able it is to take advantage of moments of unique opportunity to reconfigure itself for effective action.

Strategic resourcefulness. The book argues that the powerless can sometimes overcome the powerful not merely through luck or resources, but through superior strategic capacity. This capacity is the ability to devise effective strategies, turning existing resources into the power needed to achieve goals. It's about how one thinks, learns, and adapts, rather than just what one possesses.

Three elements of capacity. Strategic capacity is built upon three crucial elements:

• Motivation: A deep, intrinsic commitment to the cause, often a "vocation" or "calling," which fuels persistence and risk-taking.
• Salient Knowledge: Access to diverse and relevant information, including tactical skills and understanding of the environment and various actors.
• Learning Practices: A robust, reflective process of experimentation, adaptation, and re-evaluation, allowing for creative problem-solving.

Biographical and organizational roots. This capacity is rooted in both the biographical backgrounds of leaders (their identities, networks, and tactical repertoires) and the organizational structures they create (deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountability mechanisms). The story of David and Goliath serves as a metaphor: David's victory wasn't just courage, but his strategic insight to use his unique skills (sling and stones) against Goliath's conventional strength.

2. A New Era for Farm Workers: Opportunities Emerge

The days of the bracero program seemed to be numbered; national support for farm workers was building.

Shifting political landscape. The late 1950s and early 1960s marked a significant shift in the political and social environment, creating unprecedented opportunities for farm worker organizing. Opposition to the exploitative bracero program, which supplied cheap Mexican labor to growers, was mounting in Washington D.C. This erosion of political support for growers was a critical factor.

Civil rights momentum. Simultaneously, the burgeoning civil rights movement provided a new moral and political framework. The plight of migrant workers, often people of color, could now be framed as a racial justice issue, garnering public sympathy and mobilizing new allies. This broadened the potential base of support beyond traditional labor circles.

New activist networks. The era saw the rise of new radical organizers and church activists, particularly within the Mexican-American community. Organizations like the Community Service Organization (CSO) and the California Migrant Ministry (CMM) began to build community-based power and advocate for farm workers, laying groundwork that previous efforts lacked.

3. The NFWA's Unique Foundation: Community and Calling

A union is not simply getting enough workers to stage a strike. A union is building a group with a spirit and an existence all its own . . . built around the idea that people must do things by themselves, in order to help themselves.

Community-first approach. Unlike previous attempts that focused solely on workplace organizing, Cesar Chavez and his collaborators launched the Farm Workers Association (FWA) in 1962 with a deep commitment to building a self-sustaining organization rooted in Mexican farm worker families. They prioritized community empowerment and mutual aid over immediate union contracts.

Intrinsic motivation and shared sacrifice. Chavez and his core team, many of whom were Mexican Americans with personal stakes in the outcome, rejected outside funding initially to maintain autonomy and foster intrinsic motivation. They lived on subsistence, sharing the economic sacrifices of their members, which built immense trust and solidarity. This commitment was a "vocation," not just a job.

Innovative programs and leadership development. The FWA developed practical programs to meet members' needs, which also served as organizing tools:

• Service programs: Offering alternatives to exploitative "coyotes" for legal and social issues.
• Death benefits: A group insurance plan, similar to traditional burial societies.
• Credit Union: Providing small loans, crucial for financially vulnerable families.
  These initiatives not only provided tangible benefits but also served as training grounds for new leaders and fostered a sense of collective agency.

4. AWOC's Traditional Pitfalls: Resources Without Resourcefulness

This is a trade union dispute, not a civil rights movement or a religious crusade.

Top-down, conventional approach. The AFL-CIO's Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), launched in 1959, suffered from limited strategic capacity despite substantial financial resources. Its leadership, primarily older white men from traditional building trades, viewed farm worker organizing as a conventional labor dispute, detached from the unique social and cultural context of farm workers.

Lack of motivation and salient knowledge. AWOC leaders lacked deep personal commitment to farm workers, seeing it more as a bureaucratic assignment than a calling. They also lacked salient knowledge of the farm worker world, its ethnic complexities, or the emerging civil rights movement. Their strategy was rigid, relying on familiar tactics that proved ineffective:

• Targeting labor contractors rather than workers.
• Focusing on workplace strikes without community support.
• Ignoring the cultural and racial dimensions of the struggle.

Insulated decision-making. AWOC's top-down structure and reliance on external funding insulated its leaders from accountability to farm workers or potential allies. Strategic decisions were made by a small, homogeneous group, with little input from on-the-ground organizers or farm worker communities. This prevented learning and adaptation, leading to repeated failures and a squandering of resources.

5. The Teamsters' Opportunistic Strategy: Employers Over Workers

You know, this is almost going to be a losing proposition. . . . every year you’ve got different workers coming in . . . so even if you organize the group the prior year, they are not going to be there next year.

Jurisdictional defense. The Teamsters, expelled from the AFL-CIO in 1957, entered the farm labor arena not out of a desire to organize farm workers, but to protect their existing jurisdiction in canneries, packinghouses, and trucking. Their strategy was primarily defensive, aiming to prevent other unions (especially the NFWA) from gaining a foothold that could threaten their control over the agricultural supply chain.

"Responsible unionism" and employer alliances. The Teamsters' approach, termed "responsible unionism," involved signing contracts directly with employers, often without worker consent, to offer a "safe" alternative to more militant unions. This strategy leveraged their power in other sectors to secure agreements, but it alienated workers and ignored their demands for better conditions or self-determination.

• Bud Antle contract (1961): The first field contract, signed with a major lettuce shipper, primarily to secure bracero supply and prevent AWOC from organizing.
• DiGiorgio intervention (1966): Attempted to sign a contract with DiGiorgio to thwart the NFWA, relying on foremen to intimidate workers.

Lack of commitment and understanding. Teamster leaders, like AWOC, were largely white, older men with little personal connection or vocational interest in farm workers. They viewed farm worker organizing as a "losing proposition" due to high turnover and ethnic complexities. Their internal political dynamics, rather than strategic needs, often drove their actions, leading to a lack of genuine engagement with the workers' cause.

6. The Delano Grape Strike: A Movement is Born

What is a movement? It is when there are enough people with one idea so that their actions are together like the huge wave of water, which nothing can stop.

Unplanned catalyst. The Delano grape strike, initiated by AWOC's Filipino workers in September 1965, caught the NFWA off guard. Despite initial doubts about their readiness for a major strike, NFWA leaders quickly recognized the opportunity and strategically decided to join, transforming a local labor dispute into a broader social movement.

Strategic conditions for engagement. The NFWA's decision to join was contingent on three critical conditions, reflecting their unique strategic capacity:

• No strike fund: Leaders and members would share economic sacrifices, deepening commitment.
• Non-violence: Embracing civil rights tactics to garner broader moral support and distinguish themselves.
• Union recognition: Fighting for long-term institutional change, not just short-term wage gains.

Innovative tactics and leadership development. The NFWA quickly innovated beyond traditional stationary picket lines, developing "roving picket lines" to engage workers across multiple farms. This required constant adaptation and on-the-spot problem-solving, which in turn fostered a new cadre of leaders from among the strikers and volunteers. This dynamic process of learning and adaptation was central to the movement's growth.

7. Redefining Conflict: Boycotts and Civil Disobedience

We farm workers have the same weapons—our bodies and our courage. . . . The day we farm workers apply this lesson with the same courage they have shown in Alabama and Mississippi—on that day, the misery of the farm worker will come to an end.

"Moral jujitsu" and public engagement. Faced with grower resistance and legal injunctions against picketing, the NFWA embraced civil disobedience, drawing inspiration from the civil rights movement. They turned aggressive actions by local law enforcement into opportunities for public witness, generating widespread sympathy.

• Mass arrests: Staging arrests for "disturbing the peace" by speaking to workers, which garnered national media attention.
• Prayer vigils: Using religious gatherings at camp entrances to circumvent picketing injunctions and connect with workers.

The consumer boycott: a new arena. When dockside picketing was enjoined, the NFWA pivoted to a consumer boycott, targeting Schenley Industries' easily recognizable liquor brands. This redefined the arena of conflict, shifting pressure from the fields to urban supermarkets and liquor stores, where a diverse coalition of supporters could participate.

• Student and religious networks: Volunteers from civil rights groups and churches were dispatched nationwide to organize boycotts.
• Strategic alliances: Walter Reuther's visit and pledge of financial support from the UAW and AFL-CIO's IUD legitimized the NFWA and provided crucial resources.

Narrative power. The NFWA skillfully framed the struggle as "La Causa," a farm worker civil rights movement rooted in Mexican cultural and Catholic social justice traditions. This narrative resonated with a broader public, distinguishing it from a mere labor dispute and attracting moral and financial support that AWOC and the Teamsters could not.

8. The DiGiorgio Showdown: Outmaneuvering Goliath

I knew that if we lost this one, we would lose the union, because the public wouldn’t have supported us after that.

Employer counterattack. DiGiorgio, a powerful agribusiness corporation, attempted to undermine the NFWA's momentum by proposing a "phony election" with the Teamsters, designed to exclude strikers and ensure a Teamster victory. This forced the NFWA into a high-stakes battle for legitimacy.

Strategic response to a rigged game. The NFWA's leadership, including Chavez, Huerta, Padilla, and new legal and organizing talent, devised a dual strategy:

• Discredit the election: Publicly expose the unfairness of DiGiorgio's proposed election, leveraging media and political allies.
• Boycott the vote: Organize DiGiorgio workers to refuse participation, demonstrating that a Teamster victory would lack legitimacy.

Leveraging political influence. The NFWA successfully pressured Governor Pat Brown, who was facing a tough re-election, to intervene. Brown's agreement to investigate and appoint an independent arbitrator, Professor Ronald Houghton, led to a new, fairer election. This demonstrated the NFWA's growing political clout.

Victory through organizing. In the subsequent election, the NFWA outmaneuvered the Teamsters by meticulously organizing a "dragnet" campaign to bring back former DiGiorgio workers (many of whom were NFWA supporters) to vote. This grassroots effort, combined with the union's public credibility, resulted in a decisive victory for the NFWA, defying historical odds and cementing its position as the legitimate voice of farm workers.

9. UFWOC's Consolidation: Unity and Autonomy

Supreme governing authority of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee shall reside in the members in convention assembled through representative[s] of their own choosing . . . . In the original interim period between conventions, this governing authority shall reside in the National Executive Board.

Strategic merger. The NFWA's affiliation with the AFL-CIO, forming the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC), was a carefully negotiated move. Chavez ensured terms that preserved the NFWA's autonomy, despite initial skepticism from within his ranks. This merger brought the financial backing of the AFL-CIO while allowing UFWOC to retain its unique identity and grassroots accountability.

Expanded leadership and governance. UFWOC's structure reflected its diverse origins, with a provisional Executive Board comprising leaders from both the NFWA and AWOC, including Filipino organizers. The union also established new forms of governance, such as elected ranch committees for contract administration, which became new sources of leadership and accountability.

Financial independence and volunteer ethos. While benefiting from AFL-CIO subsidies, UFWOC continued to rely heavily on member dues and diverse fundraising efforts, preventing over-reliance on any single external source. The core of its operations remained its full-time volunteer staff, who worked for subsistence, embodying a "servanthood" ethos that fueled commitment and allowed for rapid expansion.

10. The Perelli-Minetti Test: Sustaining the Fight

Without the pressure Chavez was applying, the Teamsters would have found it much more difficult to move in many of the industries . . . . In grapes, the Teamsters had minimal power.

Teamster resurgence. The DiGiorgio victory spurred the Teamsters to a renewed, more aggressive counterattack. They signed a "sweetheart" contract with Perelli-Minetti & Sons, a Delano vintner, behind UFWOC picket lines, aiming to establish themselves as the preferred union for growers seeking to avoid the UFW. This forced UFWOC into another high-stakes battle.

Boycott and "moral framing." UFWOC responded with a boycott of Perelli-Minetti wines, despite the challenge of a Teamster contract. They leveraged their established networks of religious leaders, students, and Mexican-American communities, framing the Teamsters as a corrupt, powerful white union conspiring with growers against powerless farm workers. This moral narrative proved highly effective, overshadowing the Teamsters' claims of legitimacy.

Reclaiming the secondary boycott. UFWOC's legal team, led by Jerry Cohen, ingeniously found a loophole to protect the union's right to conduct secondary boycotts. By separating a small group of NLRA-covered workers into a distinct AFL-CIO local, UFWOC ensured it remained exempt from federal restrictions on boycotts, a critical tactical advantage for future campaigns. The Teamsters' attempts to mimic UFWOC's grassroots organizing failed due to their lack of genuine commitment and understanding of farm worker needs.

11. The ALRA Breakthrough: Institutionalizing Power

The new law was the product not only of political bargaining, but also of hours of deliberation as the UFW developed the strategic capacity to use a collective bargaining law to organize.

Political alignment. After years of intense struggle, including a devastating 1973 grape strike and boycott, the political landscape shifted in California with the election of Democratic Governor Jerry Brown in 1975. Brown, committed to "restoring peace" in the fields, created an opportunity for legislative action. Growers, facing mounting boycott pressure and financial strain, also became open to a legal framework.

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA). In May 1975, the ALRA was enacted, providing farm workers with collective bargaining rights, a historic achievement. The law included several innovations tailored to the unique challenges of farm labor:

• Mandatory elections: Employers had to recognize and bargain with unions chosen by workers in secret ballot elections.
• Timely elections: Elections held within seven days of petition submission, preventing employer delays.
• Worker protection: Safeguards against employer intimidation and unfair labor practices.
• "Make whole" remedy: Compensation for losses due to bad-faith bargaining.

UFW's strategic capacity in action. The UFW's ability to shape this legislation and then effectively use it demonstrated its evolved strategic capacity. They fielded an army of volunteer organizers, defended existing contracts, and targeted Teamster-held and unorganized ranches. The UFW won a majority of the initial elections, proving its legitimacy and forcing the Teamsters to withdraw from the fields by 1977.

12. The Peril of Success: When David Becomes Goliath

Although Californians celebrate Cesar Chavez Day, Cesar Chavez streets, parks, libraries, and schools dot the Southwest, and Cesar Chavez stamps deliver the U.S. mail, the living and working conditions of California farm workers are little better at the beginning of the twenty-first century than when he began organizing in the early 1960s.

Internal decline. Despite its historic victories and the institutionalization of the ALRA, the UFW entered a period of decline from which it has not recovered. Ironically, the very success that brought resources and stability also led to internal changes that decimated its strategic capacity. The union stopped organizing, drove out experienced leaders, and shifted its focus.

Chavez's transformation and purges. Cesar Chavez, influenced by Synanon's cult-like organizational model, began to consolidate internal political control, replacing experienced leaders with those whose loyalty was paramount. This led to:

• Suppression of deliberation: The "Synanon game" replaced open debate with controlled, judgmental sessions.
• Loss of accountability: Centralized control over resources and the absence of intermediate political structures (locals, districts) insulated leadership from member demands.
• Departure of talent: Purges of legal, organizing, and administrative staff, including key founding members, stripped the union of its expertise and creativity.

Shift from organizing to advocacy. The UFW increasingly relied on direct-mail fundraising and grants, rather than member dues or grassroots organizing, to sustain itself. While its financial assets grew, its membership dwindled, and its ability to effectively represent farm workers diminished. The UFW transformed from a dynamic, adaptive movement into a centralized advocacy organization, losing the very resourcefulness that had defined its early success.

Last updated: December 13, 2025