Key Takeaways
1. The Puzzle of Federalism: Italy's Unitary vs. Germany's Federal Path
Why was Italy formed as a unitary state and Germany a federal state?
A striking divergence. In the mid-19th century, Italy and Germany, two late-developing European powers, embarked on parallel journeys of national unification. Both faced similar ideological, cultural, and geopolitical pressures, yet their institutional outcomes diverged dramatically: Italy became a centralized, unitary state, while Germany adopted a decentralized, federal system. This contrast presents a fundamental puzzle for understanding how nation-states are built and what determines their internal structure.
Shared starting conditions. Before unification, both regions exhibited strong regional loyalties and a vibrant intellectual discourse around federalism as a solution to internal diversity. Piedmont in Italy and Prussia in Germany, the leading states in their respective unification processes, were militarily powerful and aimed to project greater geopolitical weight while maintaining monarchical control. Despite these similarities, the institutional blueprints for their new nations were fundamentally different.
Enduring legacies. The choices made during these "national moments" in the 1860s had profound and lasting impacts, shaping the political, economic, and social trajectories of both countries for over a century. Understanding this divergence is crucial not only for historical analysis but also for contemporary discussions on state-building, federalism, and institutional design in diverse polities worldwide.
2. Conventional Theories Fall Short: Ideas, Culture, and Military Power
In short, the three most important explanations of the genesis of federalism cannot account for the two most prominent cases of national unification in nineteenth-century Europe.
Ideological commitment insufficient. Conventional theories often posit that federalism arises from a strong ideological commitment to decentralization among political elites. However, in both Italy and Germany, leading figures like Cavour and Bismarck, along with prominent intellectuals, expressed support for federalist ideas. Yet, only Germany adopted federalism, demonstrating that ideological preference alone is not a sufficient condition.
Cultural divisions not determinative. Another common explanation links federalism to deep-seated cultural or ethnic divisions within a society. Both Italy and Germany possessed long histories of independent city-states and strong regional identities, rooted in diverse economic gradients and historical experiences. If cultural fragmentation were the sole driver, both should have become federal, but Italy did not, challenging this cultural-historical perspective.
Military power's unexpected role. William Riker's influential "social contract" theory suggests federalism emerges when the political center is militarily too weak to "overawe" the periphery, forcing a negotiated bargain. Paradoxically:
- Prussia, a military heavyweight, established a federal system.
- Piedmont, comparatively weaker, imposed a unitary system.
This directly contradicts Riker's prediction, indicating that military strength alone does not dictate the outcome of federal versus unitary state formation.
3. Infrastructural Capacity: The Decisive Factor in Federalism's Origins
Instead, the origins of federalism are found in the internal structure of the subunits of a potential federation at the moment of founding.
Beyond military might. The key to understanding federalism's origins lies not in the military power of the unifying center, but in the "infrastructural capacity" of the regional subunits. This refers to the ability of subnational governments to effectively govern their societies, encompassing:
- State rationalization (e.g., constitutions)
- State institutionalization (e.g., parliaments)
- Embeddedness of the state in society (e.g., administrative reach)
Credible partners for negotiation. When a political core seeks to integrate regions with high infrastructural capacity, these regions can serve as credible negotiation partners. They possess the administrative, fiscal, and political structures to:
- Deliver tax revenue
- Mobilize military manpower
- Maintain social order
- Implement policy goals
Such capable subunits make a negotiated, federal path desirable and feasible for the unifying center.
The paradox resolved. The "paradox of federalism's origins"—how a center can be strong enough to unify but accommodating enough to decentralize—is overcome when the subunits are infrastructurally strong. The unifying core sees value in preserving these capable regional structures, as they can effectively contribute to the larger nation-state's goals, making concessions a strategic advantage rather than a sign of weakness.
4. Dual Forces Drive Unification: Economic Modernization and State Ambition
The central argument I propose centers around two deeply rooted structural factors that determined the political position taken by regional political leaders vis-à-vis national unification in the 1850s and 1860s.
Commercialization's uneven impact. The commercialization of economic life across Europe after 1815 was a geographically uneven process. Regions that experienced early and successful commercialization of land and labor, often influenced by direct Napoleonic rule, developed social groups (e.g., liberal middle classes, commercialized aristocracies) predisposed to support national markets and unified political institutions. These groups saw national integration as a path to economic growth and stability.
State leaders' strategic motives. Societal pressures alone were insufficient. National unification was initiated only when the leadership of these early-commercializing regions possessed the military, administrative, and fiscal means, coupled with motives of political aggrandizement, to co-opt nationalist movements and expand their control. These state-level motivations included:
- Resolving fiscal crises (e.g., high public debt)
- Enhancing geopolitical standing
- Maintaining monarchical authority against liberal challenges
Regional responses varied. This interplay of economic modernization and state capacity produced diverse regional responses:
- Initiators: Large, rich states (Prussia, Piedmont) with both social support and political means.
- Supporters: Small, rich states (Hamburg, Lombardy) with social support but insufficient political capacity to lead.
- Resistors: Small, poor states (Württemberg, Tuscany) lacking both social support and political means, often relying on external protection.
- Hostile opponents: Large, poor states (Bavaria, Kingdom of Two Sicilies) with political means to resist but little social support for unification.
5. Italy's Centralizing Path: Unification by Conquest Amidst Regional Weakness
Since absorbed states are perceived as not able to deliver the benefits of national unification, they are viewed simply as an impediment to unification.
A legacy of institutional fragility. Piedmontese state-builders inherited regional states, particularly in southern Italy, plagued by deep infrastructural incapacity. Centuries of foreign rule and incomplete political modernization left these states without robust constitutional frameworks, effective parliamentary structures, or specialized administrative institutions. This weakness was evident in their limited ability to:
- Collect taxes efficiently
- Conscript military personnel
- Maintain civil order
- Implement social and economic policies
Unification by conquest. Faced with this institutional vacuum and the threat of widespread instability (exacerbated by Garibaldi's revolutionary actions), Piedmontese officials, despite their initial decentralist leanings, adopted a strategy of "unification by conquest." This involved:
- Unconditional annexation: Eliminating existing regional monarchical leaders and institutions.
- Plebiscite over assembly: Using a rapid, controlled popular vote rather than lengthy parliamentary negotiations to legitimize annexation.
- Extension of Piedmontese law: Imposing Piedmont's centralized legal and administrative system across the entire peninsula.
A self-reinforcing centralization. Each step in this process further debilitated potential regional governments, creating a self-reinforcing dynamic towards a unitary state. The absence of credible regional partners, coupled with the urgent need for stability, made centralization the path of least resistance, inadvertently destroying the very structures that might have supported a federal Italy.
6. Germany's Federal Path: Unification by Negotiation with Strong Regional States
The effort to violently conquer southern Germany would only create for us the same element of weakness that southern Italy has created for that state.
Robust regional institutions. In stark contrast to Italy, Prussia encountered a landscape of well-developed regional states. Most German states, including those in the south, possessed:
- Established constitutions
- Functioning parliaments with budgetary rights
- Concentrated and specialized administrative structures
These institutions were deeply embedded in their societies, making them effective at governance and difficult to simply dissolve.
Unification by negotiation. Bismarck, learning from Italy's experience and facing strong, legitimate regional governments, pursued a strategy of "unification by negotiation." This involved:
- Limited annexation: Directly annexing some northern states but leaving the larger southern states (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Saxony) largely independent.
- Diplomatic compacts: Forging the union through a series of treaties between sovereign monarchs, reinforcing a norm of negotiation.
- Preserving state autonomy: Granting significant fiscal, administrative, and political autonomy to the constituent states within the new federal Reich.
A self-reinforcing federalism. This approach institutionalized existing regional actors (monarchs and their state apparatuses) as integral parts of the new federal system. The high infrastructural capacity of these states meant Prussia could confidently devolve authority, knowing they could effectively manage their domains and contribute to national goals, thereby solidifying Germany's federal structure.
7. The Self-Reinforcing Dynamic of State Formation: Path Dependence in Action
In the context of Italian unification, the centralizing responses to each of the three tasks of national unification increased the likelihood, over the course of the six years of institutional creation (1859–65), that Piedmontese officials would adopt a unitary political system.
Initial choices matter. The process of nation-state formation is marked by "critical junctures" where initial decisions, often made under pressure, set in motion self-reinforcing dynamics. These dynamics, or "positive feedback" loops, make subsequent movement along the same institutional path more likely, even if the initial choice was unintended or suboptimal.
Italy's centralizing spiral. In Italy, the perceived institutional weakness of annexed regions led to Piedmont's "unification by conquest." This strategy, in turn:
- Eliminated regional actors: Destroyed potential negotiating partners.
- Created instability: Required further central intervention to maintain order.
- Justified unitary imposition: The "myth of revolution" legitimized extending Piedmontese laws.
Each centralizing step made a federal outcome less feasible, locking Italy into a unitary trajectory.
Germany's federal reinforcement. Conversely, Germany's "unification by negotiation" reinforced federalism. The existence of strong regional institutions meant:
- Credible negotiation partners: Regional monarchs could demand concessions.
- Effective governance: States could implement national laws, reducing the need for central intervention.
- Legitimacy of regional power: The "compact among sovereigns" enshrined state autonomy.
This created a virtuous cycle where regional strength fostered federal solutions, which in turn preserved regional strength.
8. Resolving the Paradox: Strong Centers Can Willingly Concede Power
The key issue in the establishment of a federation is not the coercive strength of the center vis-à-vis the subunits, but instead the relative infrastructural capacity of the subunits vis-à-vis their own societies.
Beyond Riker's assumption. The conventional wisdom, often rooted in Rikerian theory, assumes that a unifying political center will always prefer a unitary system unless constrained by military weakness. This study challenges that by demonstrating that strong centers, like Prussia, can willingly concede power and embrace federalism.
Strategic concessions. Prussia's military might was undeniable, yet Bismarck chose a negotiated, federal path. This was not a sign of weakness, but a strategic choice driven by:
- Domestic stability: Avoiding the unrest and administrative burden seen in Italy's south.
- International appeasement: Allaying fears of an overly centralized German power.
- Leveraging existing capacity: Utilizing the efficient administrative and fiscal structures of the German states.
These concessions were not forced but were seen as the most effective way to achieve national unification while maintaining monarchical control and stability.
The value of capable subunits. When regional states possess high infrastructural capacity, they become valuable assets rather than mere obstacles. A strong center can delegate significant authority, knowing that these subunits can effectively manage local governance, collect taxes, and contribute to national defense. This makes federalism a desirable and efficient institutional solution, allowing the center to achieve its goals without overextending its own administrative reach.
9. A Supply-Side Theory of Federalism: Institutions Shape Possibilities
A central finding of this study is that both these portrayals are flawed in their assumption that institutions neatly “fit” the farsighted designs of powerful political actors.
Beyond demand-side explanations. Traditional theories of federalism often focus on the "demand side" – the ideological preferences of elites or the societal demand for decentralization. This study introduces a "supply-side" perspective, arguing that the preexisting supply of effective regional political institutions is equally, if not more, crucial.
The institutional inheritance. The institutional landscape inherited by unifying centers dictates which strategies of state formation are feasible and desirable.
- High supply of regional institutions: When regional states are well-developed (constitutions, parliaments, strong administrations), they offer a "supply" of capable governance structures. This enables a negotiated path, leading to federalism.
- Low supply of regional institutions: When regional states are underdeveloped or fragile, the "supply" of effective governance is low. This pushes the center towards direct intervention and unitary solutions, as there are no credible partners to whom power can be devolved.
Layering vs. conversion. This supply-side dynamic influences the mode of institutional change:
- Layering (Germany): New federal rules are "layered" atop existing, robust regional actors and norms, preserving continuity.
- Conversion (Italy): Existing (weak) regional rules and actors are "converted" or replaced by the unifying center's system, often through imposition.
Federalism, therefore, is not merely a choice but an outcome shaped by the institutional raw material available at the moment of national founding.
10. Beyond the Cases: Ideology and Institutions Across Western Europe
In short, we see that among seventeen of the largest nation-states in western Europe, a state-centered approach to federalism’s origins that focuses on the motivations of actors and the institutional constraints they face is quite fruitful.
Refining the framework. While the Italy-Germany comparison held ideology constant (both had federalist leanings), extending the analysis to 17 other Western European nation-states reveals the interplay of two key factors:
- Strong federalist ideology: Whether political elites advocated for a federal structure.
- Strong regional institutions: Whether constituent regional states possessed developed constitutional, parliamentary, and administrative structures.
Confirming evidence. The broader sample largely confirms that both factors are necessary, but neither alone is sufficient, for federalism to emerge.
- Federal outcomes (e.g., Austria, Switzerland): Occurred when both strong federalist ideology and strong regional institutions were present.
- Unitary outcomes (e.g., France, Italy, Netherlands): Resulted when either federalist ideology or strong regional institutions (or both) were absent.
This suggests that even committed federalists will struggle to implement their vision if the underlying institutional capacity at the regional level is lacking.
The enduring impact of founding moments. The institutional form adopted at a nation-state's founding moment often persists, highlighting the long-term causal impact of these critical junctures. The study concludes that federalism is not simply a political choice but a complex institutional outcome, deeply rooted in the historical development and capacity of subnational governance structures.
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