Separate and Unequal

1. The Kerner Commission's Genesis: A Political Maneuver Amidst Crisis

Creating a presidential commission seemed like the ideal option: it allowed him to demonstrate leadership without committing his administration to a specific course of action.

A President under siege. In July 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson faced a nation in turmoil. Deadly riots had erupted in Newark and Detroit, marking the culmination of four consecutive summers of racial unrest. This crisis coincided with a deeply unpopular and costly war in Vietnam, which was tearing apart the Democratic Party and diverting resources from his ambitious Great Society domestic agenda. Johnson also contended with a resurgent Republican Party that capitalized on white suburbanites' fears of crime and racial disorder, leading to significant GOP gains in the 1966 midterm elections.

A strategic delay. Faced with these mounting pressures and limited policy options, Johnson announced the creation of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (NACCD), later known as the Kerner Commission. His primary motivation was to demonstrate presidential leadership and reassure the nation without committing his administration to immediate, potentially controversial actions. He hoped the crisis would pass by the time the commission issued its report, a common strategy for postwar presidents dealing with vexing political issues.

Mainstream appointments. Johnson carefully selected the eleven-member commission, aiming for a mainstream, bipartisan group. He appointed Illinois Democratic Governor Otto Kerner as chairman and New York's liberal Republican Mayor John Lindsay as vice chairman. The commission included:

• Two African Americans (Roy Wilkins, Edward Brooke)
• Two Republican and two Democratic members of Congress
• Representatives from business and labor
• One woman (Katherine Graham Peden)
  Notably, there were no radicals, young people, or black nationalist spokesmen, as Johnson expected a mainstream report that would endorse his existing domestic agenda and shield him from criticism.

2. Asserting Independence: The Commission Defies White House Expectations

The new commission, however, failed to follow the White House script.

Defying expectations. Despite Johnson's careful selection, the commission quickly asserted its independence. Led by Vice Chairman John Lindsay and Senator Fred Harris, members were determined to conduct a thorough investigation into the underlying causes of the riots, rather than simply rubber-stamping the administration's views. This early defiance set the stage for a contentious relationship with the White House.

Early ideological clashes. The commission's initial meetings revealed deep divisions. Lindsay and Harris pushed for a broad mandate to examine the root causes of urban violence, such as poverty, discrimination, and lack of opportunity. In contrast, businessman Charles "Tex" Thornton insisted the commission focus solely on "law and order" and measures to control riots, fearing a "white backlash" if the report appeared to justify the unrest. These ideological fault lines would persist throughout the commission's work.

Challenging the National Guard. One of the commission's first acts of independence was to recommend reforms for the National Guard. Cyrus Vance's report on Detroit highlighted the Guard's ineffectiveness and potential for exacerbating violence due to:

• Lack of racial integration (e.g., Michigan's Guard was 98% white)
• Poor riot-control training
• Indiscriminate firing at crowds and buildings
  The commission's public recommendation for increased black recruitment and improved training angered Johnson, who privately threatened Harris for pushing the issue.

3. Unveiling the "Straitjacket of Facts": Field Teams Expose Systemic Racism

The evidence they gathered of persistent racial discrimination, and a growing gap between blacks and whites, was both overwhelming and irrefutable.

In-depth investigations. To answer "What happened?" and "Why did it happen?", the commission's executive director, David Ginsburg, and his deputy, Victor Palmieri, organized field teams. These teams, often composed of young, idealistic Peace Corps veterans, fanned out to twenty-six riot-torn cities. They conducted extensive interviews with residents, community leaders, and officials, compiling detailed reports and statistics.

Shocking realities. The field reports painted a stark picture of life in poor urban areas, revealing pervasive racial discrimination and neglect. Commissioners' personal tours to these areas further underscored the deplorable conditions, shocking even those with prior intellectual understanding. Key findings included:

• Housing: Dilapidated, overcrowded public housing, often with inadequate sanitation.
• Employment: Chronic high unemployment, especially among black youth (e.g., 33% in Newark), and limited access to good-paying jobs due to discrimination.
• Education: Poorly funded, segregated schools with lax standards (e.g., Detroit black schools 3-5 years behind white schools).
• Police Brutality: Widespread complaints of abusive practices, harassment, and overreaction by overwhelmingly white police forces.

Questioning the Great Society. The investigations also revealed the limited impact of Johnson's Great Society programs. Field teams found that federal initiatives often failed to reach the "true poverty class," creating dashed hopes and exacerbating frustration. This evidence challenged the administration's narrative of progress and convinced many commissioners that deeper, systemic issues were at play.

4. The "White Racism" Diagnosis: A Controversial Core Finding

White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II.

Forging a consensus. By late October 1967, David Ginsburg recognized a common theme emerging from the tours and testimony: white society bore primary responsibility for the conditions in America's slums. He skillfully steered the commission towards identifying "white racism" as the fundamental cause of the riots, a broad enough concept to unite most commissioners. This diagnosis became the organizing theme for the report's crucial Chapter 4.

Beyond individual prejudice. The commission's understanding of "white racism" extended beyond individual prejudice to encompass systemic issues. It referred to a constellation of ideas and actions suggesting white superiority and black inferiority, which manifested as:

• Discrimination in employment, housing, and education
• Residential segregation and the creation of black ghettos
• Indifference of white institutions and officials to black concerns
  This framework allowed the commission to blame societal structures rather than just individual "bad actors."

Internal dissent and radical proposals. While "white racism" gained superficial consensus, deeper divisions persisted. A staff report titled "The Harvest of American Racism" by social scientists like Robert Shellow and Lou Goldberg, argued that riots were often "rational" responses to oppression and called for radical solutions, including direct funding to militant groups. Ginsburg and Palmieri, deeming it "too provocative" and "unusable," rejected and ordered copies destroyed, fearing it would alienate the White House and conservative commissioners.

5. LBJ's Betrayal: Funding Cuts and Presidential Disengagement

If you’re going to drink whiskey, drink a little at a time and you can drink all night. If you drink the whole bottle right away, you’ll throw it up.

Financial strangulation. Despite initial promises of unlimited resources, the commission faced severe financial difficulties. Johnson, increasingly angered by Lindsay's influence and the commission's liberal direction, refused to seek a supplemental appropriation from Congress. By early December, the commission was effectively broke, forcing Ginsburg to drastically cut staff and accelerate the report's deadline.

Political retribution. LBJ's decision was a calculated act of retribution. He viewed the commission as a "Frankenstein monster" that had betrayed his expectations by:

• Criticizing his administration's pace of change
• Proposing billions in new spending at a time of fiscal austerity
• Allowing Lindsay to gain national prominence
  Johnson's personal pride was wounded, and he felt liberals failed to appreciate his civil rights accomplishments.

Ginsburg's difficult choice. Faced with the president's disengagement, Ginsburg chose loyalty over transparency. He publicly justified the accelerated deadline by claiming the urgency of the situation, rather than revealing the White House's budget cuts. This decision, while protecting the president, fueled staff suspicions of a "whitewash" and led to leaks to the media.

6. Forging Unanimity: The "Two Societies" Warning and Contentious Compromises

This nation is at present moving toward two societies, one black, one white, separate and unequal.

The final push for consensus. With a rapidly approaching March 1 deadline, the remaining staff, under Ginsburg and Palmieri, worked tirelessly to finalize the report. The most challenging task was drafting the recommendations section, which required balancing the ambitious proposals favored by Lindsay and Harris with the "law and order" emphasis of Thornton and the fiscal conservatism of Corman and McCulloch.

Lindsay's powerful summary. John Lindsay, fearing the report would be ignored, insisted on a hard-hitting summary. His aides, Peter Goldmark and Jay Kriegel, crafted a powerful introduction that included the now-famous phrase: "This nation is at present moving toward two societies, one black, one white, separate and unequal." This language, echoing the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision, was designed to shock white America into action.

Last-minute negotiations. The summary, along with the report's extensive program recommendations, sparked intense debate. Lindsay's coalition pushed for:

• Six million new low- and moderate-income housing units over five years
• Two million jobs for the unemployed and underemployed over three years
• A national system of income supplementation
  Thornton, Corman, and Peden resisted, but the threat of multiple minority reports, which would undermine the commission's authority, ultimately led to a unanimous vote. Thornton even threatened a last-minute minority report at the signing ceremony before being persuaded to sign.

7. A Prophetic Report: Public Reception and Political Polarization

The report of the riot commission splits the darkness like a flash of lightning.

Media frenzy. Upon its release on March 1, 1968, the Kerner Report generated massive media attention. Major newspapers and television networks focused on the summary's stark warnings about "white racism" and "two societies." The report became a bestseller, with Bantam Books selling nearly a million copies in two weeks, making it the fastest-selling book since Valley of the Dolls.

Divided reactions. Public reception mirrored the nation's growing polarization:

• Liberals and Civil Rights Leaders: Hailed the report as courageous and a "moment of truth," praising its indictment of white racism and its call for action. Martin Luther King Jr. called it "an important confession of a harsh truth."
• Conservatives: Condemned the report as too costly, blaming rioters rather than society, and dismissing "white racism" as an excuse for lawlessness. They argued it overlooked progress and promoted federal overreach.
• Average African Americans: Expressed skepticism, viewing it as "more of the same" and doubting real change would occur.

Nixon's political weapon. Richard Nixon, campaigning for president, seized on the white backlash against the report. He criticized it for blaming everyone "except the perpetrators of the riots" and appealed to the "silent majority" with promises of "law and order." This strategy successfully tapped into white voters' anxieties and helped solidify a new conservative coalition.

8. Limited Immediate Impact: The Report's Legislative Fate

Money cannot go to the Vietnam War and the race war at the same time.

LBJ's cold shoulder. Despite the report's widespread attention, President Johnson initially ignored it, then offered only faint praise. His anger stemmed from the report's cost, its perceived criticism of his administration, and the ongoing Vietnam War. He believed the commission's ambitious recommendations were politically and fiscally unfeasible, especially as Congress was demanding cuts to existing Great Society programs.

A legislative mixed bag. The report's broader legislative impact was limited, largely due to White House hostility and congressional indifference. However, it did provide crucial momentum for the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Senator Walter Mondale and other liberals used the report's dire warnings to push the stalled bill through Congress, with Republican John B. Anderson famously switching his vote after King's assassination.

King's assassination and renewed unrest. The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in April 1968, just weeks after the report's release, triggered widespread riots in over one hundred cities. This violence, including armed soldiers guarding the Capitol in Washington D.C., further hardened white attitudes and shifted public discourse away from racial justice towards "law and order." Any slim hope for implementing the report's ambitious agenda was effectively extinguished.

9. An Enduring Legacy: "Two Societies" in a Changing America

The problem of the color line remains as real in the second decade of the twenty-first century as it was in 1900 when W. E. B. DuBois coined the phrase.

A prophetic warning. The Kerner Report's haunting prediction of America moving towards "two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal" proved tragically accurate, albeit in ways the commissioners could not fully foresee. Decades of political shifts, demographic changes, and economic transformations deepened racial divides.

Evolving challenges. The post-1968 era saw:

• Political Shift: The rise of conservative populism (Nixon, Reagan) that dismantled many Great Society programs and cut federal aid to cities.
• Demographic Changes: The Immigration Act of 1965 led to increased diversity, complicating the "black-white" narrative with new tensions among ethnic groups (e.g., 1992 Los Angeles riots).
• Economic Inequality: The end of the postwar boom, deindustrialization, and policies favoring the wealthy widened the gap between rich and poor, disproportionately affecting black communities.
• Mass Incarceration: "Tough on crime" policies led to a dramatic increase in federal and state prison inmates, with young African American men bearing the heaviest burden.

Continued relevance. Despite progress like the election of Barack Obama, systemic issues persist. Stubborn racial segregation in housing, education, and employment, coupled with disparities in income and poverty rates, continue to plague black communities. Recent racial unrest (e.g., Ferguson, Baltimore) serves as a stark reminder that the underlying problems identified by the Kerner Commission remain unresolved, prompting renewed calls for dialogue and action, echoing the commission's original plea for "new will."