Natural Goodness

1. Moral Subjectivism Rests on a Mistake: The Gap Between Grounds and Judgment

It is this gap between ground and moral judgement that I am denying.

Subjectivism's core error. Theories like emotivism and prescriptivism, dominant in modern moral philosophy, claim that moral judgments require a speaker's subjective feelings, attitudes, or intentions beyond factual description. This creates a logical gap: even if all factual grounds are met, someone might not make the moral judgment because they lack the required subjective state.

Hume's practicality requirement. These theories attempt to explain morality's action-guiding nature, a point David Hume rightly emphasized. They argue that moral judgments motivate action because they express desires or commitments, linking morality to the agent's "conative" state.

Rejecting the gap. The mistake is assuming this subjective element is necessary for moral judgment itself. Moral judgments, I argue, are assertions about facts – facts about what there is reason to do. The connection to action comes not from a subjective state, but from the nature of practical rationality itself.

2. Introducing Natural Norms: Goodness in Plants and Animals

Expressivist theories have the remarkable though seldom-mentioned consequence of separating off the evaluation of human action not only from the evaluation of human sight, hearing, and bodily health but also from all evaluation of the characteristics and operations of plants and animals.

A different kind of evaluation. Unlike evaluating things based on human interests (secondary goodness), living things possess an "autonomous," "intrinsic," or "natural" goodness. This applies to plants and animals and their parts or operations, independent of their usefulness or beauty to us.

Beyond human attitudes. We don't explain the goodness of strong roots or sharp fangs by saying we have a "pro-attitude" towards them. These evaluations are objective facts about the living thing itself, based on its nature and way of life.

A shared conceptual structure. The evaluation of human action, I propose, shares a basic logical structure with these evaluations of non-human living things. Moral defect is a form of natural defect, not fundamentally different from defects found in sub-rational life.

3. Life Form Determines Natural Goodness: The Role of Teleology

We start from the fact that it is the particular life form of a species of plant or animal that determines how an individual plant or animal should be...

Aristotelian categoricals. Descriptions of living things often rely on propositions about the species or "life form" (e.g., "Rabbits are herbivores," "The male peacock displays its tail"). These are not statistical claims about every individual but describe the characteristic way of life of the species.

Function and purpose. These "Aristotelian categoricals" are linked to teleology – the function or purpose of a characteristic or operation within the life cycle of the species. What "plays a part in the life" of a living thing is causally and teleologically related to its development, self-maintenance, and reproduction.

Norms from life form. Natural goodness and defect are determined by this life form. A slow deer is defective because swiftness is necessary for the deer's characteristic defense (flight) and survival. This establishes norms independent of human desires or interests.

4. Transition to Humans: Evaluating Characteristics by Life Form

The question is, therefore, whether characteristics of humans can be evaluated in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity that we found in the case of plants and animals.

Applying the schema. Can the same structure of natural normativity apply to human beings? Yes, initially for physical and mental characteristics like sight, hearing, memory, and the capacity for language. These can be evaluated as good or defective based on their role in human life.

Beyond mere biology. While rooted in our biological nature, human life is vastly more complex than that of plants or animals. Human good involves language, imagination, social cooperation, and diverse activities, leading to a much wider range of evaluable characteristics and operations.

Human necessities. Despite diversity, we can identify general human necessities by considering deprivation. Lack of capacity for language, imagination, or social connection constitutes a defect because these are needed for human good, just as strong roots are needed for an oak.

5. Human Action and Will: Virtues as Natural Perfections

And if we ask whether Geach was right to say that human beings need virtues as bees need stings (see Chapter 51), the answer is surely that he was.

Virtues as excellences. Moral virtues like justice, charity, courage, and temperance are excellences of the human will and action. They are dispositions that enable human beings to act well, just as swiftness enables a deer to escape predators.

Needed for human good. Virtues are necessary for human beings to live well, given our nature as social, rational animals. Cooperation, trust, family ties, and codes of conduct are essential elements of human life, and virtues like loyalty, fairness, and kindness make these possible.

Promise-keeping example. Breaking a promise is bad because the institution of promising is an "Aristotelian necessity" for human life – something on which much human good hangs, given our limited means of binding each other's wills. This evaluation derives from facts about human life and capacities, not from subjective attitudes or utilitarian calculations.

6. Practical Rationality is an Aspect of Human Goodness

I want to say, baldly, that there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of the will.

Challenging the independent standard. It is often assumed that practical rationality is an independent standard (like maximizing desire satisfaction or self-interest) to which moral action must somehow conform. This, I argue, is a mistake.

Rationality as acting well. Practical rationality is itself a form of human goodness – specifically, goodness of the will in respect of reason-recognition and reason-following. Acting rationally is acting well, and acting irrationally is acting badly.

Virtues and reasons. Possessing virtues means recognizing certain considerations (like a promise or a neighbor's need) as powerful reasons for action and acting on them. This recognition and response is practical rationality in action.

7. Answering the Sceptic: Why Act as a Good Person Would?

For let us suppose that the normative pattern that I called ‘natural normativity’ does govern our evaluations of human beings as human beings... The sceptic will surely ask ‘But what if I do not care about being a good human being?’

The sceptic's challenge. If moral goodness is a form of natural goodness, why should a rational agent care about being a good human being, especially if it conflicts with their desires or interests?

Rationality is the answer. The answer is not that one should care about being a good human being as an external goal. Rather, acting as a good human being acts is acting rationally. The question "Why should I do that?" when asked about a virtuous action is ultimately a question about practical rationality itself.

Reasons are grounded in facts. Reasons for action are grounded in facts about human life and the requirements of practical rationality, not solely in an agent's subjective desires or interests. Recognizing a reason for action gives a rational person a goal, and this recognition is based on objective facts and concepts.

8. The Good Human Being: Goodness of the Rational Will

For to speak of a good person is to speak of an individual not in respect of his body, or of faculties such as sight and memory, but as concerns his rational will.

A specific evaluation. The evaluation "a good human being" or "a good person" is distinct from evaluating other human characteristics. It specifically concerns the individual's rational will – their voluntary actions, purposes, and dispositions.

Voluntary action is key. Like Mill's "moral" evaluations, this wider class of evaluations of the rational will applies only to voluntary actions. Involuntary movements or actions done under duress or excusable ignorance do not count for or against goodness of the will.

Sources of goodness/badness. Goodness or badness in action can arise from:

• The nature of the act itself (e.g., saving a life vs. killing).
• The end for which the action is done (e.g., saving a life for extortion).
• The agent's judgment (acting against one's conscience is bad, even if the conscience is mistaken).

9. Happiness and Human Good: Challenging the Separation from Virtue

But I now want to argue that we find in our own thought a way of understanding human good and even human happiness that does not allow of such a combination.

Happiness as human good. The idea that happiness is humanity's good is central to moral philosophy, but it seems problematic if happiness can be achieved through wickedness. This challenges the link between virtue and human good.

Beyond pleasure and contentment. Happiness, in the sense relevant to human good, is not mere pleasure, contentment, or a cheerful mood. It involves a dimension of depth, tied to basic human goods like family, friendship, meaningful work, and the pursuit of truth.

Wickedness precludes true happiness. Considering examples like notorious criminals or brave resistors, we see a conceptual resistance to attributing deep happiness to those who profoundly lack humanity or act wickedly. There is a sense in which a truly happy life is not possible for the wicked, or for those who must sacrifice virtue, even if they experience pleasure or contentment.

10. Immoralism: The Challenge to Natural Goodness

Therefore the life of the unjust was superior to that of the just.

The immoralist claim. Immoralists like Thrasymachus, Callicles, and Nietzsche challenge conventional morality by claiming that injustice is better than justice, especially for the strong who can get away with it. They see justice as serving the weak and hindering the flourishing of the strong individual.

Analogy with friendship. Just as it would be a misunderstanding to see friendship solely in terms of reciprocal services performed grudgingly for reward, it is a misunderstanding to see justice solely in terms of external constraints accepted out of fear or for social benefits. Friendship, like justice, involves internal dispositions and attitudes.

Nietzsche's critique. Nietzsche specifically attacked Christian "pity morality," viewing compassion as a weakness born of resentment. He saw conventional morality as taming humans, hindering creativity and spontaneity, and leading to a shallow, conformist happiness.

11. Revaluing Values: Assessing Dispositions within the Natural Framework

He was saying that something thought good was not really good: ‘Pity is thought good but is not really good.’

Assessing the challenge. Nietzsche's challenge, particularly his critique of pity, can be understood within the framework of natural normativity. He is questioning whether a disposition like pity truly contributes to human good or is a defect, as he claimed.

A factual question. This is a question about facts of human life: Does compassion, as it actually functions in human beings, contribute to or detract from human good? Is it a sign of strength or weakness? Does it lead to flourishing or frustration?

Natural normativity provides the criteria. The framework of natural goodness provides the criteria for assessing such claims. If Nietzsche's psychological facts about pity were correct (that it is always rooted in resentment and harmful), then his "revaluation" of pity as a defect would be justified within this framework. However, the evidence suggests genuine compassion exists and contributes to human good.

Last updated: September 14, 2025