Key Takeaways
1. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged from a profound anti-Western sentiment and a vision of comprehensive Islamic revival.
"It is no exaggeration to say that absent the West, the group would not exist."
Foundational discontent. Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, driven by a deep sense of "shame and shackles" among Egyptian Muslims who felt disrespected in their own country. This sentiment was exacerbated by the pervasive British occupation since 1882, which manifested in economic dominance, military presence, and cultural penetration, particularly visible in cities like Ismailia. Al-Banna perceived this as a direct assault on Egyptian national identity and Islamic morality.
Moral decay. Al-Banna was profoundly disturbed by what he saw as a "wave of atheism and indecency" engulfing Egypt, especially after moving to Cairo in 1923. He attributed this moral decline to the "violent Western invasion" and its "materialist philosophy and Frankish customs," which he believed weakened religious observance and corrupted youth. The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 further amplified his sense of a widespread intellectual and moral crisis, leading him to believe that the religious establishment was failing to respond effectively.
Call for revival. Convinced that Egypt faced a major crisis, al-Banna resolved that an "Islamic spirit remained among the people" and needed to be fostered. He aimed to chart a path toward revival through a "general Islamic call founded on knowledge and education and jihad." This mission was explicitly designed to counter Western influence and restore a sense of national self-fulfillment rooted in Islamic principles.
2. The Brotherhood's ideology framed a binary struggle between a spiritual East (Islam) and a materialist, hostile West.
"East and West, al-Banna surmised, were locked in a deep-rooted existential struggle, the contours of which explained the arc of history."
Civilizational divide. Al-Banna's worldview sharply divided the world into a "purely materialistic West" and an inherently more "spiritual" East, synonymous with Islam. He believed the West's material strength masked a spiritual void, leading to moral corruption and eventual decline, while the East's spiritual vitality, though diminished, held the key to renewed strength. This perspective inverted colonial narratives that often depicted the East as decadent.
Historical narrative. The Brotherhood's ideology was built on a "decline and fall" story of Islamic history, from the Prophet Muhammad's golden age to the corrupt present. Al-Banna attributed Muslim defeats by Crusaders and Mongols, and later by Western imperialists and Zionism, to a gradual abandonment of true Islamic understanding. He saw European empowerment through the Renaissance and Reformation as a shift in world leadership, with the East falling into a "long sleep" due to its spiritual weakness.
Secular threat. Secularization was viewed as the West's most insidious weapon, aiming to destroy Islam by challenging the core ideal of tawhid (unity of life). Al-Banna condemned Western imports like "half-naked women," liquor, theaters, and novels as corrupting influences. He called for a return to Islam as a "comprehensive order" and a complete guide to life, believing that only this moral rectification could reverse Muslim enfeeblement and lead to a renewed Islamic state and, ultimately, a restored caliphate.
3. Early British engagement with the Brotherhood oscillated between dismissal, suppression, and attempts at co-optation.
"The British, it should be said, seem to have paid little attention to the Brotherhood at this point."
Initial disregard. In its nascent years, the Muslim Brotherhood barely registered on the British radar, seen as one of many minor Islamic associations. British officials were more preoccupied with mainstream political actors like the Wafd Party and the monarchy. Early reports, if any, often dismissed the Brotherhood as "trivial" and "not at present in any way dangerous," underestimating its burgeoning popular appeal and organizational capacity.
Growing concern. The Brotherhood's activism on the Palestine issue, particularly its support for the Arab Revolt (1936-1939) and calls for "holy war" against "imperialists" and Zionists, forced it onto the British agenda. Diplomatic dispatches began to label the group as "fundamentally anti-British," "fanatical," and "subversive." The discovery of alleged financial ties between the Brotherhood and Nazi agents further solidified British suspicions, linking the group to broader Axis subversion efforts.
Co-optation attempts. Despite viewing the Brotherhood as a threat, some British officials, particularly within military intelligence, explored unorthodox strategies of co-optation. Inspired by earlier attempts to "buy off" other nationalist groups like Young Egypt, figures like James Heyworth-Dunne initiated talks with Hasan al-Banna, offering financial inducements to temper his anti-British stance. These efforts ultimately failed, but they established a pattern of British willingness to engage with seemingly hostile groups if it served strategic interests, even as the dominant policy remained one of suppression.
4. Post-WWII, the Brotherhood's growing militancy and anti-Zionism led to its first dissolution and the assassination of Hasan al-Banna.
"The Brotherhood, though repudiating any direct involvement in violence, had helped to create the atmosphere in which it occurred."
Post-war resurgence. After World War II, the Brotherhood's influence surged amidst widespread disillusionment with Egypt's political elite and the enduring British presence. Al-Banna intensified his critique of the West, linking its materialism to the "fires of war" and advocating for "jihad and martyrdom" to achieve national liberation. The group's participation in the 1945 elections, though unsuccessful due to alleged government manipulation, signaled its commitment to national politics.
Palestine and violence. The escalating conflict in Palestine became a central rallying cry for the Brotherhood, which vehemently opposed Zionist aspirations and British policy. The group actively recruited volunteers for "physical-force jihad" in Palestine, sending battalions to fight alongside Arab irregulars. This period also saw the Brotherhood implicated in domestic violence, including bombings of Jewish-owned properties and attacks on Egyptian officials perceived as collaborators, despite al-Banna's public disavowals of terrorism.
Dissolution and assassination. By late 1948, the Egyptian government, with Western diplomatic backing, viewed the Brotherhood as an uncontrollable "Frankenstein monster" threatening state stability. Following the "jeep case" (discovery of arms caches and alleged coup plans), Prime Minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi dissolved the Brotherhood. This triggered a cycle of violence: a Brotherhood member assassinated al-Nuqrashi, and in retaliation, Hasan al-Banna was shot dead in February 1949, marking a brutal end to the movement's first phase of open activism.
5. Nasser's rise to power marked a period of intense repression for the Brotherhood, forcing its underground survival and regional expansion.
"The Brotherhood, though laying claim to an intellectual heritage intrinsic to Islam, was fundamentally a movement born in response to Western—specifically British—power."
Initial alliance and swift rupture. The 1952 Free Officers' coup initially saw cooperation between the Brotherhood and the military, with some Free Officers having past ties to the Ikhwan. However, ideological differences and Nasser's ambition quickly led to a clash. The Brotherhood's demands for an Islamic state and its opposition to Western alliances conflicted with Nasser's secular, pan-Arabist vision. Nasser's strategic use of the Brotherhood's anti-British stance during the Suez Canal negotiations ultimately paved the way for its second, more brutal, suppression.
Systematic repression. Following an alleged assassination attempt on Nasser in October 1954, the regime launched a comprehensive crackdown. Thousands of Brotherhood members were arrested, imprisoned, and tortured, and six leaders, including Sayyid Qutb, were executed. This systematic repression aimed to dismantle the organization entirely, forcing it underground and into exile. Western officials, initially wary of the Brotherhood's "extremism," largely welcomed Nasser's decisive action, viewing him as a modernizing force preferable to the "fanatical" Islamists.
Underground survival and regional growth. Despite severe persecution, the Brotherhood demonstrated remarkable resilience, maintaining clandestine networks within Egypt and expanding its influence across the Middle East. Exiled leaders like Sa'id Ramadan established new bases in countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Syria, fostering transnational Islamist networks. This period also saw the intellectual radicalization of figures like Sayyid Qutb, whose writings, particularly Milestones, provided a potent ideological framework for future generations, emphasizing Jahiliyyah (ignorance) and the necessity of revolutionary jihad against secular regimes and Western influence.
6. The Sadat and early Mubarak eras saw the Brotherhood's cautious re-emergence and a strategic accommodation with the state.
"Sadat, in this estimate, resembled a 'Tudor monarch in a benevolent mood.' He was 'autocratic and all powerful,' but used this power 'discreetly' and in a way that was 'responsive to public feelings.'"
Sadat's calculated liberalization. Following Nasser's death in 1970, Anwar Sadat, seeking to consolidate power against Nasserist and leftist rivals, initiated a "corrective revolution" that included a cautious liberalization. He released imprisoned Brotherhood members, promoted religious discourse, and allowed limited political activity. This strategic accommodation aimed to co-opt the Brotherhood as a counterweight, leading to its quiet re-emergence and the establishment of its unofficial newspaper, al-Da'wa.
Ideological continuity and pragmatic engagement. The Brotherhood, under leaders like 'Umar al-Tilmisani, maintained its core anti-Western and anti-communist ideology, viewing Nasser's era as a "Jahili age" of corruption and Soviet subservience. While condemning Sadat's peace treaty with Israel on ideological grounds, the Brotherhood pragmatically avoided direct confrontation, focusing on rebuilding its organizational structure and influence within professional syndicates and parliament. This approach, emphasizing "preaching not judging," aimed to distance the group from violent extremism while pursuing its long-term goal of an Islamic state.
Mubarak's inherited strategy. Upon assuming power in 1981 after Sadat's assassination by radical Islamists, Hosni Mubarak largely continued the policy of cautious accommodation with the Brotherhood. He released many detained members and allowed the group to operate in a semi-open fashion, participating in elections (unofficially) and expanding its social and economic networks. Western officials, particularly in the US, viewed this as a pragmatic strategy to contain more radical Islamist elements, seeing the Brotherhood as a "moderate" force preferable to violent alternatives, despite its enduring anti-Western rhetoric.
7. Western perceptions of the Brotherhood evolved from an extremist threat to a potential "moderate" counterweight against radical Islamism.
"We expect the Muslim Brotherhood... to continue to move toward the center of the Egyptian political spectrum as it evolves through the culturally and politically acceptable phase of the cult cycle."
Shifting paradigms. From the 1970s onwards, as an Islamic revival swept the Middle East, Western analysts began to re-evaluate the Brotherhood. Initially seen as an anachronistic, extremist threat, the rise of more violent jihadist groups led to a new categorization: the Brotherhood was increasingly viewed as a "moderate" Islamist force, positioned on a spectrum against "extremists" who advocated violence. This shift was partly driven by the Brotherhood's own efforts to present a non-violent, gradualist image.
The "Islamist dilemma." The end of the Cold War and the subsequent "third wave" of democratization intensified debates in Western foreign policy circles about how to engage with Islamist movements. The "Islamist dilemma" pitted "confrontationists," who saw all Islamists as inherently anti-democratic and linked to terrorism, against "accommodationists," who advocated for dialogue with non-violent groups. The latter argued that excluding moderate Islamists risked radicalization, while inclusion could foster further moderation and democratic integration.
Strategic engagement. By the 1980s, US and British officials, while still wary of the Brotherhood's anti-Western ideology and its long-term goals, began to see it as a potential "counterweight" to more revolutionary Islamic groups. This led to cautious, often unofficial, diplomatic contacts, particularly during the Mubarak era. The rationale was that engaging with the Brotherhood, despite its problematic aspects, was a pragmatic way to:
- Gain intelligence on a significant opposition force.
- Encourage its moderation and participation within the existing political system.
- Prevent its members from drifting towards more violent alternatives.
This approach reflected a growing fatalism that Islamist influence was inevitable, and the Brotherhood was the "least worst option."
8. The Brotherhood's global network expanded into the West, adapting its mission while retaining core anti-Western ideological tenets.
"The Brotherhood in the West was thus 'not a membership,' it was 'a way of thinking.'"
Diaspora and institutionalization. From the 1950s onwards, the Brotherhood's presence expanded beyond the Middle East, driven by students and exiles fleeing repression. This led to the organic formation of new organizations in Europe and North America, such as the Muslim Students Association (MSA) in the US and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). These groups, while often denying formal ties to the Egyptian Brotherhood, shared its ideological heritage and aimed to establish a "comprehensive Islam" in Western societies.
Adapting the mission. The Western-based Brotherhood focused on preserving Islamic identity and preventing assimilation into secular societies. Their activities centered on:
- Da'wa (missionary work) and education.
- Building mosques and Islamic centers.
- Establishing professional and youth associations (e.g., ISNA, CAIR in the US, FEMYSO in Europe).
- Promoting "Islamization of knowledge" and publishing Islamist literature.
This adaptation reflected a shift from state-centric politics to community-focused identity politics, aiming to create an autonomous Islamic space within the West.
Enduring ideological framework. Despite adapting its modus operandi and engaging in a discourse of "integration," the Western Brotherhood largely retained its core anti-Western ideological tenets. Figures like Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Brotherhood ideologue, articulated a "middle way" that rejected secularism and materialism while criticizing Western foreign policy, particularly regarding Israel. The "Explanatory Memorandum" of the US Brotherhood even spoke of "destroying Western civilization from within," highlighting a deep-seated, albeit often concealed, anti-Western sentiment that persisted across its global network.
9. Post-9/11, Western engagement with the Brotherhood became a contentious debate, balancing democracy promotion with security concerns.
"The Brotherhood, they surmised, was targeting the Egyptian 'political center' through moderate-sounding policies and an improved image."
The "War on Terror" and the "Freedom Agenda." The 9/11 attacks profoundly reshaped US foreign policy, leading to the "War on Terror" and a subsequent "Freedom Agenda" promoting democracy in the Middle East. This created a dilemma: how to reconcile the desire for democratic change with deep-seated fears of Islamist electoral success. Initially, the US severed most official contacts with the Brotherhood, viewing it with suspicion in the context of rising Salafi-jihadist violence.
Re-evaluation and cautious engagement. As the limitations of authoritarian allies became apparent and the "Freedom Agenda" gained traction, some Western officials, particularly in the UK and later the US, began to re-evaluate the Brotherhood. They distinguished between violent jihadists and "moderate" Islamists, arguing that engaging the latter could:
- Counter radicalization.
- Foster democratic participation.
- Provide a "firewall" against more extreme groups.
This led to a cautious resumption of contacts, often at working levels and with parliamentary members, despite strong objections from authoritarian regimes like Mubarak's.
Persistent ambiguities and mutual suspicion. Despite renewed engagement, the relationship remained fraught with ambiguities and mutual suspicion. Western officials struggled to reconcile the Brotherhood's democratic rhetoric with its illiberal ideological stances on issues like women's rights, minority rights, and the implementation of Sharia. The Brotherhood, for its part, continued to view the West as a hostile, imperialist force, blaming it for regional instability and supporting authoritarian regimes. This complex interplay of strategic interests, ideological differences, and historical grievances defined the relationship on the eve of the Arab Spring, where the Brotherhood's perceived "inevitability" would be put to the ultimate test.
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