Unstable Majorities

1. American Politics is Defined by Unstable Majorities, Not Deep Public Polarization.

The United States did not experience any comparable period of majoritarian instability in the entire twentieth century.

Frequent shifts. American politics since 1992 has been characterized by "unstable majorities," a stark contrast to the long periods of stable party control seen in the 20th century. The US electoral system, with its independently elected executive and bicameral legislature, allows for eight possible patterns of institutional control (President, House, Senate). Historically, only a few patterns dominated for decades, such as:

• Republican dominance (1896-1930)
• Democratic dominance (1932-1952)
• Divided government (1954-1992)

Recent volatility. However, the last twelve elections (1992-2016) have produced six different patterns of control, with frequent flip-flopping between parties. This includes events like:

• Republicans capturing Congress for the first time in 40 years (1994)
• The president's party gaining House seats in midterms (1998, 2002)
• Unified control shifting dramatically in short spans (e.g., 2004 RRR to 2006 RDD to 2008 DDD)

Voter consistency. Paradoxically, this macro-level instability coexists with increased consistency in individual voter choices. The author argues that voters are primarily "responders" to the choices offered by parties, and the nature of these choices, rather than a fundamental shift in the electorate, drives the observed instability. This sets the stage for understanding "party sorting" and "overreach" as key explanatory factors.

2. The Political Class is Polarized, But Normal Americans Remain Centrist.

All in all, the data compiled by academic and commercial survey organizations indicate that in broad outline the American public has changed little in the past four decades.

Elite divergence. The "political class"—elected officials, party activists, and campaign donors—has undeniably polarized. Data shows:

• Congressional ideological positions have diverged significantly since the 1970s, with little overlap between parties (Figure 2.1).
• Partisan activists and donors have moved further apart ideologically (Figures 2.2, 2.3).
• Americans correctly perceive that the parties have become more distinct (Figure 2.4) and care more about election outcomes (Figure 2.5).

Public's stability. In stark contrast, "normal Americans"—the vast majority not deeply involved in politics—have not polarized.

• Ideologically, the proportion of self-identified moderates has remained stable, still the modal position (Figure 2.6).
• Partisan-wise, independents are at a record high, now the largest single "partisan" category, not diminishing (Figure 2.7).
• On specific "hot-button" issues like abortion, most Americans remain centrist, favoring legal abortion only under certain circumstances, with little change over decades (Figure 2.8, 2.9).

False perceptions. Despite this reality, the public believes it has polarized, a phenomenon termed "false polarization." Studies show that the more partisan or ideological individuals are, the more they exaggerate differences between themselves and their opponents. This misperception is often fueled by media coverage and homogeneous social networks among the politically involved.

3. Party Sorting, Not Public Polarization, Explains Increased Partisan Conflict.

When we speak of political polarization, it is more a matter of Democrats and Republicans becoming more homogeneous in their lives and basic beliefs than it is of the nation as a whole becoming fundamentally divided.

Sorting vs. Polarization. The core argument is that the US has experienced "party sorting," where liberals have increasingly become Democrats and conservatives Republicans, rather than a broad "polarization" of the entire electorate. Sorting makes parties internally homogeneous and distinct from each other, even if the overall distribution of public opinion remains centrist. This process is initiated by the political class, with the public following later.

Three key features:

• Elite-driven: The political class sorts first, and the attentive public takes note and sorts later.
• Involvement-dependent: Sorting increases with the level of political involvement; activists and donors are far more sorted than average voters.
• Imperfect public sorting: While typical partisans are better sorted than in the past, it remains far from perfect. For example, substantial minorities of strong partisans hold views on abortion that contradict their party's platform (Table 3.1).

Affective polarization. This sorting contributes to "affective polarization"—an increased dislike between partisans. As parties become more distinct ideologically, the average Democrat and Republican are further apart, naturally leading to greater animosity. This is reinforced by distorted perceptions of the opposing party's extremity.

4. Party Sorting Fuels Incivility, Gridlock, and Higher Stakes in Politics.

The natural consequence of party sorting is that each party gradually comes to have less contact with, knowledge of, and sympathy for the constituencies of the other.

Contentious politics. Party sorting has transformed American politics into a more contentious and less civil arena. In the mid-20th century, heterogeneous parties allowed for cross-party coalitions and compromise. Today, with parties more ideologically homogeneous, proposals from one side are often strongly opposed by the other, and there are fewer moderates to bridge divides. This mirrors the "venomous politics" of the late 19th century, where parties represented distinct economic interests.

Homogeneous coalitions. Modern party coalitions are increasingly homogeneous along regional and demographic lines:

• Democrats are largely an urban party, strong in coastal regions.
• Republicans are predominantly suburban and rural, dominating the South and heartland.
  This reduces incentives for parties to moderate stances on issues like energy, environment, or guns, as their constituents' interests are more aligned.

Higher stakes. Party sorting has also raised the stakes of politics. When parties were heterogeneous, party control mattered less for substantive policy outcomes. Now, with ideologically coherent parties, control of government institutions directly translates into attempts to implement distinct party platforms. This intensifies emotional involvement and animosity, as partisans increasingly question the motives of opponents, dismissing their arguments rather than engaging with them.

5. The "Overreach" of Governing Parties Drives Electoral Instability.

The more a party’s record and platform depart from the median, the greater the electoral loss.

Alienating the margins. "Overreach" occurs when a party, after winning control, attempts to govern in a manner that alienates the marginal members of its electoral coalition. These marginal voters, often independents or loosely attached members of the opposition, are typically more centrist than the party's base. When the governing party pursues policies or priorities too extreme for these voters, it suffers losses in the next election.

Examples of overreach:

• Clinton (1992): Campaigned as a centrist but pursued a traditional liberal agenda (e.g., healthcare overhaul), leading to the Democratic calamity in the 1994 midterms.
• Gingrich (1994): Republican House majority overreached with aggressive budget cuts, leading to a public backlash and Clinton's easy re-election in 1996.
• Bush (2004): Despite a narrow win, claimed a mandate for a "freedom agenda" and Social Security private accounts, contributing to the Republican "thumpin'" in 2006.
• Obama (2008): Focused on cap-and-trade and the Affordable Care Act, priorities more aligned with the Democratic base than the broader public, resulting in a "shellacking" in 2010.

Why overreach persists. This tendency is exacerbated by:

• Homogeneous party bases: Pressures from the left (Democrats) or right (Republicans) pull elected officials away from the center.
• Close party balance: Creates urgency to act quickly, as long-term majority control is uncertain.
• Policy-driven parties: Modern parties prioritize achieving policy goals over merely winning elections, making them willing to take greater electoral risks.

6. Independents Are the Crucial, Volatile Swing Voters, Not "Closet Partisans."

Independents clearly hold the balance of electoral power in the contemporary United States.

Dismissing independents. Many analysts dismiss the rising number of self-identified independents (around 40% of the electorate, Figure 6.1) by claiming they are "closet partisans" or "leaners" who vote just like weak partisans. This view, however, overlooks crucial distinctions.

Evidence of independence:

• Less stable identification: Independent leaners are significantly less stable in their partisan self-identification over time compared to weak partisans.
• Less party satisfaction: They are less satisfied with how well either party represents their views (Table 6.1).
• Higher third-party support: When given the option, independent leaners are more likely to vote for third-party candidates than weak partisans (Table 6.2).

Electoral impact. This volatility makes independents the critical "marginal members" of any electoral coalition.

• The party that wins the independent vote usually wins the presidential election (Figure 6.3).
• Large swings in the independent vote are consistently associated with significant shifts in House election outcomes (Figure 6.4), demonstrating their power to create "wave elections."

RAE limitations. The "rising American electorate" thesis, which posits an inevitable Democratic majority due to demographic shifts, faces challenges. It assumes static group allegiances and ignores potential backlash from other groups, as well as the ability of parties to adapt their platforms. The 2016 election, where Trump gained among white working and middle classes, highlighted the fragility of these assumptions.

7. Congressional Elections Have Re-Nationalized, Ending the "All Politics Is Local" Era.

Today one can better predict the winner’s vote in a congressional district using the district’s previous presidential vote than its previous House vote.

End of an era. The aphorism "all politics is local," once a cornerstone of American political understanding, no longer holds true. The mid-to-late 20th century was an era of "incumbency and insulation," where:

• Presidential coattails were minimal (Figure 7.1).
• Midterm seat losses for the president's party were relatively small (Figure 7.2).
• The incumbency advantage was high (Figure 7.3).
• Split-ticket voting and split-district outcomes (presidential vote for one party, House for another) were common (Figures 7.4, 7.5).

Return to national tides. Since the 1994 Republican takeover, congressional elections have "re-nationalized," meaning candidates' fates are increasingly tied to their party's national standing.

• Split-ticket voting has sharply declined (Figure 7.5).
• The national component of the House vote now outweighs the local/personal component (Figure 7.7).
• State legislative elections also show increasing nationalization.

Candidate sorting. This shift is largely attributed to party sorting among candidates. Parties now nominate more ideologically homogeneous candidates, reducing the incentive for voters to split their tickets. Campaign finance trends, with ideologically committed donors, further reinforce this homogenization. While this increases collective party responsibility, it also contributes to the rapid, disruptive swings in institutional control seen in recent "wave elections."

8. The US Experience of Elite Polarization is Exceptional Compared to Europe's Depolarization.

The American experience of increasing polarization is untypical: most other countries witnessed constant or declining levels of polarization.

Opposite trajectories. While the US political class has polarized, major parties in many other advanced democracies have experienced the opposite: depolarization. Studies in Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands show:

• Elite convergence: Major parties (e.g., UK's Labour and Conservatives) have softened their platforms and converged ideologically (Figure 8.1, 8.2).
• Public de-sorting: As elites depolarized, the public in these countries also de-sorted, with less policy distance between adherents of major parties (Figure 8.5).
• Stable public opinion: Similar to the US, the aggregate public opinion in these countries has changed little, but unlike the US, elite and partisan positions have moved closer.

Puzzling findings. This American exceptionalism is puzzling, as traditional theories often linked majoritarian electoral systems (like the US and UK) to two broad, catch-all parties, and proportional representation systems (like much of Europe) to more ideological parties. The UK's depolarization, despite its majoritarian system, challenges simple explanations.

Rise of populism. This convergence of mainstream parties in Europe may have created a vacuum, contributing to the rise of "far-right" populist parties (e.g., National Front in France, UKIP in Britain, Table 8.1). These parties often exploit new cleavages like immigration, attracting voters disillusioned by the centrist positions of traditional parties.

9. Current Political Instability Echoes the Late 19th Century's "Era of No Decision."

The major historical precedent for such instability of institutional control came during the so-called Period of No Decision or Era of Stalemate in the late nineteenth century.

Historical parallel. The current era of unstable majorities (since 1992) closely resembles the late 19th century's "Era of No Decision" (1874-1894), a period marked by closely fought national elections and frequent shifts in institutional control (Table 9.1). This earlier era also saw:

• Only one presidential candidate winning a popular vote majority in five elections.
• Two instances of the popular vote winner losing the Electoral College (1876, 1888), a phenomenon not repeated until 2000.
• Unified party control for only four years out of two decades.

Shared dislocations. Both periods were characterized by profound socioeconomic transformations that disrupted old electoral coalitions and created new problems:

• Economic Transformation: Industrial Revolution then; post-industrial now.
• Globalization: Rapid economic integration then; now.
• Population Movements: Rural-to-urban then; internal migrations (South-North, Frostbelt-Sunbelt) now.
• Immigration: Surged then; surged now.
• Inequality: Gilded Age wealth disparities then; rising inequality now.

Consequences of instability. Such instability hinders effective governance, as "great presidents" rarely emerge during these times. The late 19th-century era ended with a decisive victory (McKinley Republicans) and sustained performance. The critical question is whether the US can afford another prolonged period of political chaos, especially given today's slower economic growth and global threats.

10. The 2016 Election Reflected Deep Dissatisfaction and Flawed Candidates, Not a Moral Collapse.

Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton head into the final hours of the 2016 presidential campaign with the worst election-eve images of any major-party presidential candidates Gallup has measured back to 1956.

Historically flawed candidates. The 2016 election was unique for the unprecedented negative ratings of both major party candidates.

• Trump shattered the record for unfavorable ratings (63%), surpassing Barry Goldwater (47%).
• Clinton nearly matched this, with 55% unfavorable, exceeding George McGovern (41%) (Figure 10.1).
  Voters saw both as deeply flawed, with many choosing the "lesser of two evils."

"Change" vs. "Continuity." A significant number of Americans voted for Trump despite their negative views of his qualifications, temperament, and honesty (Table 10.1). Exit polls indicated that voters prioritized "change" over "empathy, experience, and judgment," a dimension where Trump, the "disrupter," overwhelmingly beat Clinton, the candidate of continuity. This suggests that many votes for Trump were driven by dissatisfaction with the status quo rather than enthusiastic endorsement of his controversial persona.

Media and "game changers." The media's almost unanimous opposition to Trump, often spilling into news coverage, may have backfired due to declining trust in media (Figure 10.2) and a perceived anti-elite bias. Claims of "game-changing" events like the Comey letter or Russian interference, while widely discussed, are typically found by scholarly research to have small, transitory effects on election outcomes.

11. Antielitism and Class Resentment Drove 2016 Voting More Than Racism or Sexism.

When a man as uncouth and reckless as Trump becomes president by running against the nation’s elites, it’s a strong signal the elites are the problem.

Questioning identity politics. While racism and sexism were frequently cited as primary drivers of Trump's victory, the evidence is not unambiguous.

• Millions of whites who voted for Obama in 2012 switched to Trump in 2016 (Table 11.1), challenging a simple racism narrative.
• The gender gap, while present, was not unusually large compared to previous elections (Table 11.2), and a majority of white women voted for Trump.
  These observations suggest that other factors were at play beyond simple bigotry.

Revolt of the "unprotected." A more compelling explanation is the resurgence of antielitism and class resentment. Many Americans, particularly the "unprotected" (those whose lives are negatively impacted by economic and social changes), feel ignored or condescended to by "protected" elites in Washington, Wall Street, media, and academia. This sentiment, reminiscent of George Wallace's campaigns in the 1960s, targets:

• Economic elites: For perceived failures and bailouts after the 2008 crash.
• Political elites: For not addressing economic distress and focusing on niche cultural issues.
• Cultural elites: For perceived disdain towards the values and lifestyles of the heartland.

"Seriously, not literally." Trump's success stemmed from his ability to tap into this deep-seated resentment. His supporters often took his outlandish promises "seriously, but not literally," understanding that he aimed to move the country in a direction they desired, even if his specific proposals were unrealistic. This "directional voting" suggests a preference for a candidate on their side of an issue, even if extreme, over a moderate who maintains an undesirable status quo.

12. The Era of Unstable Majorities Continues, Challenging Both Parties and Institutions.

For now, at least, an era of unstable majorities continues.

Persistent discontent. The alarmist rhetoric surrounding Trump's presidency, while understandable, may overlook the underlying stability of the American public and the resilience of its institutions. The 2016 election, while consequential, did not represent a fundamental shift in the electorate's moral character. Instead, it highlighted deep-seated dissatisfaction with elites and the political status quo.

Institutional resilience. The US institutional system, with its separation of powers and checks and balances, is robust and has historically frustrated presidents. This suggests that even a disruptive president like Trump will face significant constraints, preventing a rapid descent into autocracy. The ongoing disarray within the Trump administration itself further limits its ability to enact sweeping changes.

Challenges ahead. The era of unstable majorities is likely to continue, with the 2018 midterms presenting the next opportunity for significant shifts in institutional control.

• Senate: Democrats face an uphill battle, defending many seats in Trump-won states.
• House: Democrats need 24 seats, a plausible target given historical midterm swings and the number of Republicans in Clinton-won districts.
  Trump's non-traditional Republicanism could ironically prevent congressional Republicans from overreaching, potentially leading to smaller electoral losses. However, the Democratic Party's ability to harness its energized progressive base without alienating marginal voters will be crucial for its success.

Last updated: February 19, 2026