Code Warriors

1. The Post-War Pivot: From Axis to the "Russian Problem"

"Sooner or later they will inevitably try to break this, since they do not trust the Russians further than they could throw a steam-roller."

Wartime expansion. The U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) apparatus grew massively during WWII, with thousands of cryptologists and advanced machines like the Enigma bombes. Initially focused on Axis powers, the Army and Navy codebreakers began collecting Soviet diplomatic traffic from 1943, despite the USSR being an ally. This was driven by a post-Pearl Harbor directive to "get everything" and a growing distrust of Stalin.

Unbreakable codes. Early efforts against Soviet codes, particularly one-time pads, were largely unsuccessful, leading many to deem them "unbreakable." However, a Finnish intelligence leak and the sheer volume of intercepted traffic provided initial clues. The goal was to prepare for post-war negotiations, anticipating Soviet intentions.

Bureaucratic imperative. The decision to target Soviet communications was less about immediate threats and more about establishing a comprehensive, permanent intelligence-gathering system. Leaders like Alfred McCormack and Colonel Carter W. Clarke envisioned a post-war world where the U.S. needed "fullest intimate knowledge" of all nations, friends and foes alike, to secure its interests.

2. VENONA's Revelation: Unmasking Soviet Espionage

"It was the first substantial result from the three-year effort to break the Soviet diplomatic codes."

Gardner's breakthrough. Meredith Gardner, a linguist at Arlington Hall, made crucial progress in 1946 by breaking the spell table in the Soviet NKGB (KGB) "Jade" codebook. This allowed the decipherment of names and proper nouns, revealing Soviet cover names for agents and places like "TYRE" (New York City) and "ENORMOZ" (atomic bomb espionage).

Duplicate key blunder. The success of the VENONA project stemmed from a monumental Soviet security blunder: the reuse of one-time-pad pages, likely due to wartime printing disruptions. This created "depths" in the messages, allowing cryptanalysts to strip away the additive key and expose the underlying code groups.

Atomic spies exposed. The decrypted messages directly implicated Soviet agents in the Manhattan Project, including Klaus Fuchs (CHARLZ) and Julius Rosenberg (LIBERAL/ANTENNA), and high-level officials in the British, American, and Australian governments. This provided undeniable proof of extensive Soviet espionage, confirming suspicions that had been dismissed as McCarthyite hysteria.

3. The Cold War's Moral Murkiness: Secrecy and Plausible Deniability

"The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping."

Ethical dilemma. George Kennan warned that adopting totalitarian tactics to fight totalitarianism risked undermining America's democratic values. The creation of the CIA and its authorization for covert operations, including propaganda and subversion, introduced "plausible deniability" as a means to reconcile these contradictions.

Compromised truth. This strategy, however, led to a culture of official lies and secrecy, eroding public trust in government. The refusal to disclose VENONA's findings to the public, courts, or even the President, allowed figures like Senator McCarthy to exploit fears of communist infiltration with unsubstantiated claims.

Self-perpetuating secrecy. The need to conceal morally dubious actions led to ever-greater secrecy, insulating intelligence agencies from democratic accountability. This created a "moral black hole" where the means often overshadowed the ends, fostering cynicism and disillusionment among the populace.

4. Digital Dawn: Computers Transform Cryptanalysis

"This is just absolutely ideal for our business. It’s better for our business than it is for the mathematicians."

Pendergrass's vision. Lieutenant Commander James Pendergrass, after attending the world's first computer course in 1946, recognized the digital computer's potential for cryptanalysis. Its speed, flexibility, and ability to manipulate discrete data were perfectly suited for tasks like searching for key repetitions and statistical analysis.

NSA's early patronage. The Navy, through Engineering Research Associates (ERA), commissioned the "Atlas" computer, while the Army Security Agency (ASA) developed "Abner." These early machines, like ERA's magnetic drum memory and Abner's "Swish" streaming function, pioneered specialized architectures for cryptanalytic mass data processing.

Beyond IBM. While IBM punch card machines were adapted for cryptanalysis, they were "improvisations." The new digital computers offered a leap in capability, performing complex statistical tests and exhaustive searches far beyond manual or electromechanical means, though programming them for specific cipher attacks remained a significant challenge.

5. Bureaucratic Battles: The Struggle for SIGINT Control

"The entire attempt to effect 'coordination' through such an ungainly mechanism was 'totally useless.'"

Fragmented authority. Post-WWII, the U.S. SIGINT structure was plagued by inter-service rivalries, with the Army, Navy, and Air Force each maintaining separate cryptologic agencies. The Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), created in 1949, failed to centralize control, leading to duplication and inefficiency.

"Information" vs. "Intelligence." A semantic fiction persisted that SIGINT agencies only provided "information" (translations), not "intelligence" (analysis). This artificial separation hindered comprehensive analysis and allowed other agencies like CIA to claim primary analytical roles, often without full understanding of the source.

NSA's creation. The Brownell Committee's scathing 1952 report led to AFSA's replacement by the National Security Agency (NSA), intended to unify and centralize SIGINT. However, the military services retained significant autonomy, continuing turf battles over intercept sites, ELINT, and analytical roles, often to the detriment of overall intelligence effectiveness.

6. The Codebreaker's Dilemma: Brains Versus Bugs

"No national strategy should be based on the hope or expectation that we will be able to read high-level Soviet encrypted traffic in the near future."

Unbreakable Soviet ciphers. After "Black Friday" in 1948, Soviet high-level military and diplomatic codes became virtually impenetrable, largely due to improved one-time-pad usage and sophisticated machines like the Fialka. This challenged NSA's traditional cryptanalytic methods, despite massive investments in computers.

The "direct approach." Faced with cryptanalytic dead ends, the focus shifted to physical infiltration and technical surveillance. The Berlin Tunnel, a joint CIA-SIS operation, tapped into Soviet landlines, yielding invaluable intelligence. The "Great Seal bug," designed by Léon Theremin, demonstrated Soviet prowess in covert electronic eavesdropping.

TEMPEST and side channels. The discovery of "side channel" emissions from cryptographic equipment (TEMPEST) revealed vulnerabilities that could expose plaintext. This led to a massive program to develop shielding and masking technologies, highlighting that even "unbreakable" ciphers could be compromised by exploiting physical characteristics.

7. Spy Scandals: Self-Inflicted Wounds of Secrecy

"The publicity attending the arrest and prosecution of Petersen has very materially increased the already damaging aggregate of information in the public file on the nature and extent of the U.S. COMINT effort in general."

Petersen's betrayal. Joseph S. Petersen Jr., an NSA cryptanalyst, spied for the Netherlands for a decade, revealing U.S. cryptanalytic capabilities and the weaknesses of Hagelin machines. NSA's subsequent cover-up and refusal to disclose the full extent of the damage exacerbated the scandal.

Martin and Mitchell. The 1960 defection of NSA cryptomathematicians William Martin and Bernon Mitchell to the USSR exposed NSA's existence, its global surveillance of allies, and provocative ELINT missions. The agency's response focused on discrediting the defectors, leading to a "nest of sexual deviates" smear campaign and intrusive polygraph policies.

Dunlap and Walker. Later moles like Jack Dunlap (who sold NSA documents for luxury items) and John Walker (who provided KL-47 cipher keys for 16 years) highlighted the failures of NSA's internal security, particularly its overreliance on unreliable polygraphs and its tendency to ignore obvious behavioral red flags.

8. SIGINT in Hot Wars: Lessons Learned and Forgotten

"Very few commanders had any training in SIGINT. In the 1950s it had been kept closeted, a strategic resource suitable only for following such esoteric problems as Soviet nuclear weapons development."

Korean War successes. In Korea, NSA's ability to read North Korean plaintext and low-level codes provided crucial tactical intelligence, saving UN forces from annihilation at Pusan. However, General MacArthur's "SIGINT blindness" led him to ignore warnings of Chinese intervention, resulting in a disastrous military setback.

Vietnam's challenges. In Vietnam, early efforts to use direction-finding (DF) against guerrillas were hampered by jungle terrain and South Vietnamese military incompetence. Later, NSA's Iron Horse system provided real-time warnings of MiGs, significantly improving U.S. air-to-air kill ratios.

Communication security failures. Despite SIGINT successes, U.S. forces in Vietnam suffered from poor communication security. Plain-language voice transmissions and predictable operational patterns gave North Vietnam ample warning of bombing missions, highlighting a persistent failure to apply lessons from previous conflicts.

9. Eyes in the Sky: The Rise of Satellite Surveillance

"The satellite, built by the Naval Research Laboratory, was the first attempt to take signals interception into space."

GRAB's pioneering role. The 1960 launch of GRAB (Galactic Radiation and Background) marked the beginning of space-based SIGINT. This small satellite, ostensibly for cosmic radiation research, secretly collected radar signals from Soviet air defenses, demonstrating the potential for unimpeded, global surveillance.

Overcoming limitations. Satellites offered a revolutionary advantage, providing line-of-sight coverage for microwave and UHF signals from remote areas, overcoming the limitations of ground stations and dangerous ferret flights. Geostationary satellites later enabled continuous monitoring of key Soviet missile and space facilities.

Bureaucratic space race. The development of satellite SIGINT was fraught with interagency rivalries, with the Navy, Air Force, and CIA all launching their own programs. Despite NSA's mandate, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was created to centralize control, with NSA often relegated to receiving the "product" rather than directing collection.

10. The Crypto AG Deception: Undermining Allied Security

"The company had decided it would produce the Telecrypto machines in three different versions. Outwardly they would appear more or less identical, but in fact they would incorporate varying levels of security."

Hagelin's "gentleman's agreement." NSA cultivated a secret relationship with Boris Hagelin, the Swedish inventor of widely used cipher machines. This "Boris deal" ensured that Hagelin's most secure devices were sold only to NATO allies, while less secure versions, potentially with backdoors, were marketed to "friendly neutral countries" and those "leaning toward the USSR."

Compromised commercial systems. This arrangement, later revealed through a Crypto AG salesman's accusations, meant that NSA could potentially read the communications of dozens of nations using Hagelin's machines. It raised serious ethical questions about involving private companies in intelligence deception and the risks to their unwitting employees.

Friedman's doubts. Even William Friedman, the "Dean of American Cryptology," expressed growing unease about the ethics of such activities. He questioned the compatibility of covert intelligence with democratic ideals, foreshadowing the later public reckoning with NSA's practices.

11. The Cost of Impunity: Secrecy's Erosion of Trust

"Everything secret degenerates."

Organizational sclerosis. By the 1970s, NSA suffered from severe bureaucratic inertia, inefficiency, and a culture of insular secrecy. This led to slow decision-making, poor management, and a disconnect between its vast workforce and its core mission.

Unchecked power. Louis Tordella, NSA's long-serving deputy director, wielded immense, unchecked power, controlling information flow and insulating the agency from external scrutiny. This fostered a "paranoid" and "untrustworthy" management culture, as noted by external reviews.

Watergate's aftermath. The Watergate scandal forced unprecedented public and congressional scrutiny on U.S. intelligence. NSA's "Shamrock" program (bulk collection of international telegrams) and "Minaret" (domestic surveillance of anti-war activists and critics) were exposed, leading to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, which for the first time imposed statutory limits on NSA's activities and mandated oversight.

12. SIGINT's Enduring Verdict: A Silent Victory

"The greatest victory was not getting the world blown up along the way so that it was possible for the peaceful end to come when it at last did."

Preventing nuclear war. NSA's most crucial, yet invisible, Cold War achievement was providing minute-by-minute assurance of Soviet military movements and missile launches. This tactical warning capability reduced the risk of surprise attack and averted runaway escalation during crises like Suez and Cuba, playing an incalculable role in preventing nuclear war.

Tactical battlefield support. The agency's ability to rapidly process and disseminate enemy radar tracking data to U.S. fighter aircraft in Korea and Vietnam significantly improved combat effectiveness. This laid the groundwork for modern SIGINT support to troops, a legacy that matured in later conflicts.

Flaws and contradictions. Despite its successes, NSA's Cold War history was marked by profound miscalculations, bureaucratic infighting, and ethical compromises. The "Ultra Syndrome"—overreliance on SIGINT—and the fiction of "information" over "intelligence" led to distorted analyses and a lack of accountability, ultimately eroding public trust.

Last updated: November 28, 2025