Hidden Hand

1. The CCP's Global Ambition: Reshaping the World Order

The Party’s program of influence and interference is well planned and bold, and backed by enormous economic resources and technological power.

An ideological struggle. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views the international landscape through a "Cold War mentality," perceiving itself as surrounded by "hostile forces" that it must defeat or neutralize. This perspective, rooted in the post-Soviet era, frames its global activities as an ongoing ideological struggle, aiming to transform the international order without direct military conflict. The CCP's ultimate goal is to shape the world in its own image, ensuring its continued rule at home and establishing China as the number one global power.

Eroding resistance from within. Rather than overt confrontation, the CCP's strategy involves subtly eroding resistance within Western countries by cultivating supporters, silencing critics, and subverting institutions. This wide-ranging campaign has advanced further than many Party leaders might have initially hoped, exploiting the perceived weaknesses of democratic systems. The CCP's plans are extensively detailed in internal speeches and documents, emphasizing a targeted approach to influence elites in the West.

Vulnerability of democracies. Democratic institutions and the post-World War II global order are proving more fragile and vulnerable to these new forms of political warfare than previously imagined. The CCP's tactics affect universal human rights, democratic practice, and the rule of law, creating a pervasive climate of fear among Chinese people living abroad, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Falun Gong practitioners, and Hong Kong democracy activists, as well as governments, academic institutions, and business executives wary of financial retaliation.

2. United Front Work: The "Magic Weapon" of Influence

Mao Zedong described united front work as one of the three ‘magic weapons’ of the Chinese Communist Party.

Co-opting and coercing. United front work is the CCP's fundamental strategy to induce, co-opt, and coerce individuals and groups outside the Party to align with its interests, while simultaneously undermining designated "enemies." This Leninist-inspired approach, developed during China's civil war, has been refined into a "science" with specific theories for engaging various groups, including political parties, intellectuals, ethnic groups, religious organizations, private companies, and overseas Chinese communities.

A sprawling infrastructure. Overseen by the CCP's United Front Work Department (UFWD), this work is executed through a vast network of Party agencies and Party-linked organizations. It forms the core of the CCP's overseas influence and interference activities, extending beyond the UFWD to become the responsibility of every Party member. Under Xi Jinping, united front work has intensified, particularly targeting overseas Chinese (qiaowu) to mobilize their wealth and influence for the "Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation."

Shaping mainstream perceptions. In recent years, united front efforts have increasingly focused on promoting a favorable view of the PRC within Western mainstream societies. This involves targeting elites to counter negative perceptions of CCP rule and highlight perceived positives. Influential Westerners engaging with Chinese culture or business may unknowingly interact with covert united front structures, becoming subjects of psychological manipulation designed to align them with Beijing's political objectives.

3. Economic Statecraft: Leveraging Markets for Political Gain

If you don’t do what Beijing’s political leaders want they will punish you economically.

Weaponizing economic dependence. China, as the world's largest factory and second-biggest economy, uses its immense economic clout as a potent political weapon. Industries heavily reliant on access to China's vast market face economic coercion if they incur Beijing's displeasure. This "economic vise" has been tightened conspicuously, as seen when:

• Imports of Canadian soybeans, canola, and pork were blocked after the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.
• South Korea faced 43 retaliatory measures, including tourism bans and import blocks, for installing an American anti-ballistic missile system.
• The Houston Rockets faced immediate backlash and suspension of games in China after a manager tweeted support for Hong Kong protesters.

The Belt and Road Initiative as blackmail. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as the ultimate instrument of economic statecraft, or "economic blackmail." While presented as an outlet for China's capital and a solution for developing nations' infrastructure needs, its true objectives extend to reordering the global geopolitical system. The offer of low-interest loans, often without environmental or other conditions, is hard for capital-short countries to resist, making them susceptible to Beijing's influence.

Discourse control through BRI. The BRI is not merely an economic project but a powerful vehicle for projecting power through "discourse control," shaping global narratives about China's role. It integrates commercial, technological, academic, and cultural activities, from think tank networks and media agreements to sister cities and "people-to-people exchanges." Nations signing onto the BRI implicitly endorse the CCP's narrative of "inclusive globalization" and "a community of common destiny for humankind," subtly legitimizing Beijing's authoritarian model.

4. Espionage and Influence: A Blended Threat

China’s espionage activities are closely integrated into Beijing’s influence operations.

Fusion of spying and influence. Beijing's espionage activities, aimed at stealing secrets and intellectual property, are inextricably linked with its influence operations, which seek to shape opinion and behavior. This fusion often involves the same individuals and organizations, with intelligence agents operating under deep cover while united front operatives openly cultivate relationships. The "Chinagate" scandal of 1996, involving donations to the Clinton campaign from individuals with ties to Chinese military intelligence, offered an early glimpse into this deep penetration.

Diffuse intelligence gathering. China dedicates enormous resources to both industrial and state espionage, deploying not only professional intelligence services but also thousands of "amateur information collectors." This "de-centralized micro-espionage" encourages professionals, businesspeople, students, and even tourists to provide information to handlers in embassies and consulates. Information sought includes:

• Technology and trade negotiation details.
• Business pricing and strategies.
• Reports on diaspora activities.
• Personal data for blackmail or coercion.

Targeting Westerners. China's intelligence agencies, primarily the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the PLA's Intelligence Bureau, actively recruit both Chinese diaspora and non-Chinese individuals. Recruitment methods exploit ego, sex, ideology, patriotism, and most commonly, money. Westerners are often lured with modest payments for "white papers," gradually escalating to requests for confidential information. Honey traps (meiren ji) and long-term relationships are also employed to compromise and "turn" targets, making them unwitting conduits for Beijing's agenda.

5. Media Control: Shaping Global Narratives

The Party believes it is now powerful enough to transform the global conversation.

"Our surname is Party." In China, media are an arm of the Party, mandated to serve its purpose and spread "positive energy." Xi Jinping famously declared that "the media must be surnamed Party," signifying their patriarchal subservience to the CCP. This loyalty is enforced through an intricate system of control, including propaganda directives, political editors, and severe penalties for "political mistakes" or "fake news," even for minor typos.

A global media force. The CCP has invested over $10 billion annually since 2009 to create a "new media world order" and "international first-rate media." Key players include:

• China Media Group (Voice of China): Formed by merging CCTV, China National Radio, and China Radio International, broadcasting in multiple languages globally.
• Xinhua News Agency: Rapidly expanding with over 180 bureaus outside China and a 24-hour English news channel, CNC World.
• China Daily Group: Publishes the flagship English-language daily and special editions for various regions, often taking orders from the CCP's Office of External Propaganda.
• Global Times: A subsidiary of People's Daily, serving as an outlet for more hawkish and nationalistic views.

"Borrowing boats" and self-censorship. The CCP employs "borrowing a boat to sail the sea" by placing its content in foreign media, such as the "China Watch" supplements in major Western newspapers. It also signs cooperation agreements with international news agencies like Associated Press and Reuters. This creates incentives for foreign media to self-censor to maintain market access or avoid jeopardizing partnerships. Social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, despite being blocked in China, are vigorously used by CCP media to spread disinformation and mobilize internet trolls ("50 cent army") to attack critics, while simultaneously monitoring and censoring Chinese users abroad.

6. Cultural Monopolization: Exporting "Red Culture"

‘Building leadership power over culture is one of the CCP’s cultural missions.’

Culture as political tool. For the CCP, culture is inherently political, serving as a tool for national rejuvenation and ideological control. The "Culture Going Global" strategy aims not to export traditional Chinese culture, but "red culture"—CCP values. This involves the Party positioning itself as the legitimate custodian of Chinese heritage, deciding what constitutes authentic culture, and transforming traditional elements into expressions of "red culture."

Poly Culture: A military-linked cultural front. Companies like Poly Culture, a subsidiary of the opaque China Poly Group, exemplify this strategy. Poly Group originated as a state-owned weapons manufacturer linked to the PLA's General Staff Department, and its top echelons are dominated by princelings. Poly Culture, while engaging in high-profile cultural events and sponsoring Western orchestras, serves to:

• Befriend and co-opt elites.
• Raise China's global cultural profile.
• Integrate into the Belt and Road Initiative's cultural diplomacy, staging performances that promote "red concerts" and "songs and dances in praise of the heroic journey of Communism in China."

Crushing cultural deviance. While promoting controlled cultural expressions, the Party actively suppresses any cultural activities it doesn't control. This includes:

• Banning Chinese-Canadian Miss World contestant Anastasia Lin for her human rights activism.
• Pressuring Western arts centers to remove "political" artworks, such as unflattering depictions of Xi Jinping.
• Forcing film festivals to pull Chinese films for "technical reasons" if they touch on sensitive historical periods like the Cultural Revolution.
• Relentlessly campaigning to prevent performances by the Falun Gong-aligned Shen Yun dance troupe, often by pressuring venues with threats of losing access to the Chinese market.

7. Academic Influence: Silencing Dissent, Steering Research

Universities as a political battlefield.

Thought management in academia. The CCP views academia as a vital battleground in its ideological struggle, aiming to reshape global discourse and promote "systemic confidence" in the Chinese model. This "thought management" project extends beyond China's borders, seeking to mute criticism, export censorship norms, and promote research that boosts the "Chinese path" and "Chinese theories." Western universities, often unaware of the CCP's objectives, become unwitting participants in this agenda.

Confucius Institutes and direct pressure. Confucius Institutes, ostensibly for language and culture, are explicitly part of "China's overseas propaganda set-up," managed by the Hanban. They exert leverage over host institutions, with curricula and staff selection decided in Beijing. Their interference in academic freedom is well-documented, including:

• Censoring topics like the "three Ts" (Taiwan, Tibet, Tiananmen).
• Confiscating conference programs that mention Taiwanese organizations.
• Lobbying to cancel events deemed "hostile."
• Explicitly forbidding employees from practicing Falun Gong in some contracts.

Financial dependence and self-censorship. Many Western universities have become financially dependent on lucrative Chinese student fees and research partnerships. This creates strong structural incentives for self-censorship among academics and administrators, who fear jeopardizing access to China or losing funding. Threats to cut off student flows or cancel joint programs are frequently used to bring universities into line. This "anaconda in the chandelier" effect leads scholars to "naturally" adjust their research and public statements, distorting the global understanding of China.

8. Mobilizing the Diaspora: Loyalty to the "Ancestral Homeland"

As long as the overseas Chinese are united, they can play an irreplaceable role in realizing the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation as they are patriotic and rich in capital, talent, resources and business connections.

Qiaowu: Overseas Chinese affairs. The CCP's qiaowu work aims to mobilize the 50-60 million people of Chinese descent living abroad, binding them to the "ancestral homeland" through appeals to national pride and cultural identity. This involves cultivating sympathetic community groups to serve CCP interests and suppressing hostile voices. The goal is to disseminate Party policy and prevent the spread of "poisonous Western ideas" like democracy and human rights.

Control of diaspora organizations. Over the past two decades, CCP-sympathetic individuals, often assisted by Chinese embassies and consulates, have taken over or established numerous Chinese community and professional associations in Western countries. These include:

• Peaceful unification councils.
• Business associations and chambers of commerce.
• Professional, scientific, and scholarly associations.
• Alumni and hometown associations.
• Religious and cultural groups.
• Student and scholars associations (CSSAs).
  These organizations are guided, rather than directly controlled, to "infiltrate their inner workings without overtly intervening," ensuring pro-Beijing elements are seen as representing the entire Chinese community.

Huaren canzheng: Political participation. Beijing actively promotes "huaren canzheng" ("ethnic Chinese participation in politics"), encouraging trusted Chinese-heritage individuals to join political parties and run for office in democracies. This strategy, akin to Mao's "mixing sand" tactic, aims to plant sympathetic individuals in the "enemy's camp." These politicians are expected to prioritize ethnic Chinese voters' interests, which often align with Beijing's agenda. This program, advanced in countries like Canada and Australia, exploits democratic processes to further authoritarian influence, often leveraging narratives of historical humiliation and anti-Chinese racism to unite voters.

9. Reshaping Global Governance: Challenging International Norms

Xi Jinping called on China to ‘lead the reform of the global governance system’.

Challenging the established order. Under Xi Jinping, China has shifted from merely participating in global governance to actively seeking to "lead the reform" of the system. While publicly presenting itself as a "champion of multilateralism" and a counterweight to "US unilateralism," the CCP's true aim is to reshape international institutions and global regimes to suit its authoritarian interests. This involves gaining acceptance for authoritarian systems and values on par with democratic ones, and creating new international organizations that stress national sovereignty to minimize accountability for China.

Sinicizing the United Nations. China is expanding its influence within the UN system, leveraging its permanent seat on the Security Council and its substantial allies among the G77 developing nations. It has gained effective control of key UN departments, such as the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, which is now described as "a Chinese enterprise." UN agencies are increasingly signing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agreements, helping Beijing "internationalize and legitimize its own domestic interests" and spread its narrative that the BRI is a global, rather than purely Chinese, initiative.

Alternative norms and parallel institutions. The CCP actively promotes its alternative definitions of "human rights," "terrorism," and "internet governance" through international bodies. It pushes "human rights with Chinese characteristics," prioritizing "the right to development" over individual and political freedoms, and uses forums like the "South-South Human Rights Forum" to normalize its repressive policies. Furthermore, Beijing creates parallel and pseudo-multilateral organizations, such as the 17+1 summit (between China and Central/Eastern European nations) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to bypass existing alliances, deal with countries bilaterally, and promote its norms, effectively "using the countryside to surround the city" on a global scale.

10. Double-Hatting and Front Groups: Obfuscating Party Control

When foreigners fail to recognise the ubiquitous role of the Party and are mistaken about who they are dealing with, it’s not solely their fault; the CCP actively attempts to obfuscate.

Masking Party ties. A leading tactic of the CCP is "double-hatting" (individuals holding multiple roles) and "double-plating" (organizations using different names depending on the context) to obfuscate its pervasive control. This makes it difficult for foreign interlocutors to recognize that they are often dealing with Party operatives or entities guided by Beijing, rather than genuine civic or independent organizations. For example, the government's State Council Information Office operates externally, but internally it is known as the Central Office of External Propaganda of the CCP, under the Central Propaganda Department.

Deceptive organizational structures. Hundreds of organizations for ethnic Chinese people in Western countries, ranging from political groups to business associations, professional bodies, and cultural organizations, have direct or indirect links to the United Front Work Department's network. These groups often use benign-sounding names like "peace," "development," "understanding," or "friendship" to mask their Party-controlled, united front nature. The Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), for instance, masquerades as an NGO but is an agency of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a top-level advisory body integral to united front work.

Strategic ambiguity. This deliberate ambiguity allows the CCP to operate in the shadows, leveraging seemingly innocuous engagements for political gain. For example, Poly Culture, a prominent player in Western high culture, is a subsidiary of China Poly Group, a conglomerate with deep ties to the PLA's military intelligence apparatus. Similarly, the International Monetary Institute, which promotes the internationalization of the Renminbi, claims independence but has senior staff with strong Party and united front links. This strategic obfuscation enables the CCP to penetrate various sectors of Western society, from local councils to financial institutions, without immediately revealing its underlying political agenda.

Last updated: February 1, 2026