Counterinsurgency Warfare

1. Revolutionary War: A Battle for the Population

If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.

Political war. Revolutionary war fundamentally differs from conventional warfare; it's a political struggle for the allegiance of the population. While conventional wars focus on destroying enemy forces and seizing territory, revolutionary wars hinge on winning the hearts and minds of the people. The population becomes the central battleground, with both insurgents and counterinsurgents vying for their support, control, and mobilization.

Asymmetry of conflict. The insurgent, starting from a position of weakness, must grow stronger by gaining popular support. The counterinsurgent, initially possessing superior resources, risks decline if they fail to secure the population's backing. This asymmetry dictates that the insurgent must convert intangible assets (like a compelling cause) into concrete strength, while the counterinsurgent must prevent intangible liabilities (like unpopular policies) from eroding their tangible assets.

Unconventional warfare. Revolutionary war remains unconventional until the end, even when insurgents develop regular armies. Subversion and guerrilla activity continue to play a crucial role, leveraging the mobilized population to maintain fluidity and freedom of action. The population's active participation is a sine qua non for success, making it impossible for the counterinsurgent to achieve the same level of control.

2. Insurgency Prerequisites: A Cause and a Weak State

The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making trouble is an attractive cause, particularly in view of the risks involved and in view of the fact that the early supporters and the active supporters—not necessarily the same persons—have to be recruited by persuasion.

Cause and vulnerability. A successful insurgency requires two essential prerequisites: a compelling cause that resonates with the population and a weakness within the counterinsurgent state. The cause serves as the insurgent's initial asset, attracting supporters and providing a basis for mobilization. The weakness of the state, whether political, administrative, or military, creates the opportunity for the insurgency to take root and grow.

Strategic criteria. The best cause is one that attracts the largest number of supporters while repelling the fewest opponents. It should align with the majority's interests, be difficult for the counterinsurgent to co-opt, and be lasting. Problems of all natures are exploitable for an insurgency, provided the causes they lead to meet the above criteria.

Exploiting crisis. Insurgencies often arise during times of crisis, whether internal or external, that weaken the state. World War II, for example, created opportunities for colonial insurgencies. The insurgent cannot, of course, choose his opponent; he must accept him as he is. If he is confronted by a powerful counterinsurgent, he has no recourse but to wait until his opponent is weakened by some internal or external crisis.

3. The Orthodox Insurgency Pattern: A Gradual Ascent

This is the basic way followed and practiced in China by the Chinese people in winning victory.

Party building. The orthodox, Communist-inspired insurgency follows a structured, multi-stage approach. It begins with the creation of a disciplined, elite party, often drawing its initial leadership from intellectuals and students. This party serves as the vanguard of the revolution, guiding the movement through its various phases.

United front. The party then seeks to build a broad united front, rallying allies around a common cause. This involves appealing to diverse groups within society, from workers and peasants to the national bourgeoisie. The party must maintain its identity and control within the united front, using "salami tactics" to gradually eliminate unreliable allies.

Guerrilla warfare. The third step involves initiating guerrilla warfare in rural areas. The goal is not simply to inflict military damage but to organize the population, establish bases, and create a parallel government. The complicity of the population is key, achieved through a combination of persuasion, intimidation, and the elimination of opponents.

4. The Bourgeois-Nationalist Shortcut: Terrorism as a Catalyst

The precise and immediate aim of the initial core of insurgents, a dedicated but inevitably small group of men with no broad organization to back them, is to set up a revolutionary party rapidly.

Rapid mobilization. The bourgeois-nationalist pattern offers a shortcut to insurgency, relying on terrorism to rapidly mobilize support and create a revolutionary movement. This approach bypasses the slow, painstaking process of building a party and organizing a united front.

Blind and selective terrorism. The initial phase involves blind terrorism, aimed at generating publicity and attracting attention to the cause. This is followed by selective terrorism, targeting low-ranking government officials and others who maintain links between the state and the population.

Involving the population. The goal is to isolate the counterinsurgent from the masses, involve the population in the struggle, and obtain their passive complicity. This is achieved through assassinations, extortion, and the enforcement of simple rules, such as boycotts.

5. Counterinsurgency in the Cold War: Preemptive Political Action

The essential problem for the counterinsurgent stems from the fact that the actual danger will always appear to the nation as out of proportion to the demands made by an adequate response.

Dilemma of response. In the "cold" phase of a revolutionary war, the counterinsurgent faces a difficult dilemma: the actual danger appears out of proportion to the demands of an adequate response. The insurgent operates largely within the bounds of legality, making it difficult to justify repressive measures.

Direct vs. indirect action. The counterinsurgent can take direct action against insurgent leaders, but this risks alienating the population and providing a platform for the insurgent cause. Indirect action, aimed at addressing the underlying conditions that fuel the insurgency, is often more effective but requires long-term commitment and resources.

Infiltration and political machine. Infiltrating the insurgent movement can disrupt its operations and provide valuable intelligence. However, the most crucial step is to build or reinforce a political machine at the grass roots, capable of countering the insurgent's influence and winning the support of the population.

6. Counterinsurgency's Hot War Laws: Population Support is Key

The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.

Conventional warfare limits. Conventional military tactics, focused on destroying enemy forces and seizing territory, are often ineffective in revolutionary war. The insurgent is elusive, and simply clearing an area does not guarantee long-term control.

Active minority. Support is gained through an active minority. In any situation, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause. The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority.

Conditional support. Support from the population is conditional. The population will not actively support the counterinsurgent unless they feel safe and are convinced that the counterinsurgent has the will, means, and ability to win. This requires a convincing success early on and a commitment to long-term security.

7. Counterinsurgency Strategy: Clear, Hold, Build

To find the favorable minority, to organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority.

Step-by-step procedure. A successful counterinsurgency strategy involves a step-by-step procedure: clear an area of insurgents, hold it with static units, and then build political and economic institutions to win the support of the population. This requires a sustained commitment of resources and personnel.

Economy of force. The step-by-step approach allows for an economy of force, concentrating resources in a selected area while maintaining pressure on insurgents elsewhere. As an area is secured, forces can be transferred to neighboring areas, creating a snowball effect.

Irreversibility and initiative. The strategy aims to create irreversibility by establishing local leadership and self-defense units. It also seeks to regain the initiative from the insurgent, forcing them to react to the counterinsurgent's actions.

8. From Strategy to Tactics: Primacy of Political Command

A single boss must direct the operations from beginning until the end.

Single direction. Counterinsurgency requires a single direction, with a clear chain of command and coordinated efforts between civilian and military components. A single leader must direct operations from beginning to end, ensuring that all actions are aligned with the overall strategy.

Political primacy. The political power must be the undisputed boss, with the armed forces serving as one of many instruments. Giving the soldier authority over the civilian would thus contradict one of the major characteristics of this type of war. In practice, it would inevitably tend to reverse the relative importance of military versus political action and move the counterinsurgent’s warfare closer to a conventional one.

Adaptation of forces. The armed forces must be adapted to counterinsurgency warfare, with a focus on infantry, mobility, and intelligence gathering. Soldiers must be trained in civic action and political engagement, and the military structure must be reorganized to prioritize these skills.

9. The Operations: A Step-by-Step Approach

The operations during this step, being predominantly of a military nature, will inevitably cause some damage and destruction.

Clear and hold. The first step involves destroying or expelling insurgent forces from the selected area. The goal is to prepare the stage for further action, not necessarily to achieve complete military victory.

Contact and control. The second step involves deploying static units to establish contact with and control the population. This includes conducting a census, enforcing movement restrictions, and providing protection against insurgent attacks.

Destroy political cells. The third step involves destroying the insurgent political organization. This is a police operation, conducted by professionals, with a focus on leniency and rehabilitation.

Last updated: September 12, 2025