Key Takeaways
1. Amoral Familism: The Root of Collective Inaction
Most of the people of the world live and die without ever achieving membership in a community larger than the family or tribe.
A limiting factor. The village of Montegrano in southern Italy exemplifies a society where collective action beyond the nuclear family is virtually impossible. This inability to cooperate for the common good, or any end transcending immediate family interests, is termed "amoral familism." It profoundly limits economic and political development, as modern economies and successful self-government depend on the capacity for corporate organization.
Lack of civic engagement. In stark contrast to American towns buzzing with voluntary associations and public-spirited undertakings, Montegrano exhibits a striking absence of community-focused initiatives. There are no organized charities, no local newspapers, and even the few existing associations, like a club for upper-class men, never concern themselves with community welfare. This pervasive disinterest in public affairs is a direct consequence of the prevailing ethos.
Beyond mere poverty. While extreme poverty is a significant backdrop, it alone doesn't explain this collective paralysis. Peasants, despite their hardship, could contribute time to community projects but choose not to, often using poverty as an excuse. The issue isn't a lack of resources or time, but a fundamental cultural barrier to concerted action for shared benefit.
2. The Nuclear Family's Absolute, Short-Run Priority
Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise.
The guiding principle. The core hypothesis explaining Montegrano's behavior is that individuals act as if following the rule: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise." This "amoral familism" means morality exists only within the nuclear family, and outside it, self-interest reigns supreme.
Sacrifice for children. Parents view their existence as a relentless struggle to "set the children on the right road"—to enable them to marry and have their own families. This involves continuous "sacrifices," often at the expense of the child's individual aspirations, like Prato giving up his apprenticeship for his sister's dowry. However, this intense focus on the children's future is still framed within the family's material advantage.
Weakening bonds. As children approach adulthood and marriage, their attachment to their family of origin weakens, shifting focus to their prospective family of procreation. Marriages are often strategic, based on "interesse" (material advantage), leading to profound distrust even between in-laws. This transactional view of relationships, even within extended kin, underscores the narrow definition of family loyalty.
3. Pervasive Distrust and Envy Beyond the Family Unit
In the Montegrano mind, any advantage that may be given to another is necessarily at the expense of one's own family.
Zero-sum mentality. The Montegranesi operate under the belief that any gain for another family comes at the expense of their own. This zero-sum outlook fosters deep suspicion and envy towards anyone outside the immediate nuclear family, including friends, neighbors, and even distant relatives. Charity or justice towards outsiders is seen as a luxury one cannot afford.
Friends are dangerous. Friends are considered potential liabilities, not assets. They are seen as costly, potentially dangerous, and peculiarly susceptible to envy, especially since they know one's affairs intimately. This apprehension is vividly illustrated in TAT stories where friends or neighbors cause calamity out of jealousy, leading people to avoid close attachments.
Strategic neighborliness. While close friendships are avoided, relations among neighbors are generally good, but for pragmatic reasons: the urgent need for mutual aid in emergencies (e.g., fire, illness). However, precautions are taken to minimize temptation and envy, such as concealing purchases. This transactional approach extends even to fellow townsmen, where self-interest often overrides any sense of community obligation.
4. Political Incapacity and Systemic Corruption
In a society of amoral familists, no one will further the interest of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so.
Self-serving governance. Public office in Montegrano is viewed as a means for private gain, not public service. Officials are assumed to be self-serving and corrupt, and private citizens see no reason to concern themselves with public affairs unless it directly benefits their family. This leads to a lack of accountability and a pervasive cynicism about political motives.
Disregard for law. Laws are often ignored if there's no immediate fear of punishment. Employers cheat workers, and tax evasion is common. Agreements relying on legal enforcement are avoided due to the perceived unreliability of the system and the high cost of securing justice. This further impedes economic and social development requiring trust and adherence to rules.
Voter behavior. The electorate's behavior is erratic, shifting votes based on short-term material gains or a desire to punish incumbents for perceived injustices or unfulfilled promises. Loyalty to abstract political principles is secondary to immediate family advantage. This transactional voting pattern prevents the formation of stable political machines or consistent policy implementation.
5. Ideology Disconnected from Practical Behavior
In a society of amoral familists there will be no connection between abstract political principle (i.e., ideology) and concrete behavior in the ordinary relationships of every day life.
Hypocrisy perceived. Any claim of public-spiritedness or ideological commitment is widely regarded as a fraud. Priests are seen as "money grubbers," and socialists are viewed as hypocrites if their actions don't align with their stated ideals. This deep skepticism discredits any attempt at moral or political leadership.
Professional self-interest. Professionals, despite their education or official positions, often lack a sense of mission or calling. They use their specialized training as a "weapon" for private advantage. For example, a socialist doctor might not equip his office adequately, and a pharmacist, holding a government monopoly, might offer minimal service at high prices, showing no concern for community welfare.
Discrediting ideals. The visible discrepancy between the espoused ideology and the self-interested behavior of those who claim to uphold it further erodes trust in abstract principles. A peasant, observing a socialist landowner hiring a mule instead of ten workers, concludes that socialism is meaningless, as the landowner prioritizes convenience over the stated goal of worker welfare. This reinforces the belief that everyone is ultimately "after something."
6. Historical Roots: High Death Rates and Absent Extended Families
Until after the Second World War, when anti-biotics came into common use, the death rate there was high—never less than 15 per 1,000 and in some years probably as much as 40 or 50.
Fear of premature death. A pervasive fear of premature death, particularly of parents leaving children "on the street," is a structural cause of Montegrano's ethos. Historically, high death rates meant many children lost one or both parents, often becoming beggars. This deep-seated apprehension, termed "preoccupazione," shapes their worldview.
Absence of extended family. Unlike societies with strong extended families that provide a safety net, Montegrano's households are predominantly nuclear. This means children see their parents as their sole source of protection, intensifying the fear of abandonment upon parental death. Orphans are rarely taken in as equals by relatives, often becoming servants or facing severe hardship.
Land tenure's role. The historical land tenure system in southern Italy, characterized by absentee landlords and fragmented small plots, prevented the development of large, stable "stem" families seen in northern Italy. Without secure, adequate landholdings, peasants lacked the incentive or opportunity to organize larger family units that could pool labor and provide mutual support, thus reinforcing the nuclear family's isolation.
7. Childhood Rearing Reinforces Selfishness and External Control
It can be said with justice according to the proverb, 'Slaps and spanks make nice children'—and the mother spanks because she wishes them well.
Permissive yet punitive. Montegrano parents are generally permissive with young children, but punishment, often physical, is frequent and capricious. It's not consistently linked to moral principles but rather to immediate behavior or perceived dangers. This teaches children that gratification and deprivation depend on the whim of those in power, not on an internal sense of right or wrong.
Naughtiness as cleverness. Children's "naughtiness," often involving deception, is sometimes viewed with amusement and even pride as evidence of a "foxy" (furbo) and enterprising spirit. This subtly encourages cunning and self-interest, as parents implicitly applaud cleverness in navigating rules, even if it involves minor transgressions.
External locus of control. This upbringing fosters a belief that behavior is largely shaped by external forces and that punishment is a matter of "bad fortune" rather than guilt. Children are taught to avoid punishment by remembering advice or fearing consequences, rather than internalizing moral principles. This model extends to their view of the state and God, seen as powerful, capricious entities to be propitiated or feared.
8. The Illusion of Luck and Capricious Divine Intervention
God is like luck, and if luck could be managed by intention, it would not be luck.
Capricious deities. For many Montegranesi, God is not a loving or just figure but a demanding, capricious overlord who distributes bounty or catastrophe by whim. Saints are often preferred for prayer, as they are perceived as more accessible and capable of specific, practical "miracles" (e.g., protecting a sick pig), but they too are seen as unpredictable.
Transactional faith. The relationship with the divine is often transactional, based on "interesse." Believers promise candles or masses after a miracle is performed, fearing that pre-payment would remove the deity's incentive to act. This pragmatic, self-interested approach to religion reflects the broader ethos, where trust is conditional and based on immediate returns.
Discouraged initiative. This belief system, where success depends on luck or divine caprice rather than effort, acts as a check on initiative. Why save and invest, or engage in community action, if outcomes are ultimately beyond one's control? While some may make efforts "so that if Christ should give us a good year we would have done our part," deep debt from such gambles reinforces the sense of helplessness.
9. Conventional Explanations Fall Short of the Core Issue
There is an element of truth in each of the theories, but none of them is fully consistent with the facts that have to be taken into account, and one could not on the basis :of any of them—or of all of them together—predict how the people of Montegrano would behave in a concrete situation.
Poverty is insufficient. While Montegrano is desperately poor, poverty alone doesn't explain the lack of collective action. Peasants, despite their hardship, could contribute time or small resources to community projects but don't. Historical examples of equally poor societies demonstrating strong self-governance contradict poverty as the sole cause.
Ignorance is not the answer. The villagers are not as ignorant as often assumed; they understand political issues and distinguish between claims and real intentions. Their erratic voting behavior, for instance, is not due to a lack of comprehension but to a strategic, self-interested calculation, often to punish incumbents.
Class conflict is oversimplified. While class differences exist, they don't fully explain the political incapacity. There's no unified peasant action against the upper class, and class relations are often amicable by Italian standards. Distrust of the state is more "healthy" skepticism than pathological, and fatalism doesn't apply to individualistic actions like birth control. These factors are background conditions, not the primary drivers of behavior.
10. The Deep Challenge of Transforming a Cultural Ethos
Clearly a change in ethos cannot be brought about by the deliberate choice of the people of Montegrano. It is precisely their inability to act concertedly in the public interest which is the problem.
Self-perpetuating cycle. The ethos of amoral familism is a deeply ingrained cultural pattern, not a conscious choice. Its very nature—the inability to act concertedly for the common good—means the villagers cannot collectively decide to change it. If they could choose a new morality, they would already possess the capacity for collective action.
Cultural lag. Even though some underlying conditions that fostered amoral familism, like high death rates, are changing (due to antibiotics), the ethos itself will persist due to "cultural lag." Long-established ways of thinking and valuing have a life of their own, independent of the specific conditions that gave rise to them, making rapid transformation unlikely.
Risks of intervention. Deliberately changing an ethos is fraught with challenges and potential dangers. There's no guarantee that a new ethos wouldn't have equally problematic or even worse features. Furthermore, some objectionable features, like the concept of "interesse," might serve latent, important functions (e.g., protecting the family), and devaluing them could have unintended negative consequences.
11. Pathways to Progress: Cultivating Enlightened Self-Interest
However, amoral familism must be modified in at least three respects in order for organization, and thus economic and political progress, to be possible.
Broader self-interest. For progress, individuals must define self or family interest less narrowly than immediate material gain. This means pursuing a "larger" self-interest, such as valuing prestige, intrinsic satisfaction from organizational behavior, or establishing a reputation for fair dealing for future advantage. This "enlightened" self-interest is crucial for sustained cooperation.
Leadership and tolerance. A few individuals must develop the moral capacity to act as responsible leaders, even if paid, inspiring morale and acting effectively in organizational roles. Simultaneously, voters and the community must be willing to tolerate and support organizations, refraining from destroying them out of spite or envy, allowing collective efforts to take root.
Strategic interventions. Practical steps could include decentralizing governmental functions to provincial prefects, who would then encourage and reward local self-governance. Improving schools, providing vocational training, and fostering local media (like newspapers) could create a sense of community and provide avenues for social mobility. Encouraging simple cooperative ventures, like village soccer teams, could build foundational experience in collective action and bridge class divides.
Last updated:
