Key Takeaways
1. European State Diversity: Four Distinct Paths of Political Development
The political system of Louis XIV’s France or Frederick the Great’s Prussia could not have been more different from that of Pitt’s Britain, not to mention the Poland of the liberum veto.
Vast differences. Despite shared challenges like warfare and economic change, European states diverged significantly by the 18th century. This book aims to explain why some became absolutist while others constitutional, and why some developed bureaucratic systems while others remained patrimonial. The traditional dichotomy of "absolutist bureaucracy" versus "parliamentary night-watchman state" is an oversimplification.
Two dimensions. Ertman proposes a more nuanced framework by analyzing states along two key dimensions:
- Political Regime:
- Absolutist: Ruler holds both executive and legislative power (e.g., France, Spain, German states).
- Constitutional: Legislative power shared between ruler and a representative assembly (e.g., Britain, Hungary, Poland, Sweden).
- State Infrastructure:
- Patrimonial: Public offices treated as private property, dominated by proprietary officeholding, tax farming, and "inside" finance (e.g., France, Spain, Hungary, Poland).
- Bureaucratic: Hierarchically organized, staffed by educated officials without proprietary claims, governed by impersonal administrative law (e.g., Britain, German states, Denmark, Sweden).
Four state types. Combining these dimensions yields four distinct state types: Patrimonial Absolutism, Bureaucratic Constitutionalism, Bureaucratic Absolutism, and Patrimonial Constitutionalism. Understanding these variations is crucial for grasping Europe's political development and its lessons for modern state-building.
2. Local Government's Foundational Role in Shaping Political Regimes
It was this factor which helped determine the type of representative assembly and ultimately the kind of political regime (absolutist or constitutional) that would emerge centuries later within a given state.
Primary determinant. The organization of local government during a state's formative centuries was the most significant factor in determining whether it would become absolutist or constitutional. This initial structure influenced the nature of national representative assemblies and their ability to resist royal power.
Two patterns. Ertman identifies two main patterns of local government:
- Participatory: Local governance involved cooperation between central officials and local free populations (e.g., English shires, Hungarian counties, Polish ziemie). This fostered social capital and collective action.
- Administrative: Governance was top-down, with royal officials imposing authority on fragmented local landscapes (e.g., Latin Europe, Germany). This hindered local cooperation and collective resistance.
Assembly structure. Participatory local government led to strong, territorially-based national assemblies (e.g., bicameral parliaments in Britain, Hungary, Poland, Sweden), where representatives from local communities could unite. Administrative local government, conversely, resulted in weaker, estate-based assemblies (tricurial in Latin Europe and Germany), where internal divisions along status lines made collective action against the monarch difficult.
3. Dark Age Legacies: Fragmented Local Power and Weak Assemblies
The collapse of Visigothic, Umayyad, Carolingian, and, last of all, Ottonian-Salian power left Latin Europe and Germany with a fragmented local political landscape and a powerful conceptual construct – the tripartite social theory of Gerard de Cambrai and Aldaberon de Laon – which was both a product of that fragmentation and an attempt to overcome it.
Post-Roman fragmentation. In Latin Europe and Germany, large-scale Dark Age states (like the Carolingian Empire) rose and fell on the foundations of the Roman Empire. Their collapse left behind a highly fragmented local political landscape, characterized by powerful, entrenched local elites (lords, churchmen, autonomous towns) whose power often predated the new central authorities.
Administrative response. New state-formers in these regions (e.g., Capetian France, German principalities) responded by building top-down, administrative systems of local government. They sent royal officials to reassert central authority against these established local powers, rather than integrating local populations into governance. This approach was necessary due to the existing power structures.
Weak assemblies. This administrative local government, coupled with the pervasive "three orders" social theory (clergy, nobility, commoners), led to the formation of estate-based (tricurial) representative assemblies. These assemblies were inherently divided by the distinct privileges and interests of each order, making it difficult for them to unite against royal attempts to centralize power and ultimately leading to their decline or subjugation.
4. Unencumbered State Formation: Fostering Participatory Local Governance
Unencumbered by the legacies of dark age, neo-Roman statebuilding in general and opposition from old entrenched elites in particular — rulers in England, Scotland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and Hungary worked together with churchmen, native aristocrats, and other fighting men to form a series of durable new polities...
A clean slate. In contrast to Latin Europe and Germany, regions like the British Isles, Scandinavia, and East-Central Europe did not experience large-scale, failed Dark Age state-building. This meant new states formed there (e.g., Anglo-Saxon England, Hungary, Poland) were "unencumbered" by pre-existing, fragmented power structures.
Cooperative beginnings. Rulers in these regions could build their states as a more cooperative enterprise, integrating local populations into governance. This fostered participatory local government structures, such as the English shire and hundred, the Hungarian county, and the Polish ziemia. These units involved local free men in judicial, administrative, and military affairs.
Strong assemblies. This participatory local governance, in turn, led to the emergence of strong, territorially-based national representative assemblies (e.g., the English Parliament, Hungarian Diet, Polish Sejm). These assemblies, representing cohesive local communities rather than fragmented estates, were better positioned to resist royal absolutism and assert their rights in taxation and legislation.
5. Timing of Geopolitical Pressure: A Key to Infrastructural Character
differences in the timing of the onset of sustained geopolitical competition go a long way towards explaining the character of state infrastructures found across the continent at the end of the 18th century.
Nonsimultaneous onset. While geopolitical competition was a universal driver of state expansion, its timing varied across Europe, profoundly influencing the nature of state infrastructures. This "nonsimultaneity" meant different "technical resources" and bargaining positions for rulers.
Early builders (pre-1450). States facing sustained military pressure early (e.g., Latin Europe, England) had to expand their infrastructures when administrative and financial know-how was scarce. This scarcity gave immense leverage to skilled personnel and financiers, forcing rulers to concede substantial control over state functions. This often led to:
- Proprietary officeholding (offices as private property).
- Tax farming.
- Reliance on "inside" credit from officials/financiers.
Late builders (post-1450). States that experienced sustained geopolitical pressure later (e.g., Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, Poland) benefited from a different environment. By this time:
- Universities produced a larger pool of trained legal and administrative personnel.
- Financial markets were more developed, offering diverse borrowing options.
- Rulers could learn from the successes and failures of earlier state-builders.
This allowed late-forming states to resist appropriationist pressures and build more proto-modern, non-proprietary bureaucracies.
6. Patrimonial Absolutism: Entrenched Appropriation Resisting Reform
Thus Latin Europe was the homeland of an early modern state form that I have termed 'patrimonial absolutism,' an ideal type most closely approximated by ancien regime France.
Latin Europe's path. In Latin Europe (France, Spain, Italian states), the combination of fragmented local power (legacy of Dark Age states), weak estate-based assemblies, and early, sustained geopolitical competition created a unique trajectory. Rulers pursued absolutism, but their state apparatuses became deeply patrimonial.
Institutionalized appropriation. From the 12th century onwards, constant warfare forced rulers to expand their administrative and financial systems. Due to the scarcity of skilled personnel and credit, they relied heavily on practices that privatized public functions:
- Proprietary officeholding: Offices were bought, sold, and inherited (e.g., French officiers).
- Tax farming: Private syndicates collected taxes for profit (e.g., French fermiers généraux, Castilian alcabala).
- "Inside" credit: Government officials and financiers provided loans, gaining influence and privileges.
Resistance to reform. Despite repeated financial crises and military setbacks (e.g., France's bankruptcies, Spain's decline), these patrimonial structures proved incredibly durable. Entrenched vested interests—the noblesse d'état of officeholders and financiers—fiercely resisted any attempts at genuine bureaucratic reform, often using their influence at court or in the remaining assemblies to thwart change. This "rationalization of irrationalization" merely made patrimonialism more efficient, not more modern.
7. Bureaucratic Absolutism: Efficient Administration, Fragile Finances
As such, the states of Germany must be categorized as exemplars of bureaucratic, as opposed to patrimonial, absolutism.
Germanic path. In Germany and Denmark, the legacy of fragmented Dark Age states led to administrative local government and weak, estate-based assemblies, paving the way for absolutism. However, the late onset of sustained geopolitical competition (post-1450) allowed these rulers to build a different kind of state infrastructure.
Advantages of the latecomer. German princes, facing external threats from the 15th century onwards, could draw on:
- Advanced models: Borrowing administrative structures from more developed states (e.g., Swedish military administration for Prussia's Kriegskommissariat).
- Skilled personnel: A growing supply of university-trained jurists and administrators (Beamten) who did not demand proprietary rights over their offices.
- Legal frameworks: Roman law reception provided a basis for centralized, non-proprietary administration.
This enabled them to construct proto-modern, non-proprietary bureaucracies, free from the venality and tax farming prevalent in Latin Europe.
Absolutist limitations. Despite administrative efficiency, bureaucratic absolutism faced inherent financial weaknesses. Without strong representative assemblies to provide credible guarantees, rulers struggled to access broad public credit markets. They relied on:
- War chests: Accumulating cash reserves in peacetime (e.g., Prussia's Staatsschatz).
- Contributions: Extracting resources from conquered or occupied territories.
- Currency debasement: Short-term gains with long-term economic damage.
This made them vulnerable in prolonged conflicts, as seen in Prussia's financial collapse in 1795, highlighting the superiority of constitutional states in mobilizing resources.
8. Patrimonial Constitutionalism: Noble Dominance and Military Weakness
Hence these two polities conform to an early modern state type I call patrimonial constitutionalism, in contrast to the bureaucratic constitutionalism of Britain.
East-Central European anomaly. Hungary and Poland, despite having strong, territorially-based representative assemblies (Diets/Sejm) like Britain, developed a unique form of "patrimonial constitutionalism." This was due to their unencumbered state formation combined with the late onset of sustained geopolitical competition.
Noble appropriation. Because these states lacked strong central administrative apparatuses when geopolitical pressures intensified (post-1450), their powerful nobilities, already dominating local government (counties, ziemie), used their parliamentary strength to:
- Block centralizing reforms: Prevent the creation of royal bureaucracies or standing armies that might threaten their power.
- Appropriate state functions: Transfer administrative, financial, and military responsibilities to local, noble-controlled bodies (e.g., sejmiki levying and retaining taxes, private noble armies).
- Entrench privileges: Codify noble liberties (e.g., Hungary's Tripartitum, Poland's Henrician Articles), including tax exemptions and judicial authority over peasants.
Tragic consequences. This extreme form of noble self-governance, while preserving constitutional forms, led to severe military weakness. Hungary suffered decisive defeat at Mohacs (1526) and relied on Habsburg protection. Poland, paralyzed by the liberum veto and magnate dominance, became incapable of self-defense, leading to its eventual partitions in the late 18th century.
9. Bureaucratic Constitutionalism: The British Model of State Strength
It was this newly bureaucratic and irreversibly parliamentary British state which, through its seemingly limitless ability to mobilize resources for war, drove its rival, ancien regime France, inexorably towards bankruptcy and revolution over the course of the 18th century.
Britain's unique path. England's development into a "bureaucratic constitutionalism" was a confluence of unencumbered state formation (leading to participatory local government and a strong, territorially-based Parliament) and early, sustained geopolitical competition. While early competition initially fostered patrimonial tendencies, Parliament acted as a crucial counterweight.
Parliamentary oversight. From the 13th century, the English Parliament, representing cohesive local communities, consistently challenged royal corruption and administrative inefficiency. After the Glorious Revolution (1688), Parliament's permanent presence and active scrutiny enabled reformers to:
- Dismantle patrimonialism: Replace proprietary officeholding, tax farming, and "inside" credit with salaried officials and state-controlled revenue collection (e.g., Customs, Excise).
- Build public credit: Establish a market-based system of public finance (e.g., Treasury Orders, Bank of England) backed by parliamentary guarantees, attracting broad investment.
Swedish parallels. Sweden, also an "unencumbered state-former," developed a hybrid Riksdag (with a peasant estate) that, despite periods of royal absolutism, ultimately fostered a non-proprietary bureaucracy and a national bank accountable to the assembly. This allowed Sweden to achieve a form of bureaucratic constitutionalism, albeit with more contingent shifts in power.
Military superiority. This combination of a strong, accountable central bureaucracy and a robust public credit system, underpinned by parliamentary consent, gave Britain an unparalleled ability to mobilize resources for war. This fiscal-military strength proved decisive in its 18th-century conflicts with France, driving its absolutist rival to financial collapse.
10. The Paradox of Absolutist Reform: Vested Interests vs. State Capacity
The contradictions inherent in this form of absolutism, contradictions between the geopolitical ambitions of rulers and their long-term capacity to mobilize resources using institutional arrangements and methods introduced during the early days of statebuilding, had proven impossible to overcome...
Inherent limitations. Absolutist regimes, despite their centralized power, faced fundamental contradictions that hindered genuine administrative and financial reform. Rulers' geopolitical ambitions often outstripped their capacity to mobilize resources effectively without undermining the very social structures that supported their rule.
Vested interests. In patrimonial absolutist states (e.g., France, Spain), entrenched proprietary officeholders, financiers, and privileged elites had strong vested interests in the existing system. Reforms aimed at efficiency or broader taxation directly threatened their privileges and profits, leading to fierce resistance through court intrigue, parliamentary obstruction (where assemblies still existed), or even rebellion.
Fiscal dilemma. Without the consent of a broad-based representative assembly, absolutist monarchs struggled to raise sufficient, stable tax revenues. This forced reliance on unsustainable expedients like:
- Sale of offices: Generating short-term cash but privatizing public functions.
- Forced loans and currency debasement: Alienating creditors and damaging the economy.
- "Inside" credit: Creating a dependency on private financiers who extracted high costs.
These measures, while providing temporary relief, ultimately eroded state capacity and legitimacy, making long-term military sustainability impossible.
11. Path Dependence: How Early Choices Shaped Europe's Political Destiny
European statebuilding can be understood as a form of path-dependent change analogous to the continent’s later process of industrialization.
Critical junctures. European state-building exemplifies "path-dependent change," where institutional choices made at early "critical junctures" (e.g., the nature of local government after Dark Age state formation) set long-term trajectories. These initial choices constrained future options, making it difficult for states to adapt quickly or efficiently to changing environments.
Institutional inertia. Patrimonial institutions, once established, proved remarkably durable due to the power of vested interests. Even when suboptimal for military effectiveness or economic growth, these arrangements persisted for centuries. For example, France's patrimonial absolutism endured for over 300 years, only collapsing after a century of intense conflict with a more modern British state.
Lessons for today. The European experience highlights the difficulty of building effective and honest administrative and financial infrastructures. Rent-seeking behavior by officials, financiers, and other groups is a pervasive challenge. The book concludes that a strong center combined with strong, participatory local institutions is the optimal path for balancing state expansion, political participation, economic growth, and geopolitical competition, preventing either central tyranny or local oligarchic capture.
