Key Takeaways
1. America's Core Purpose: Sustain Security, Freedom, and Prosperity by Denying Regional Hegemony.
Ensuring America’s security, freedom, and prosperity thus requires us to address the foundational role of power.
The "unipolar moment" is over. The United States no longer enjoys unquestioned global preeminence, primarily due to China's rise. This shift necessitates a clear, comprehensive defense strategy to protect fundamental national objectives: physical security, freedom, and economic prosperity for Americans. Without a favorable balance of power, these core interests become vulnerable to coercion by other states.
Power dynamics are crucial. In an anarchic international system without a global sovereign, military-economic strength is the ultimate form of coercive leverage. States with the most wealth and internal cohesion can generate modern militaries capable of large-scale violence. The US must prevent any single state from accumulating enough power to coerce it, which means denying hegemony over key regions.
Asia is the decisive theater. With 40% of global GDP and two-thirds of global growth, Asia is the world's most important region. China, with an economy already larger than America's in PPP terms and rapidly growing military sophistication, is the most plausible aspirant to regional hegemony. Denying China this dominance is the cardinal objective of US grand strategy, as Chinese hegemony could lead to economic exclusion, diminished US influence, and ultimately, direct coercion.
2. Anti-Hegemonic Coalitions in Asia Require US as Cornerstone Balancer.
A group of states leaguing together to prevent another state from achieving such hegemony is an anti-hegemonic coalition.
Coalitions counter aspirants. To prevent China from dominating Asia, enough states in or active in the region must form an anti-hegemonic coalition, wielding more power than China and its confederates. This coalition's goal is denial, ensuring that China cannot prevail in a systemic regional war—a decisive conflict over its hegemonic ambitions. The threat of such a war, even if latent, shapes states' peacetime decisions.
Challenges to coalition formation. Despite shared interests in autonomy, regional states face a "balancing or bandwagoning" dilemma. China can exploit varying vulnerabilities and incentives through a "focused and sequential strategy," picking off coalition members one by one. This strategy avoids provoking a full-scale systemic war until China has shifted the balance of power in its favor.
The US as cornerstone balancer. Given China's immense power and the fragmented nature of Asian security ties, an effective anti-hegemonic coalition is unlikely to form or sustain itself without significant US involvement. The US, as an external cornerstone balancer, provides the necessary power and reassurance to anchor the coalition, making it more resilient and attractive for vulnerable states to join, thereby offsetting China's focused pressure.
3. Alliances Demand Differentiated Credibility, Not General Reliability.
What matters most, however, is not American credibility in some general sense—that is, upholding every pledge or promise the United States has ever made, however imprudent—but US differentiated credibility in Asia: the degree to which important actors in the region believe that the United States will defend them effectively against China.
Alliances provide reassurance. Vulnerable states need confidence that a powerful external balancer like the US will actually fight on their behalf, especially given the potential for catastrophic costs in a war with China. Alliances, as strong signals of intent, deter adversaries and encourage balancing over bandwagoning by fortifying the confidence of at-risk states.
The problem of abandonment. The US interest in denying Chinese hegemony is partial, while for vulnerable regional states, the stakes are existential. This divergence creates a risk of abandonment, making loose US commitments insufficient. A failure to defend an ally, particularly in Asia, would severely undermine US differentiated credibility, signaling unreliability to other potential coalition members.
Differentiated credibility is key. US credibility is not about upholding every promise, but about fulfilling specific, high-priority commitments. Sacrificing lesser commitments to preserve strength and resolve for more important ones can actually enhance differentiated credibility. For Asia, this means the US must prioritize upholding its security guarantees against China, as failure to do so would have profound, interconnected consequences for the entire anti-hegemonic effort.
4. China's Optimal Threat: The Focused Fait Accompli, Starting with Taiwan.
China’s most net gainful strategy is to attempt a fait accompli against Taiwan first.
China's strategic dilemma. China cannot simply outgrow the anti-hegemonic coalition, as other states have strong incentives to balance against it. Beijing needs a strategy to penalize balancing behavior without provoking a full-scale systemic war it would likely lose. The "focused and sequential strategy" is its answer, aiming to fracture the coalition by isolating and subjugating vulnerable members.
Conquest over punishment. China's best military strategy is not punishment (imposing costs to induce capitulation), which is often ineffective against resolute states with allies. Instead, it's the "conquest approach," using brute force to seize and hold a target state's "key territory." This provides decisive leverage to compel disaffiliation from the coalition, as demonstrated by historical examples where direct control proved more reliable than persuasion.
Taiwan as the prime target. Taiwan is China's most attractive initial target for a fait accompli due to:
- National imperative: "Reunification" is a core CCP goal.
- US credibility: Taiwan's quasi-alliance status makes its fate a critical test of US resolve in Asia.
- Military advantages: Proximity to China's military power, Taiwan's vulnerability, and its strategic location in the first island chain.
A successful fait accompli against Taiwan would significantly weaken the anti-hegemonic coalition and open the path for China to target other vulnerable states like the Philippines.
5. US Must Employ a Denial Defense to Frustrate China's Fait Accompli.
The focus of US defense planning should therefore be to deny China’s ability to effectuate a fait accompli against its allies within the anti-hegemonic coalition.
Denial, not dominance. The US cannot restore military dominance over China due to China's economic size, military sophistication, and geographic proximity to potential targets. Strategies of horizontal or vertical escalation are also likely to fail, as China values its regional hegemonic ambitions more than distant interests and can retaliate against nuclear threats.
The denial defense. The optimal US strategy is a "denial defense," which aims to prevent China from achieving its core objective: seizing and holding a target state's key territory. Success means the vulnerable state remains affiliated with the anti-hegemonic coalition, upholding US differentiated credibility. This is a lower bar than dominance, requiring only the ability to frustrate China's objectives.
Defeating the fait accompli. A denial defense can succeed by:
- Preventing seizure: Destroying or disabling enough of China's invasion forces (ships, aircraft, enablers) before they reach the target's key territory. This exploits the "stopping power of water" and the vulnerability of amphibious/airborne assaults.
- Denying consolidation: If invaders land, ejecting them from key territory before they can establish defenses. This requires rapid counterattacks or a "defense in depth" to exploit invader vulnerabilities.
Focusing on Taiwan, the US and its allies must be prepared to turn China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities against China itself in the Taiwan Strait.
6. Limited War Success Hinges on Managing the Burden of Escalation.
Prevailing in a limited war therefore requires not only superior performance within a given set of rules but persuading the other side not to continue the conflict or escalate and instead to accept a limited but meaningful defeat.
War is a contest of rules. Any conflict between the US and China would almost certainly be a limited war, as both nuclear-armed powers have overwhelming incentives to avoid total devastation. Success in such a war depends on establishing and enforcing advantageous "rules" regarding means (geographic scope, targets, weapons) and ends (not seeking regime change or total disarmament).
Shifting the burden of escalation. The winning side in a limited war is the one that can achieve its objectives within the agreed-upon rules and make further escalation by the opponent too costly or risky. If China's fait accompli on Taiwan is denied, the US and its allies can propose a rule set that allows limited strikes on Chinese mainland targets directly supporting the invasion, while keeping the burden of escalating to a wider, more destructive conflict on China.
Resolve is dynamic. A nation's willingness to fight and suffer is not fixed; it evolves based on perceptions of the adversary's intentions, the costs incurred, and domestic/international opinion. The US must be prepared to influence China's resolve by making its escalation attempts appear futile and counterproductive, while strengthening its own.
7. The Binding Strategy: Compel China to Catalyze Coalition Resolve.
The crucial presupposition for making this work is that the potentially participating states, above all the United States, would need to judge that China was indeed highly aggressive and dangerous and thus that letting it secure so much power would place their vital interests in too much peril.
When denial is insufficient. If a focused denial defense proves unworkable or requires too much escalation, the US and its allies need a fallback: the "binding strategy." This approach deliberately compels China to act in ways that reveal its true aggressive, ambitious, or cruel nature, thereby catalyzing the resolve of coalition members to fight a larger, costlier war.
Leveraging perceptions of threat. China's actions can trigger strong thumotic (spirited) reactions beyond purely rational calculations. The binding strategy aims to force China to:
- Appear aggressive: By striking first or attacking widely beyond the immediate target.
- Reveal ambition: By expanding war aims or demonstrating a hunger for more territory.
- Exhibit cruelty: By causing disproportionate civilian harm or acting oppressively in occupied territory.
- Show unreliability: By breaking pledges of restraint or neutrality.
- Expose hidden power: By forcing it to deploy previously concealed capabilities.
These actions would strengthen the coalition's will to resist, even if it means a more expansive conflict.
Integrated denial and binding. The optimal approach is a partial integration of denial defense and the binding strategy. This involves intertwining military postures and activities among Western Pacific allies (US, Japan, Australia, Philippines, Taiwan) to ensure that any Chinese attack on a vulnerable ally necessitates a broader, more aggressive campaign by Beijing. This forces China into a dilemma: either accept military disadvantage or act in ways that strengthen the coalition's resolve to defeat it.
8. Prioritize Indo-Pacific Defense, Especially Taiwan, Over All Other Conventional Missions.
Preventing China’s regional hegemony there is the most important strategic objective of the United States; this goal should therefore receive strict priority in US defense planning and resourcing.
Indo-Pacific is paramount. Denying China hegemony in the Indo-Pacific is the single most important strategic objective for the US. This mission must receive strict priority in all aspects of US defense planning, including force structure, posture, and resource allocation. Success here ensures a favorable international environment; failure renders other challenges secondary and subject to Chinese preferences.
Taiwan as the primary scenario. The US Department of Defense should use a Chinese fait accompli attempt against Taiwan as the primary scenario for preparing US forces. Taiwan's military significance in the first island chain and its importance for US differentiated credibility make its defense non-negotiable. If Taiwan can be defended, other allies are likely defensible.
Philippines as a secondary focus. Following Taiwan, the US and its allies should prepare to defend the Philippines, another critical US ally along the first island chain. Its limited self-defense capacity and strategic location make it a likely next target for China's focused and sequential strategy.
9. Maintain Key Alliances, Prudently Expand Perimeter to Defensible States.
The United States should therefore maintain its existing alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific.
Existing alliances are foundational. The US must maintain its current alliances in the Asia-Pacific, including with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, the Pacific Island states, and South Korea. These allies provide critical strength, strategic depth, and form a defensive perimeter along the first island chain. Abandoning them would severely damage US differentiated credibility and weaken the anti-hegemonic coalition.
Prudent expansion in Southeast Asia. The US should seek to bring important Southeast Asian states into the anti-hegemonic coalition, balancing the benefits of their power and geography against their defensibility. Indonesia, as the largest and most defensible state in the region, is a prime candidate for closer affiliation, potentially even an alliance if necessary.
India as a critical partner. India is a vital member of the anti-hegemonic coalition due to its growing power, strategic location, and opposition to Chinese dominance. However, given its self-reliance and ability to defend its key territory, a formal US alliance may not be necessary or desired. The US should empower India to focus on balancing China in the Indian subcontinent and Indian Ocean, complementing US efforts in the Western Pacific.
10. Nuclear Deterrence and Economical Counterterrorism are Vital, but Secondary to Asia's Conventional Needs.
The nuclear arsenal and the counterterrorism enterprise are relatively self-contained demands that require only a relatively modest share of US defense efforts and resources.
Prioritizing conventional forces. While nuclear deterrence and counterterrorism are critical for US security, they represent a smaller portion of the defense budget compared to conventional forces. The vast majority of US defense resources must be allocated to conventional capabilities optimized for denying Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.
Effective nuclear deterrence. The US must maintain a survivable, large, and destructive nuclear arsenal, capable of discriminate employment in limited war. This deters large-scale attacks by any rational state, including China and Russia, by ensuring devastating retaliation against their most valued assets. This capability is a relatively independent requirement, not directly competing with conventional needs in Asia.
Economical counterterrorism. The US must continue to prevent large-scale terrorist attacks, but this mission should be executed as economically as possible. This means prioritizing:
- Local leadership: Empowering regional actors to counter terrorism.
- Small footprint operations: Utilizing standoff capabilities and local partnerships.
- Cost-effective tools: Employing tailored, less expensive technologies (e.g., light-attack aircraft, cheaper drones).
This approach ensures counterterrorism efforts do not divert critical resources from the primary challenge of China.
11. A Decent Peace is an Achievement, Forged by Readiness to Fight for Core Interests.
Peace, then, does not come from some unfocused readiness to be unpeaceful but only from a willingness to imagine and consider what a war would actually be like.
Peace through strength. The ultimate goal of this strategy is a "decent peace" – one that respects American security, freedom, and prosperity. This peace is not naturally occurring but must be actively willed and created through preparedness for war. A refusal to contemplate conflict can paradoxically lead to it, as it signals weakness to ambitious states.
Rationality in conflict. The strategy demands a rational approach to war, correlating the costs and risks of fighting with the benefits of securing core interests. It is not about bellicosity, but about demonstrating a credible willingness to fight effectively to convince potential adversaries that aggression is not worth the cost.
A stable equilibrium. The strategy is not anti-Chinese but anti-hegemonic. Its success would result in a world where China is a respected great power, but unable to dominate Asia. This equilibrium would allow the US to trade and interact freely, and regional nations to maintain their autonomy, fostering a tense but stable peace.
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