Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks

1. The Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) are driven by systemic corruption and bureaucratic survival rather than ideological purity.

Many in the RIS also have contempt for what their services have become, for the corruption and greed of their RIS masters and those in the Kremlin who rule over them.

Endemic corruption. The modern Russian Intelligence Services (SVR, FSB, and GRU) are not the highly disciplined, ideological monoliths of Soviet myth. Instead, they are deeply infected by the same systemic corruption, greed, and careerism that plague the rest of the Russian state. Officers routinely prioritize personal enrichment, financial scams, and currying favor with superiors over genuine national security objectives.

Fabrication and careerism. Because of intense pressure to produce results that align with the Kremlin's worldview, Russian intelligence officers (RIOs) frequently fabricate or embellish their intelligence reporting. It is a common open secret within residencies that officers spin public news articles into "covert" reports to satisfy their consumers. This culture of vranyo (mutual lying) means that:

• Officers routinely run fake or exaggerated cases to justify their budgets.
• Managers must ask subordinates which of their sources are "real" and which are merely for "reporting."
• Personal connections (svyazi) and bribes dictate career advancement and lucrative foreign postings.

The "GP" mentality. Despite this internal decay, the RIS maintain an unwavering, institutional hostility toward the West, specifically the United States, which they term the glavnii protivnik (GP) or "main enemy." This adversarial mindset is deeply ingrained during training and never changes, regardless of shifting global threats like terrorism. The services exist primarily to protect the regime of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle of siloviki (strongmen).

2. The legendary "Illegals" program is the pride of the Kremlin but suffers from a massive gap between cost and actual intelligence value.

The SVR illegals from that case were comfortable living their lives in anonymity, living a much better life in New York or Boston or the DC area than they would have in Moscow of the period.

The pride of the Kremlin. Deep-cover intelligence officers operating under false identities—known as nelegali or "illegals"—are considered the crown jewels of Russian espionage. Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer himself, harbors a romantic obsession with these operatives, publicly celebrating them even in failure. However, the immense time and financial investment required to train and deploy them rarely yields proportional intelligence results.

The productivity gap. Historically, very few illegals have successfully penetrated the highest levels of Western governments. Most spend decades merely trying to blend into local societies, establishing mundane lives that offer little to no access to classified information. The SVR utilizes three distinct categories of illegals to manage this program:

• Staff Illegals: Fully trained cadre officers living under deeply backstopped, entirely fabricated foreign identities.
• Traveling Illegals: Operatives who travel from Moscow using forged passports to service dead drops and support local networks.
• Special Agent Illegals: "True-name" operatives who use real identities and dual citizenship to blend in, but lack rigorous tradecraft training.

The lure of the West. The 2010 "Ghost Stories" arrest of ten SVR illegals exposed the program's modern vulnerabilities. Many of these deep-cover spies had grown comfortable with Western lifestyles and were highly reluctant to actively spy, ignoring clear counterintelligence warning signs to avoid being recalled to Russia. Ultimately, their primary utility is bureaucratic, serving as expensive propaganda tools to project an illusion of global reach.

3. Street tradecraft relies on highly structured, repetitive, and impersonal communication methods like dead drops (tainiki) and signal sites.

The rule for the RIS seems to be "don’t fix it if it ain’t broke."

Sticks and bricks. To minimize the risk of physical surveillance, the SVR and GRU heavily favor impersonal communications over face-to-face meetings in high-risk environments like the United States. This classic street tradecraft, colloquially known as "sticks and bricks," relies on a highly structured, multi-step sequence of physical signals and dead drops (tainiki). By separating the handler and the agent in both time and space, the RIS attempt to shield their operations from hostile counterintelligence.

The operational cycle. A typical RIS impersonal exchange follows a rigid, predictable pattern designed to ensure security and close the communication loop. Both the officer and the agent must execute their roles with absolute precision to avoid leaving compromising materials exposed. This cycle generally includes:

• Signal Sites: Using chalk marks, tape, or magnets on public fixtures (like mailboxes or telephone poles) to initiate an exchange.
• Surveillance Detection: The officer conducting a rigorous marshrut proverki (checking route) to ensure they are "clean" before loading the drop.
• The Dead Drop: Placing double-wrapped, weather-insulated packages (often using heavy-duty trash bags) in remote "green areas" or parks.
• Acknowledgment Signals: Marking a separate site to confirm the package is loaded, and removing the signal once retrieved.

Vulnerability of repetition. While highly secure when executed properly, the RIS's dogmatic reliance on these methods is also their greatest vulnerability. They frequently reuse the same signal and drop sites for years, making it easy for alert counterintelligence services to monitor these locations. This lack of operational agility ultimately led to the downfall of high-profile traitors like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen.

4. Russian surveillance (naruzhka) is aggressive and pervasive at home but struggles against modern Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS) abroad.

By flattening a tire, the KGB, now FSB, was sending a message: 'Stop making it difficult for us, or we’ll make things harder for you.'

The surveillance state. Inside Russia, the FSB operates a total surveillance state with unfettered access to all digital communications, public cameras, and a vast network of human informants (stukachi). This hostile environment makes physical operations for Western intelligence officers incredibly difficult. However, the aggressive, heavy-handed surveillance tactics the FSB uses at home do not translate well to the more restrictive legal environments of the West.

Aggressive street tactics. When operating abroad, SVR and GRU officers conduct highly aggressive surveillance detection runs (SDRs) to identify host-country tailing teams. They frequently violate traffic laws, make sudden U-turns, and perform "visual ambushes" in crowded public spaces like shopping malls. While these tactics are effective at flushing out surveillance, they also instantly flag the operative as an active intelligence officer. Key elements of their physical surveillance include:

• The Starburst: Multiple officers departing an embassy simultaneously to overwhelm and stretch local surveillance assets.
• The Borzois: Support officers deployed to counter-surveil a primary officer's meeting or operational act from a distance.
• Complacency Lulls: The tendency of tired or overworked surveillance teams to make sloppy mistakes after hours or on weekends.

The UTS trap. The greatest modern threat to RIS operations abroad is Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS). The proliferation of facial recognition, biometrics, cell phone tracking, and public CCTV networks makes it nearly impossible for RIOs to operate undetected under false aliases. Because the RIS remain wedded to old-school Soviet-era physical tradecraft, they are increasingly vulnerable to being forensically unmasked by digital tracking.

5. The RIS heavily exploit human vulnerabilities through double agents, "useful idiots," and sexual entrapment (swallows).

The RIS focus on operational aspects of psychology, particularly human vulnerabilities and weaknesses that the RIS prefer to use for coercion.

The art of kompromat. Unlike Western intelligence services that prefer to recruit agents using positive incentives, the RIS specialize in exploiting human vice, weakness, and fear. They rely heavily on kompromat—compromising material—to blackmail and coerce targets into cooperation. This psychological approach is applied systematically to foreign diplomats, military personnel, businesspeople, and even journalists.

Sexpionage and honey traps. The use of attractive female or male operatives—known as "swallows" (lastochki) or "ravens"—to sexually entrap targets remains a staple of Russian tradecraft. The FSB and SVR actively target lonely, isolated, or morally compromised foreigners visiting Russia or neighboring states. The classic anatomy of a honey trap involves:

• The Seduction: Introducing a swallow (often an FSB cooptee or professional) to establish an intimate relationship with the target.
• The Setup: Recording the sexual encounter using hidden cameras in FSB-controlled hotel rooms or apartments.
• The Pitch: Confronting the target with the evidence and threatening to destroy their career or marriage unless they spy for Russia.

Exploiting the naive. Beyond blackmail, the RIS excel at manipulating "useful idiots" (poleznyy durak)—individuals who unwittingly do Moscow's bidding. These are often Western academics, journalists, or politicians whose egos are massaged by RIOs posing as fellow scholars or diplomats. By simply letting these "chatterboxes" talk freely over lavish dinners, Russian officers gather valuable intelligence without ever having to execute a formal, risky recruitment.

6. Operational technology (operativnaya tekhnika) blends sophisticated encryption with surprisingly sloppy physical security and execution.

The tech is only as good as the officer.

Operativnaya tekhnika. The RIS utilize a wide array of specialized hardware and software, known as operativnaya tekhnika, to facilitate secure agent communications. These systems range from long-range shortwave radio transmissions (LRAC) to highly sophisticated, short-range encrypted Wi-Fi bursts (SRAC). While the technology itself is often highly advanced, its security is routinely compromised by the human errors of the officers and agents using it.

The password vulnerability. A recurring theme in modern Russian technical espionage is the failure of basic operational security (OPSEC). During the 2010 Ghost Stories investigation, the FBI discovered that multiple SVR illegals had written down their complex, 26-character encryption passwords on slips of paper kept right next to their spy laptops. This elementary mistake allowed U.S. forensic experts to easily decrypt and exploit their entire communications network. Key technical tools used by the RIS include:

• Steganography: Hiding encrypted data and messages inside seemingly innocent digital image files posted publicly online.
• Buket (Bouquet): A specialized SRAC system used to transmit data bursts to a nearby receiver while walking past a target location.
• One-Time Pads: Theoretically unbreakable paper-based ciphers used to decode long-range shortwave radio transmissions.

The State Department bug. The RIS also excel at physical bugging operations (proslushka), though these too are vulnerable to alert counterintelligence. In 1999, SVR officer Stanislav Gusev was caught physically monitoring a highly sophisticated listening device planted inside a State Department conference room. Gusev's suspicious behavior—frequently feeding parking meters while sitting in a car with a hidden antenna disguised as a tissue box—ultimately exposed the entire operation.

7. Russian "wet work" and sabotage campaigns are theatrical, brutal, and increasingly reckless, designed to terrorize rather than remain covert.

The weapons deployed for traditional Russian wet work have changed over time... But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality...

Direct action. The RIS have a long, bloody history of conducting assassinations and lethal operations, historically referred to as "wet work" (mokroe delo) or "direct action." Under Vladimir Putin, these operations have become increasingly brazen, theatrical, and reckless. Rather than attempting to hide their hand, the Kremlin often uses highly distinct, Russian-only poisons like polonium-210 or Novichok to send a terrifying message to defectors and critics worldwide.

A feral campaign. Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the RIS have gone "feral," launching a massive, coordinated campaign of sabotage, arson, and murder plots across Europe. Denied their traditional diplomatic cover due to the mass expulsion of hundreds of intelligence officers, the SVR and GRU have turned to criminal proxies to carry out these attacks. This shadow war is designed to destabilize NATO and deter Western support for Ukraine through:

• Undersea Sabotage: Deploying specialized vessels like the Yantar to map, monitor, and prepare to sever critical fiber-optic data cables.
• Industrial Arson: Targeting European defense factories, warehouses, and logistics hubs supplying the Ukrainian military.
• Proxy Attacks: Recruiting local criminals and radicalized individuals via Telegram to conduct low-level sabotage and surveillance.

The price of vengeance. This reckless escalation often backfires strategically. The sloppy execution of the 2018 Salisbury Novichok attack on Sergei Skripal resulted in the death of an innocent British citizen and triggered the largest coordinated expulsion of Russian diplomats in history. Yet, because Putin views terror as an absolute necessity to maintain internal discipline and prevent defections, the RIS continue to prioritize these high-risk, low-yield operations.

8. Active measures (aktivniye meropriyatiye) weaponize societal divisions to destroy public trust in democratic institutions.

Most Americans did not fully understand that the goal of Russian intelligence was to sow distrust in the American electoral system itself, regardless of the election’s outcome.

Aktivniye meropriyatiye. Active measures (aktivniye meropriyatiye) are covert operations designed to influence foreign politics, mislead adversaries, and weaken democratic societies from within. Unlike traditional espionage, which seeks to gather secrets silently, active measures are offensive psychological warfare. The digital age has supercharged these tactics, allowing the SVR, FSB, and GRU to bypass traditional media and inject disinformation directly into Western public discourse.

The polarization recipe. The RIS do not create societal divisions; instead, they identify existing cultural, racial, or political fractures and systematically widen them. During the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, Russian troll farms operated by the Internet Research Agency (IRA) flooded social media with highly divisive content. The core strategy of these campaigns is remarkably simple yet devastatingly effective:

• Identify Vulnerabilities: Pinpointing sensitive societal issues, such as racial tensions or distrust in voting systems.
• Amplify Extremes: Using automated bots and fake personas to support and fund the most radical voices on both sides of a debate.
• Sow Chaos: Creating a state of perpetual outrage where citizens lose faith in the truth, their media, and their democratic institutions.

The ultimate objective. The ultimate goal of Russian election interference was never to elect a specific candidate, but to destroy the very concept of truth and shared reality in America. When the United States appears hopelessly divided and paralyzed by internal conflict, the Kremlin's authoritarian model looks stronger and more stable by comparison. Combating this threat requires a highly educated, media-literate public that can recognize when their emotions are being actively manipulated by foreign adversaries.

9. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine exposed catastrophic intelligence failures driven by the RIS's culture of telling the Kremlin what it wants to hear.

While marching to Putin’s tune, the RIS also led their country to disaster.

The road to disaster. The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine is one of the greatest intelligence failures in modern history, driven entirely by the systemic flaws of the RIS. The FSB's Fifth Service, which held primary responsibility for analyzing Ukrainian political stability, provided President Putin with catastrophically flawed assessments. Wedded to a culture of telling the dictator exactly what he wanted to hear, RIS leaders assured the Kremlin that Ukraine would collapse within days.

Flawed assumptions. Russian military planning was entirely dependent on the RIS successfully preparing the battlefield through subversion, sabotage, and pre-arranged defections. While the FSB did successfully recruit some high-level Ukrainian security officials, they completely misread the patriotism and resolve of the broader Ukrainian population. This intelligence failure resulted in:

• Conflating pre-war dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian government with a willingness to welcome Russian occupiers.
• Underestimating the Ukrainian military's capability and willingness to fight a prolonged, conventional war.
• Failing to anticipate the unified, massive economic and military response from NATO and the West.

The noncontact war illusion. The Russian General Staff had embraced the concept of bezkontaktnaya voina (noncontact war), believing that a combination of cyberattacks, psychological operations, and precision missile strikes would paralyze Ukraine without the need for a massive, bloody ground campaign. When this high-tech illusion shattered against fierce Ukrainian resistance, the Russian military was left completely unprepared for a grinding war of attrition. The RIS's arrogance and dishonesty ultimately led Russia into a strategic trap of its own making.

10. The silent war is won by "hero spies"—brave Russian insiders who risk everything for freedom and truth.

For every high-profile U.S. traitor like Aldrich 'Rick' Ames... or Robert Hanssen... there are dozens—perhaps even hundreds—of Russian intelligence officers... who have rejected Russia’s direction by defecting to the West or agreeing to remain inside their services while clandestinely providing invaluable information...

The true heroes. While the public is often captivated by the stories of Western traitors, the most significant victories in the shadow war are won by Russian insiders who choose to spy for the West. These "hero spies"—such as Adolf Tolkachev, Oleg Penkovskiy, and Sergey Tretyakov—have repeatedly altered the course of history by providing the United States and its allies with invaluable strategic secrets. Their motivations are rarely purely financial; instead, they are driven by a profound moral disgust with the corruption and brutality of the Russian state.

The ultimate sacrifice. Spying against the RIS carries the highest possible stakes, as the Russian services do not hesitate to torture and execute those they unmask. Despite these terrifying risks, brave Russian officers continue to volunteer, choosing to live double lives in the shadows to give their families a chance at freedom in the West. The impact of these heroic individuals is immense:

• Adolf Tolkachev: Saved the U.S. billions of dollars in defense research by providing complete blueprints of Soviet radar and aviation systems.
• Oleg Penkovskiy: Provided critical intelligence on Soviet missile capabilities that allowed President Kennedy to successfully navigate the Cuban Missile Crisis.
• Sergey Tretyakov: Exposed the inner workings and corrupt financial schemes of the modern SVR residency in New York.

A legacy of freedom. These individuals loved Russia, its rich culture, and its people, but they recognized that the Kremlin's security apparatus was an unworthy, oppressive force destroying their homeland. By choosing to stand against this evil, they proved that the RIS are not an invincible, seven-headed dragon, but a deeply flawed system that can be defeated. Their courage remains a powerful reminder that in the fight against tyranny, the truth is our most devastating weapon.

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