Kashmir

1. Kashmir's Intricate Web of Distrust and Duality

The Kashmiri is a most complex character, and not easy to fathom or engage with. He is the nicest, gentlest, kindest, most sensitive of human beings. Yet he can also be devious and prone to exaggeration.

Complex psyche. Kashmiris possess a deeply layered and often contradictory nature, shaped by centuries of foreign rule. This historical context has fostered a pervasive distrust, making direct communication challenging as they often feel compelled to present different narratives to different parties. As Brajesh Mishra aptly noted, "the only thing straight in Kashmir are the poplars."

Survival mechanism. This duality is not necessarily malicious but a survival mechanism developed over generations. Kashmiris have learned to adapt to shifting powers, often playing both sides or feigning ignorance to protect themselves and their interests. This makes genuine engagement difficult, as sincerity is constantly questioned.

Natural agents. The author suggests that centuries of foreign rule have ingrained a "natural agent" mentality into the Kashmiri DNA. This means they are often in touch with multiple factions—Indian, Pakistani, or even both—making it hard to discern true loyalties or intentions. This inherent complexity demands immense patience and nuanced understanding from any interlocutor.

2. Dialogue: The Unconventional Weapon in Kashmir

Even at the worst of times, you just have to keep talking.

Sustained engagement. The author's core philosophy in Kashmir was the unwavering belief in dialogue, even with militants and separatists. This approach, initiated by IB Director R.P. Joshi, aimed to rebuild trust and explore political solutions beyond military containment. It was a long, slow process requiring immense patience and a willingness to listen.

Breaking the ice. The author's "K-group" in the IB systematically reached out to various Kashmiri factions:

• Periphery supporters: General Kashmiris sympathetic to the movement.
• Jailed leaders: Separatists like Shabir Shah and Yasin Malik.
• Active militants: Figures like Firdous Syed.
  This comprehensive engagement helped create channels where none existed, fostering a sense of possibility for peace.

Beyond conventional methods. This strategy contrasted sharply with traditional intelligence work focused on actionable intelligence or counter-terrorism. It prioritized building relationships and understanding grievances, recognizing that a lasting solution required political engagement, not just security operations.

3. Pakistan's Proxy War and Kashmiri Disillusionment

Pakistan continues to fish in the troubled waters of Kashmir, raising the bogey of persecution of Muslims when all else fails.

"Thousand cuts" strategy. Pakistan's ISI, emboldened by its success in Afghanistan against the Soviets, initiated a proxy war in Kashmir in the late 1980s. This involved training, arming, and infiltrating Kashmiri militants, aiming to destabilize India and internationalize the Kashmir issue. The goal was to bleed India through a "thousand cuts."

Kashmiri disillusionment. Over time, many Kashmiri militants and separatists grew disillusioned with Pakistan's true intentions. Figures like Firdous Syed and Abdul Majid Dar realized that Pakistan viewed Kashmiris as pawns in its geopolitical game, prioritizing its own strategic depth and water resources over Kashmiri independence.

• Firdous Syed's tour of Pakistan revealed widespread contempt for Kashmiris and a focus on Pakistani interests.
• Majid Dar realized Pakistan's "tap of terror" could be turned off by American pressure, exposing its lack of genuine commitment to Kashmiri liberation.

ISI's tight control. The ISI maintained a tight grip on separatist groups like the Hurriyat, dictating their agenda and eliminating those who deviated from the pro-Pakistan line, as tragically seen in the assassinations of Abdul Ghani Lone and Abdul Majid Dar. This control, however, also bred resentment and a desire for genuine autonomy among Kashmiris.

4. Delhi's Political Blunders and Missed Opportunities

The problem with Delhi has been that it sees everything in black and white, whereas Kashmir’s favourite colour is grey.

Rigid perceptions. Delhi's tendency to view Kashmir in simplistic terms—either pro-India or pro-Pakistan—often led to missed opportunities and alienated potential allies. This black-and-white approach failed to grasp the nuanced aspirations and complex loyalties of Kashmiris.

Betrayal of trust. Repeated instances of political maneuvering and broken promises eroded trust.

• Sheikh Abdullah's arrest in 1953, despite his role in Kashmir's accession to India, created a deep sense of betrayal.
• Farooq Abdullah's dismissal in 1984 and the subsequent withdrawal of the vice-presidency offer in 2002 further solidified the perception of Delhi's unreliability.

Ignoring local voices. Delhi often failed to empower or listen to mainstream Kashmiri leaders, instead preferring to deal with separatists or imposing its own solutions. This undermined the democratic process and strengthened the narrative that Kashmiris had no real agency in their own future.

5. The Abdullah Dynasty: Indispensable, Yet Often Betrayed

Without Farooq Abdullah there was no National Conference and in fact while he was away, the cabinet was pretty much dead except for one meeting in which no one knew what to do or what to decide.

Central to mainstream politics. The Abdullah family, particularly Sheikh Abdullah and his son Farooq, has been central to Kashmir's mainstream politics since 1947. Despite their complex relationship with Delhi, they consistently advocated for Kashmir's integration with India, often at great personal risk. Farooq, in particular, was seen as India's most reliable nationalist in Kashmir.

Repeated betrayals. Despite their loyalty, the Abdullahs faced repeated distrust and political machinations from Delhi.

• Sheikh Abdullah's long incarcerations after 1953.
• Farooq's dismissal in 1984 and the withdrawal of the Vice-Presidential offer in 2002.
  These actions fueled a deep-seated insecurity and bitterness, even as they continued to champion India's cause.

Generational shifts and challenges. Vajpayee's attempt to replace Farooq with his son Omar as Chief Minister, while well-intentioned, was another instance of Delhi's interference. Omar, though articulate and honest, struggled with ground realities and accessibility, leading to a "lost decade" for the NC and further disillusionment among Kashmiris.

6. Intelligence Beyond Espionage: Building Bridges in Kashmir

The business of intelligence is about sinners, not saints.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) focus. The author, particularly during his time heading the IB's Kashmir Group (K-group), emphasized building human relationships and engaging in dialogue with a wide spectrum of Kashmiris, including those on the periphery of militancy, jailed leaders, and active militants. This went beyond traditional counter-intelligence.

Selling peace through dialogue. The strategy involved:

• Cultivating relationships: Spending years talking to figures like Shabir Shah, Firdous Syed, and Abdul Ghani Lone.
• Understanding grievances: Listening to their complaints and disillusionment with Pakistan.
• Offering alternatives: Presenting a path towards peace and political participation within the Indian framework.

Ethical considerations and pragmatism. While acknowledging the use of money as an "effective tool" to win people over or neutralize adversaries, the author suggests it's more ethical and smarter than violence. The goal was to bring individuals "in from the cold" and shift the movement from violence to politics, even if it meant dealing with "sinners."

7. Turning Points: Kargil, 9/11, and the Electoral Shift

Pakistan’s misadventure in Kargil was an eye-opener for Kashmiris operating out of Pakistan, Majid Dar said.

Kargil's disillusionment. The Kargil War (1999) was a significant turning point, exposing Pakistan's cynical use of Kashmiris and its ultimate abandonment of them under international pressure. This led to widespread disillusionment among militants like Abdul Majid Dar, who realized Pakistan's priorities were not aligned with Kashmiri aspirations.

9/11's global impact. The 9/11 attacks (2001) and the subsequent US "War on Terror" forced Pakistan to align with the US, further diminishing its support for Kashmiri militancy. This global shift made Kashmiris realize that Pakistan could not protect itself, let alone liberate Kashmir, leading to a "parting of ways" between many Kashmiris and Pakistan.

2002 elections: A democratic milestone. The 2002 J&K Assembly elections, overseen by Vajpayee's government with a focus on fairness, were a crucial step towards mainstreaming. Despite initial reluctance from separatists and the assassination of Abdul Ghani Lone, the elections provided a democratic outlet, significantly weakening the militancy's political legitimacy and paving the way for future dialogue.

8. The Perilous Path of Kashmiri Moderates

Lone was martyred for being courageous and forthright. As a statesman he had the vision to move forward rather than being bogged down, not marking time.

Visionary leadership. Abdul Ghani Lone, a veteran politician within the Hurriyat, recognized the futility of violence and the need for a "dignified exit" for Kashmiris from the movement. He advocated for dialogue and a political solution, even confronting Pakistani ISI officials about their hidden agenda and the presence of foreign jihadis.

ISI's ruthless suppression. Lone's moderate stance and willingness to engage with Delhi made him a target for the ISI, which feared losing control over the separatist narrative. His assassination in 2002, along with other moderate voices like Mirwaiz Moulvi Farooq and Abdul Majid Dar, sent a chilling message: "never to cross the ISI."

Internal Hurriyat divisions. The ISI's manipulation also exacerbated internal divisions within the Hurriyat, particularly between moderates like the Mirwaiz and hardliners like Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Geelani, often seen as Pakistan's man in Kashmir, became a disruptive force, hindering any unified approach to dialogue and further marginalizing moderate voices.

9. Vajpayee's Vision vs. Manmohan Singh's Lost Decade

Pandit Nehru apart, the only other prime minister who modelled himself on Nehru and had the vision, time and inclination to devote himself to Kashmir was Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

Vajpayee's enlightened strategy. Vajpayee, a shrewd politician and statesman, adopted a "pure politics" approach to Kashmir, seeking to "cut the Gordian knot" through dialogue with both Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists. His initiatives, like the Lahore bus trip, the Ramzan ceasefire, and the "insaniyat ke dairey" speech, resonated deeply with Kashmiris and created a window for peace.

Agra Summit and its aftermath. Despite the failure of the Agra Summit (2001) with Pervez Musharraf, Vajpayee's willingness to engage even after Kargil demonstrated his commitment. The subsequent military mobilization (Operation Parakaram) and the successful 2002 J&K elections further strengthened India's position, setting the stage for Advani's talks with the Hurriyat.

Manmohan Singh's missed opportunity. Manmohan Singh, despite his sincerity and desire for peace, failed to capitalize on the momentum created by Vajpayee. His administration's "lost decade" was marked by:

• Lack of political will: Inability to follow up on dialogue with separatists or Pakistan.
• Bureaucratic inertia: Over-reliance on bureaucrats who often resisted bold initiatives.
• Internal party resistance: Opposition from within the Congress, as seen in the Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement controversy.
  This led to the collapse of Musharraf's four-point formula and a return to entrenched positions.

10. The Unaddressed Wounds: Pandits, Radicalism, and Identity

The Kashmiri psyche has been shaken up. The Pandit used to think that because he was more educated than the Musalman, he was the real Kashmiri. That is one clock that truly cannot be turned back.

Pandit exodus and return. The exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in 1990, driven by targeted killings and fear, remains an unhealed wound. While Kashmiri Muslims often express a desire for their return, practical solutions are elusive. Proposals for segregated "Pandit townships" are seen as artificial and potentially divisive, highlighting the deep-seated insecurities and communal tensions that persist.

Rising radicalism. The vacuum created by political instability and disillusionment has allowed radicalism, particularly Wahhabism, to spread in Kashmir, fueled by external funding. This poses a significant threat to the traditional Sufi-influenced "Kashmiriyat" and further complicates efforts at mainstreaming. The author notes the alarming increase in loudspeakers blaring for Friday prayers and the radicalizing environment within jails.

Identity and Article 370. Kashmiris harbor a deep-seated fear of being reduced to a minority in their homeland, which fuels their sensitivity towards issues like the abrogation of Article 370 (granting special status) and the increasing number of Amarnath Yatra pilgrims. These concerns underscore the ongoing struggle for identity and self-preservation within the Indian Union.

11. Spy vs. Spy: The Case for Intelligence Dialogue

What we do brazenly you achieve by stealth.

The need for direct engagement. Despite historical animosity and the ISI's pervasive influence, the author advocates for direct, institutionalized dialogue between Indian and Pakistani intelligence chiefs. He argues that intelligence agencies can facilitate non-attributable discussions that aid the political process, much like the CIA and KGB communicated during the Cold War.

Track Two diplomacy's insights. Post-retirement, the author actively participated in "track two" dialogues, which brought together retired intelligence officers from both countries. These informal meetings provided invaluable insights into the other side's thinking and helped build personal relationships, demonstrating the potential for official intelligence-to-intelligence engagement.

Overcoming skepticism. The author highlights India's reluctance to engage with perceived "ISI agents" or even the Taliban, contrasting it with the ISI's pragmatic approach of never giving up on a target. He argues that this skepticism is a missed opportunity, as even adversaries can be turned or neutralized through sustained engagement, ultimately benefiting India's strategic interests.